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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
AN ECCLESIOLOGY FOR THE NARTHEX?
And do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the 
renewing of your mind, that you may prove what is that good and 
acceptable and perfect will of God.
Romans 12:2
 The narthex is a liminal space, if, indeed, it is a space at all. It is neither the church nor 
the world, but both places at once. It is where we “leave the world behind” as we walk into 
church, and where we pick it up again on our way out.1 Of course, we never really leave the 
world behind. Christians do not stop being Americans or consumers or political party members 
or employees when they walk into church. In and of itself this fact would pose no problem for 
discipleship were it not for some sense that we are supposed to be “different,” at least if we take 
Paul seriously. 
 Often, however, the nature of modern American society (my context) renders obedience 
to the biblical command to be not-conformed an act of tragic irony. Once upon a time, the church 
was a minority religion, a persecuted sect standing against the devil’s proxy (Rome) and its idols. 
Back then, it was possible to be not-conformed because one could lean on other members of a 
1
1 I am going to make what some might consider a rather bold move in academic theological parlance and sometimes 
refer to the church in first person. By opting for this designation I do not intend to say something about what should 
be the religious affiliation of my readers. It is, rather, that I cannot help but refer to the church in this way. As David 
Tracy says, the theologian’s vocation is normed by the internal coordination of three publics: society, the academy, 
and the church. Though I am in the academy, and probably should write like it, as an ecclesial theologian, I am 
ineluctably formed by the people in the pews next to me. Therefore I use the first person to foreground the people 
for whom I work and to live into what I aspire to be. I have three publics, but I want my primary public to be the 
church. See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 4-46.
tight-knit community for support (being hyper-eschatological certainly helped, as well, because it  
is easier to risk the world for Jesus when he is about to end it). Once upon a time, nationality, 
economy, and politics were imbued with the spirit of Christ, at least officially. Then, too, it was 
possible to be not-conformed because everything, in theory, was already transformed. But now? 
Now we are ineluctably secular, and religiously plural. (This new problem for the church is 
especially pronounced in my context, where Christianity – baptized in the waters of nationalism 
– has long been the half-official religion of the United States.) We no longer know how to be 
Christian as we struggle to figure out where modern, American secularism ends and faith begins. 
We no longer know how to be Christian as more of us negotiate faith like we negotiate 
everything else in life, through discrete acts of purchase.2 We no longer know how to be 
Christian because there are no more tight-knit communities, except maybe for those that 
withdraw completely from the world. We no longer know how to be Christian because we are 
often not even “officially” religious; if we are born into a religion, we can always opt for another 
one that suits us better. Now more than ever, faith – like everything else – is something each of 
us has to figure out for ourself. The narthex needs an ecclesiology because we are a people of the 
narthex, not just church or world, but both at once. 
 In the following pages, I am going to be talking a lot about the narthex, a metaphor that 
indicates the way that we negotiate between sacred loyalties and secular inevitabilities in our 
modern society. In proposing an ecclesiology for the narthex, I am obviously not going to 
2
2 For this point, I am indebted to David Dault’s recent dissertation, which argues, among other things, that since the 
interpretation of the Bible is shaped as much by the secondary material surrounding most Bibles (such as 
commentary, cover art, and market demographic) as the “actual text” (which, Dault says, there is none), Bible 
printers and Christian retailers amount to a “covert magisterium” in Protestantism (and I would point out, to a lesser 
extent in any religion insofar as it is a recognized “market”), inescapably forming our interpretation of the “Bible” 
beneath all that extra material. David Dault, “The Covert Magisterium: Theology, Textuality and the Question of 
Scripture” (Dissertation, Vanderbilt, 2009). 
develop an entire ecclesiology, nor am I suggesting that the totality of the church is located in the 
narthex. I will use the term to indicate the way that Christians today often feel themselves 
“caught in the middle,” but I will say more on this in a moment. 
 An ecclesiology for the narthex concerns itself with how to be church in a world where 
we are ineluctably shaped by and inevitably support (by shopping, paying taxes, watching 
television, etc.) that which, by definition, is not Christian. Thus, in the following pages I attempt 
to develop a constructive, limited ecclesiology that tries to bring together what it means to be 
unavoidably secular with what it means to be faithfully Christian. I do this by re-imagining a 
defunct political theology, called symphonia, for our modern context. I call it ecclesial 
symphonia to distinguish it from its Byzantine forebear, as a way to account for how the disciple 
relates sacred loyalties to secular inevitabilities in a way that is consistent with the being and 
mission of the church. Symphonia can help us be church today because it resists engaging society 
as one institution to another. For Byzantium and, I will argue, for us (though, obviously, in a 
modified way) the church is the body of Christ extended into its institutions, working the 
kingdom of God into them. In other words, this essay transforms symphonia from a political 
ideal into an ecclesiology of conditional engagement with secular society on the basis of its 
proleptic realization of the kingdom of God.
Ecclesial Presuppositions
 Before developing the above thesis I need to say a word about the presuppositions I bring 
to it. Though such prolegomena are normally the stuff of full systematic theologies, the benefit of 
a brief foray into some of the biases I bring to the table can help serve even this partial and 
3
limited ecclesiology. Namely, it can help keep things concise by preventing my later argument 
from doubling back upon itself in digressions to answer questions singly that can here be 
addressed all at once. Because the subject of this essay is ecclesiology, I limit the following brief 
set of presuppositions to the church.
The Significance of the Church
 Everything I have said so far reveals several biases I have about the church. The first bias 
relates to my church affiliation, which I mention because it will shine some light on the way I 
develop my argument, with an eye toward Christian practice (it is also important for an ecclesial 
theologian to be upfront about such things). I happen to be Orthodox, but I am not doing 
Orthodox ecclesiology in any narrow, partisan way. The following account presumes certain 
conventions of Orthodox worship (e.g. eucharistic practice) and theology (e.g. eucharistic 
doctrine), broadly speaking, but it also self-consciously ecumenical. An ecclesial theologian 
always writes out from within her particular community, even if what she says is for the whole 
church. 
 My second bias (which is closely related to biases three through five below) is that I 
presume the church is important, but I do not presume one church is inherently “more important” 
than any other. The most important church for the singular Christian is the one of which she is a 
part. Though the Christian’s ultimate loyalty is to Jesus Christ, he is never known apart from his 
body, which we broadly encounter in a community of disciples. Also, this emphasis on the 
catholic body of saints requires the church to question its own “identity.” The emphasis I place 
on ecclesial identity will become particularly important as I develop an account of symphonia for 
4
the contemporary church in the proceeding pages. When I refer to ecclesial identity, I mean that 
the very nature of the church enjoins it to reflect upon what it is and what is its place in the 
world. That does not mean there is something like a uniform Christian identity or culture that 
makes Christians a uniquely recognizable social group. In a way, the fact that we ask questions 
about identity and context are more important than the answers.3 We do have an aspirational 
center in our reception of Jesus Christ from the scripture and tradition that sets limits both on the 
questions we are given to ask and the range of answers the community deems acceptable. 
Ecclesial identity refers to a shared task to relate this center to new social contexts in our 
particular communities. Thus my fourth bias is that, for Christians, the church takes priority. At 
baptism we bind ourselves not to blind obedience to an hierarchical authority, but to heed the 
wisdom of our sisters and brothers before all others. Another way to put this bias is to say that 
the church is “a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation” (1 Pet. 2.9); the church is 
5
3 Though I do not agree with all of her conclusions, Kathryn Tanner helpfully construes Christian identity as 
awareness of internal diversity within a broad range of “acceptable” Christianity. I am particularly indebted to her 
criticisms of postliberal theology. Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology, Guides to 
Theological Inquiry (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 93ff.
not incidental to helping us live out the teachings of Jesus.4 The church needs to think about its 
identity because of a final bias, one that is the primary motive force of this essay. I believe the 
mission of the church is to change the world. Specifically, our mission is to prepare the world to 
receive the kingdom of God in the eschaton; understanding its place in the world is essential for 
the church to fulfill this mission. Therefore, the rationale for this bias (for not all biases are 
without reason) needs to be addressed further, below. 
The Significance of the Kingdom
 Though talk of “changing the world” sounds like half-a-lyric to a bad Christian pop song 
(quaint at best and naive at worst), it is a modern way of expressing the raison d'être of the early 
church. Now is not the place for an extended discussion of messianology, but as Jürgen 
6
4 Unless otherwise stated, all translations come from the NKJV. I am aware that this translation has some serious 
shortcomings. In the first place, its rendering of passages does not always reflect the most current biblical 
scholarship. In the second place, it defaults to gender-exclusive terminology when gender-neutral terminology 
would be just as acceptable. The NRSV is the preferred translation among academics for biblical exegesis. It reflects 
the most current scholarship, and it, laudably, defaults to gender-inclusive terminology whenever it does not obscure 
the intent of the text. Thus, in the New Testament, adelphoi is rendered “brothers and sisters,” because obviously the 
author was not only addressing the males in the group. True as that may be, however, I do worry that obscuring the 
sexism present in the Bible and its language may keep us from confronting it, not to mention that the translations of 
some passages depart a little too much from the more literal meaning of the Greek text. (For instance, the NKJV 
renders Philippians 2:13 as follows: “for it is God who works in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure.” 
That translation sticks fairly closely to the Greek: “qe!s g"r #stin $ #nerg%n #n &m'n ka( t! q)lein ka( t! 
#nerge'n &p*r t+s e,dok-as. The NRSV, on the other hand, injects a fair amount of commentary into a 
potentially objectionable passage, which reads “for it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to 
work for his good pleasure.”) Of course, those issues are secondary to my main reasons for opting for the NKJV. In 
the first place, this essay only engages in something like biblical exegesis once (barely, and then I opt for the RSV). 
Instead, I tend to use scripture as poetic gloss or to refer the reader to an idea contained in a particular passage. 
When invoking the Bible in this way, it seems more appropriate to preserve something of the wording with which an 
American audience is more familiar. The theological evocations John 3:16 is able to muster are diminished when 
“begotten” is dropped from the verse. For this same reason, I sometimes use the KJV over the NKJV. Subsequent 
biblical references are not prooftexts as much as invocations of entire theological concepts or even acts of doxology. 
In the second place, the NKJV is becoming the translation of my American Orthodox tradition for reasons that have 
as much to do with marketing “accidents” as with the way it parallels certain passages of the liturgy (the NKJV is 
the translation of the Orthodox Study Bible, which is slowly working its way into more and more homes of Orthodox 
Christians, especially converts from evangelical traditions, like me; this edition of the Bible is published by Thomas 
Nelson, which owns the rights to the NKJV and is headed by an Orthodox Christian). In the same way that some 
theologians opt for the KJV, NASB, or NIV, defaulting to the NKJV is my way of standing in solidarity with my 
particular Christian communion.
Moltmann has noted, the self-understanding of the church as the body of Christ is inseparable 
from the biblical witness to the hope of Israel.5 To be Christian, as Paul said, is to be “grafted in” 
to Israel’s story, and thus to share Israel’s messianic hope (Romans 11:17). The first disciples 
followed Jesus because they saw this hope in him. This is what it means for Jesus Christ to be the 
Messiah; he is the bringer of that hope and this hope incarnate. This hope is expressed in Israel’s 
prophets. As Amos said, Israel (and so the church) hopes for a world where “justice roll[s] on 
like a river, righteousness like a never failing stream” (5:21-25). One must always be careful 
when making broad pronouncements about biblical themes. There are always exceptions. 
Nevertheless, according to John G. Gammie, the prophetic witness, in all its variation, is 
remarkably consistent in its understanding about God’s standard of righteousness that the 
kingdom would bring. This witness focuses on what we call social justice.6 Thus Isaiah says, 
“Cease to do evil, Learn to do good; Seek justice, Rebuke the oppressor; Defend the fatherless, 
Plead for the widow” (1:16b-17). 
 Though I will say more about the following point in a later chapter, a brief word about 
how I understand the church to relate to Jesus Christ’s embodiment of God’s reign will help 
illuminate my constructive argument. The church is the community called to embody God’s 
righteousness in its remembrance of Jesus. The church is not the kingdom, but it is invited to be a 
foretaste of the kingdom in the present. Jesus announced the kingdom of God in himself when he 
stood in his home synagogue and, in his first recorded public sermon, read from Isaiah (61:1-2; 
Luke 4:18-19), 
7
5 Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, trans., Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 1-37. Jürgen Moltmann, Jesus Christ for Today's World, trans., Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 7.
6 Of course Gammie’s particular claims are far more nuanced. John G. Gammie, Holiness in Israel (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1989), 71-124.
The Spirit of the LORD is upon Me,
Because He has anointed Me
To preach the gospel to the poor;
!!!!!!He has sent Me to heal the brokenhearted,
!!!To proclaim liberty to the captives
And recovery of sight to the blind,
!To set at liberty those who are oppressed;
!!!!!To proclaim the acceptable year of the LORD.
He concluded his reading with the simple words, “Today this Scripture is fulfilled in your 
hearing” (21). There is some speculation that Jesus had announced the beginning of the biblical 
Jubilee, a biblical prescription for debt forgiveness and regular redistribution of wealth and 
resources (indeed, much of the above passage does focus on economic issues – the poor and 
possible reference to those in debtors’ prison).7 Whether or not that is the case, though, Jesus had 
announced the beginning of a new order. Consistent with the theme of his Mother in the 
Magnificat, “He has put down the mighty from their thrones, And exalted the lowly. He has filled 
the hungry with good things, And the rich He has sent away empty” (Luke 1:52-53). All present 
that day understood Jesus’ meaning. The congregation was filled with awe (albeit briefly) 
because “Joseph’s son” had just announced the beginning of God’s reign in himself (4:22). 
 M. Douglas Meeks draws attention to the political themes of the kingdom of God by 
describing it as the “reign of God’s righteousness,” which refers to the power of God for 
abundant life over death – the fullness of human flourishing.8 Like nearly every other Jew, Jesus 
and his followers knew the the kingdom of God was a new, egalitarian social order. Zealots 
flocked to Jesus (see Luke 6:15), and Rome rightly feared him as a political agitator because the 
reign he announced was a threat to the hierarchical and oppressive society of Rome. The 
8
7 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 19-22. John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, 2nd ed. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 21ff.
8 M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1989), 77, passim.
language of righteousness implies not only a new social order but an aspiration. The biblical term 
– !"#$"%&'() – implies being conformed to a new divine standard. In a manner of speaking, we 
are called to embody the kingdom in anticipation of its final arrival (a theme I will return to 
later). As Jesus Christ is the firstfruits of the resurrection, we might say that the church is the 
firstfruits of the kingdom of God. This means the church aspires to the righteousness prophesied 
by Amos and the egalitarianism pronounced by Isaiah. As John Howard Yoder says, this does not 
mean the church is the kingdom. Rather, “The believing body is the image that the new world – 
which in the light of the ascension and Pentecost is on the way – casts ahead of itself. The 
believing body of Christ is the world on the way to its renewal; the church is the part of the 
world that confesses the renewal to which all the world is called.”9 
 This call to embody God’s righteousness implies not perfection but the struggle toward a 
goal, and it speaks to the particular universal quality of symphonia to be discussed later. The 
church has gravitas. Like a large celestial body, its faithfulness to Jesus’ teaching about the 
kingdom has a way of bending the fabric of reality toward that which is the source of its own life 
and the reason of its own existence. The kingdom makes the church what it is. Without it, we 
would not exist. Insofar as it lives into the reality of this kingdom, the church brings the world 
with it. 
 Now is not the place to run down a list of the teachings of Jesus and to explain how the 
church lives into them (of course, the kingdom is more than what Jesus said but also who he is). I 
have broadly described what I presume the kingdom of God to entail as essential background, so 
that the reader may have a sense of what I mean when I use the term, particularly that I do not 
9
9 John Howard Yoder, Body Politics: Five Practices of the Christian Community before the Watching World 
(Schottdale, PA: Herald, 1992), 78.
mean “heaven” or anything else ethereal. The kingdom of God is concrete. Nevertheless, in the 
context of this essay, the concrete content of the kingdom is secondary to the recognition of its 
presence. I am focusing not on what the kingdom is but where it is. Naturally, knowing where 
something is requires knowing what it looks like, but drawing a map is not the same thing as 
drawing a portrait. This essay is a map. I invite us to locate the kingdom of God – our 
commitment to which makes us Christian – in the intersection of our ecclesial commitments and 
secular inevitabilities. In other words, where is the kingdom of God where faith happens in the 
everyday life of the believer?
The Significance of the Secular
 Finally, I need to say a word about the way I understand the secular to present a particular 
challenge to the practice of the Christian faith. Because I am more concerned with the way that 
living in the secular divides our loyalties and our world-views, I will not be spending a great deal 
of time analyzing, deconstructing, or developing genealogies of the origins of the secular and its 
implications for the church. Not only would that distract from this essay’s focus on practice, but 
it would also “remake the wheel.” Analyses of the secular are the regular stock and trade of 
modern theology. My intent is, modestly, to account for the presence of the secular in the church 
and the church of the secular. 
 Still, given that intent, it would help to know what I intend this term to indicate in the 
context of this essay. Broadly, I intend it in the biblical sense of “the world,” both in its positive 
and negative connotations (like we find in the prologue of John and the writings of Paul, 
respectively). Technically, secular is a time-word. It once referred to the time we live in before 
10
the arrival of the eschaton. Modern “secularism” is more complicated. It refers to a whole 
“disenchanted” way of looking at life, in the language of Taylor, where belief in supernatural 
things like God, the saints, the angels, and the eucharist – all the stuff of traditional faith – have 
to be justified and explained.10 Taylor’s description is accurate, as well as what I take to be his 
implication that some developments in the secular were positive, others negative.
 My concern however is not with the secular as an abstract concept but an experience. 
Two children of the secular I keep in mind in the following pages are the state and the market. I 
also have in mind what we might call a general historic worldview – the understanding that 
modern societies see themselves and the world differently than people did in the past. When I use 
the word secular or secularism in the following pages, I presume the way these forces influence 
our thinking and our behavior, often without our knowing it. Secular thus refers to the narratives 
we absorb, both passively and actively, from living in a modern society, especially as they are 
provided to us by state and market forces under a notion of historic “progress.” Such influences 
are not inherently problematic, but they can challenge what, for lack of a better term, we might 
call a “biblical worldview” in some troublesome ways. For instance, in modern, secular politics 
individuals are seen to possess certain “inalienable” rights. These rights are a good thing. People 
should be free to believe and express themselves as they wish. However, the rights of an 
individual are not identical to the dignity that comes as a creature made in the image of God. 
Rights-talk tends to define people in an exclusionary way, so that legal disputes get sorted out by 
weighing how the actions of one individual violated the autonomy of another (whether the 
movement of his hand violated the integrity of my nose, etc.). Individuals with rights are not 
11
10 By which I mean that saying, “God did it,” is no longer an acceptable explanation for scientific phenomena or 
socio-political events. Charles Taylor covers the rise of secularism in his intellectually (and actually) hefty book, 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007), 300 and passim. 
called to be inherently open, loving, or responsible to others, whereas seeing people as imago 
Dei puts individuals in infinite series of obligations to each other. My intention in pointing out 
this difference is not to make a case for one against the other. Rights-talk can exist within an 
imago Dei framework. The point is that we often do not reflect upon this difference anymore 
than we think about what it means to be a market demographic or a product of evolutionary 
forces, and so on. My point is not opposition, only influence and the need to reflect upon it. 
 Therefore, though I sometimes use the word secular and world interchangeably – 
especially as I develop an account of Christ, cosmos, and history in the constructive portion of 
this essay – I often opt for the former term to impress upon us the fact that we have been 
irrevocably shaped by the Enlightenment and its legacy. I use secular to remind us that our world 
is different from the world of Paul or John and to foreground the forces I mentioned above. 
Though our context is not more complicated than that of the first century church, it is more 
complex, and these complexities – the concepts of individual rights, democracy, the market, 
human autonomy, mechanism, science, and so on that we take for granted every day – requires a 
novel approach to dealing with our world. In sum, I am not focusing on the secular itself, but 
with its influence upon us – the way it inhabits the church by inhabiting us – with or without our 
knowledge, a phenomenon of interpenetration I, again, refer to as the narthex.
The Development of Ecclesial Symphonia
 This limited ecclesiology thus attempts to develop an account of the church-world limen 
in the heart of the believer that helps her reconcile the competition between secular inevitabilities 
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and sacred loyalties.11 That is why the development of my argument will focus more on issues of 
efficacy than logic. Not that my argument will be illogical, but I will not always claim that A or 
B is true because of x, y, and z logical principles. Such an argument would require the 
architectural support of an entire systematic theology. Instead, my strategy in this essay is to 
make sure that the points I make are internally consistent, and that the structure I build with them 
works – that it offers a functional account of the church-world limen. Naturally, this implies that 
some narthexical ecclesiologies do not work, which brings us to the the first two chapters of my 
argument, proper. 
 My argument is divided into two parts. Chapters two and three are analytical. There I 
identify a set of problems to which my constructive chapters (four through six) propose a 
solution. Thus, chapter two offers a couple of dysfunctional ecclesiologies as a joint critical foil 
to my overall constructive aims. I argue that an ecclesiology that sees the secular as the, ipso 
facto, “enemy” or “problem” for the church leads to a cognitively dissonant discipleship. I 
recognize that term carries certain psychological baggage, but I use it here in its most general 
(least discipline-specific) sense to refer to inconsistency between belief and practice. Naturally, 
all of us, to some extent, fail to live up to our statements about the church. Within the context of 
this essay, however, Christian cognitive dissonance refers to a tendency among some theologians 
and their adherents to insist upon the primacy of the church for the formation of Christian 
personhood and Christian practice, without  developing a concomitant ecclesiological account 
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11 The term limen can connote a threshold or a boundary. Were I talking about a church/world limen, I would be 
indicating a separation between the two terms (church and world). However, this term unites church and world with 
a hyphen. Paired with the concept of a limen, it thus acknowledges the fact of their merger while recognizing a 
difference between the two: The church and world are united but distinct in their union. Another way to think about 
this is with a psychological analogy. In psychology a limen refers to a threshold below which a stimulus cannot be 
experienced. We may think of a church-world limen as a place where church and world stimulate each other. While 
we recognize a conceptual difference between these two stimuli, we cannot separate one from the other in our actual 
experience. 
for the fact that we are not only shaped by secular culture, but also support it. Christian 
cognitive dissonance is a kinder, gentler way of saying “accidental hypocrisy.” I make this case 
by establishing a conceptual range between two extremes of what I dub “postliberal 
ecclesiology,” by which I mean ecclesiologies that replicate in some way the intratextualism of 
George Lindbeck. On the one hand, there is the ecclesial sectarianism of Stanley Hauerwas, 
which develops a vision of the church as an “alternative” to modern secularism, as well as 
“secularized” churches. On the other hand, we have the ecclesial triumphalism of John Milbank, 
which desires the establishment of a renewed Christendom through the visible church’s conquest 
of secular thought and, with it, secular institutions. Both would object to my description of their 
work as “sectarian” and “triumphalist,” respectively, but I am not the first to raise these 
accusations. 
 At this point, I need to pause and say a word about my use of the term “postliberal” in 
this essay. The term suggests an allegiance to so-called Yale theology. It might rightly describe 
Hauerwas, who studied at Yale, but I have never seen this term applied directly to Milbank. For 
that reason, in the course of writing this essay, I experimented with a number of terminological 
alternatives to it. John Bowlin has recently hinted at affinities between Milbank and Hauerwas 
similar to those I identify below. His term “hyper-Augustinian” was attractive, but only for a 
moment.12 It is true that Milbank and Hauerwas have similar readings of Augustine. So the 
advantage of this term is in the way it points to an affinity between the two without all the Yale v. 
Chicago semantic baggage of “postliberalism.” However, I will argue that Milbank and 
Hauerwas misuse and misread Augustine, and I invoke the good bishop of Hippo against them. 
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12 J. Bowlin, “Just Democracy, Just Church: Hauerwas and Coles on Radical Democracy and Christianity,” Scottish 
Journal of Theology 64, no. 1 (2010): 82.
“Hyper-” suggests the opposite, that Milbank and Hauerwas are very Augustinian. So for me to 
call them “hyper-Augustinian” would only confuse the issue. Not to suggest that Milbank and 
Hauerwas are heretics, but, as an analogy, calling them hyper-Augustinian would be a bit like 
calling Mani hyper-Christian, and my conscience will not abide such abuse of the good bishop. 
In his recent book The Trial of the Witnesses, Paul DeHart does suggest a greater degree of 
harmony between Milbank and Lindbeck than some might immediately recognize (I make a 
similar point later).13 Therefore, it does not seem out of the question for me to apply the term 
“postliberal” broadly to both figures. Not unlike Bowlin’s “hyper-Augustinianism,” I use it not to 
be terminologically precise but to illustrate some conceptual affinities between Lindbeck, 
Milbank, and Hauerwas. Thus, in the context of Milbank and Hauerwas’ ecclesiologies, the term 
“postliberalism” intends to be little more than broad theological shorthand to indicate their 
critical posture toward liberal theology and replication of a certain aspect of Lindbeck’s 
methodology applied to the church. 
 My intent in the second chapter is not necessarily to show absolute dependence upon 
Lindbeck so much as conceptual parallels. Insofar as their ecclesiologies replicate Lindbeck’s 
method, Milbank and Hauerwas are subject to some of the same critiques leveled against 
Lindbeck, namely a false “unidirectionality” he posits between culture and the text that allegedly 
absorbs it. As others have noted, the relationship is not so simple. Text and culture interpret each 
other. Likewise, the relationship between the church and culture is equally interactive, something 
for which the ecclesiologies of Milbank and Hauerwas cannot account. They think of the secular 
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13 DeHart’s deals at length with the appropriation and reinterpretation of The Nature of Doctrine by theologians such 
as Stanely Hauerwas, William Placher, John Milbank and others, as well as critics like David Tracy. His thesis is that 
the debates to which Lindbeck himself refers contributed to a misreading of The Nature of Doctrine, which DeHart 
tries to amend (not uncritically) in his own book. See Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and 
Decline of Postliberal Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 1-56, 
148-90.  
as the church’s “enemy” that we can either only conquer or evade, but they cannot explain how, 
in their doctrines of the church, Christians can be ineluctably shaped by the secular, not to 
mention support it through their everyday actions, without de facto apostasy. This disjunction 
between claims about the primacy of the church and the way we actually live our lives (Christian 
cognitive dissonance) is the heart of my charge against them: their ecclesiologies make 
consistent Christian discipleship impracticable.14 We say one thing about the priority of the 
church against the secular, but live very secular lives. 
 The third chapter closes out the analytical portion of my argument. It claims that a major 
factor contributing to Christian cognitive dissonance is an excessive confidence in the visible 
church that comes with identifying it with the kingdom of God. It is one thing to posit the 
kingdom as the aspiration of the church, imperfectly realized in the present. Indeed, I have little 
doubt that Milbank and Hauerwas would insist that the kingdom remains such for their 
ecclesiology. However, despite their intentions, I intend to show that their ecclesiologies do 
confuse the church with its own eschatological perfection in their refusal of the Augustinian 
category of “invisibility.” This accusation of confusing the church with the kingdom is not 
unique to my argument, but I will try to breathe new life into it by making it in Augustinian 
terms, attempting to show how their collapsing of the kingdom into the church stems from their 
respective misreadings of Augustine’s ecclesiology, in particular his distinction between the 
“visible” and “invisible” church. Both Hauerwas and Milbank seem to worry that the language of 
“invisibility” robs the church of a substantive critique or alternative to secular modernity, when, 
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14 I recognize that there is a downside to lumping Milbank and Hauerwas together in this way. In particular, it blunts 
my critique because I’m going to end up speaking at a certain point in generalities. However, the point of a foil is 
not necessarily to decimate one’s “opponent,” but to describe an alternative more clearly by playing it off what it is 
not. Establishing a range between these two extremes in the way that I do is not an attempt to derail either figure, but 
to show how to step off the train entirely.
actually, the opposite is true. The Augustinian distinction focuses attention on the “visible” 
church by stressing the presence of the kingdom in it, which is proleptically realized in the love 
of the saints that holds the church together. Refusing the distinction between the church and its 
eschatological perfection leads Milbank and Hauerwas to their respective ecclesiological 
extremes, for it leaves available two options: either go on an impossible quest to make the 
empirical church “match” the perfection of the kingdom (i.e. Neo-Donatist sectarianism) or 
slacken the kingdom’s critique of worldly power by identifying the kingdom with the dominance 
of the church in a new Christendom (i.e. Neo-Eusebian triumphalism). By invoking the 
Augustinian distinction in a way contrary to its intended purpose, which was to foreground the 
ambiguous nature of a mixed ecclesial body, both fail to see the interaction between the world 
and the church as it really is. 
 Chapter four begins construction of an alternative account of the church-world limen. 
Locating a major failure of postliberal ecclesiology in the isolation of the kingdom of God to the 
church suggests its resolution lies in expanding the bounds of that kingdom. The fourth chapter 
addresses the problem of Christian cognitive dissonance by proposing that we see the kingdom 
of God not only in the church but in the culture we inevitably engage and support. It is not 
enough to acknowledge the fact of inevitable Christian support of the secular, but to relate that 
support to our primary commitment to the kingdom of God in the church. Thus, this chapter 
begins our constructive turn by moving from Roman North Africa to Constantinople, offering 
Byzantine political theory as an example of the possible. Though their society was formally 
Christian, in the now defunct ideal of a symphonia (or harmony) between church and state, we 
see an interactive account of the inevitable perichoresis that takes place between church and 
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culture more consistent than that offered by Milbank and Hauerwas. Though symphonia had its 
problems (to put it mildly), it was an honest attempt to comport both church and culture to the 
kingdom of God that was realizing itself in both. That is why a handful of contemporary Russian 
thinkers saw the potential of symphonia to inform the way the church could relate to an 
increasingly secular and modern culture. They suggest that the failed experiment of political 
symphonia need not have died in 1453, but that a symphonic relationship between church and 
world is even more viable in a context like ours. Vladimir Solovyov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and 
Sergei Bulgakov variously suggest that the dream of the Byzantine’s might be redeemable not 
just as a political theory but an ecclesiological “principle” for engagement with secular society.
 Chapter five builds upon this dream to develop symphonia as a rationale for ecclesial 
engagement with culture, offering an initial argument that we are able to engage the secular 
insofar as the kingdom of God is proleptically present in it. To develop this thesis I rely on the 
latter thinker mentioned above – Sergei Bulgakov. In his sophiology (which is also an attempt to 
re-think symphonia as a theory of culture), the creation is made the expression of God’s own 
inner-divine life, in particular God’s love of Godself. Thus God loves Godself by loving the 
creation and the creation knows itself in knowing God. This helps account for the significant 
contextual difference between us and the Byzantines by showing how even a culture that is not 
formally Christian can still be the domain of the kingdom. The sophiology of Bulgakov thus 
enabled him to develop their basic insight for a more or less secular context. In a word, he made 
creation the expression of God’s own inner-divine life, in particular God’s love of Godself. 
Though this helpfully grants culture a kind of revelatory, and thus theologically legitimate, status 
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for the church, I nonetheless end on a critical point that this “sustained metaphor” does not 
provide sufficient concrete content for ecclesial action.15 
 The sixth chapter develops such content by assigning to Christ the functions Bulgakov 
gives to Sophia, which is thereby “historicized” as the unfolding content of the kingdom of God 
driving human history. Having offered this christological corrective to Bulgakov’s sophiology, 
we then turn to the manifold scriptural witness to Jesus Christ to “fill out” that content for the 
church. The purpose in doing this is to keep the constructive alternative to postliberal 
ecclesiology only from being an hypothetical “model” – a kind of ecclesial tactic – but to explain 
how the secular can be incorporated into the self-understanding of the church – its very identity – 
without such interaction thereby contributing to cognitive dissonance. I conclude that the identity 
of the church is not to be found simply in its narratives anymore than its culture but in the 
interaction between the two – a dynamic relationship wherein the need to discern the presence of 
God’s reign in the secular throws the church back upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, 
which in turn send the church back into the secular.
 
 This is symphonia. Once it had been a conditionally cooperative engagement with the 
state. Our state is secular (and in our market-driven society it is not the only “ruler”). This 
symphonia is ecclesial because it happens in the church – in people of God’s dynamic to and fro 
from church to world and back again. It is a symphonia that takes place in the narthex. The 
church can still do the work of God’s kingdom in secular society, by supporting society where it 
does God’s work and opposing the parts of itself that do evil in the world by constantly 
19
15 Rowan Williams, “Eastern Orthodox Theology,” in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian 
Theology since 1918, ed. David F. Ford and Rachel Muers, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 
576.
remembering what it means to be the body of Christ and a foretaste of the reign of God’s 
righteousness. 
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PART I
CHURCH V. SECULAR:
ANALYZING AN ECCLESIOLOGICAL IMPASSE
CHAPTER II
“POSTLIBERAL” ECCLESIOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
And if a house is divided against itself, that house cannot stand.
Mark 3:25
 Facing the man who was about to execute him, Jesus was asked if he were a king, where 
was his kingdom?  He answered, “My kingdom is not of this world…My kingdom is not from 
here” (John 18:36). Jesus did not say his kingdom was spiritual. Jesus’ kingdom is not spiritual 
anymore than Jesus is a spirit. Rather, it is not of this world because the kingdom of Jesus is not 
the kingdom of Pilate. Though the church is not the kingdom, it is how we lean into the kingdom 
of God while living in the kingdom of Pilate. In the conflict between Christ and Pilate we 
experience an ecclesial crisis – a crisis of church life, a crisis of the people of God pressed 
together in their pews. This crisis is that we confess with our mouths (Romans 10:9) an absolute 
loyalty to Christ’s kingdom, but so often we live with our lives a loyalty to the kingdom that is 
“from here.” This ecclesial crisis cannot truly be measured (though some have surveyed 
confessing Christians and found that the character of their lives is indistinguishable from 
anybody else1), but, at the risk of making an audacious presumption, it is a crisis felt by many of 
us; we know something is wrong here. 
 Fully addressing this ecclesial crisis is the work of pastors, not lay theologians, who can 
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1 See http://www.barna.org/barna-update/article/5-barna-update/188-faith-has-a-limited-effect-on-most-peoples-
behavior. Accessed 11 December 2009. 
only address it secondarily, insofar as it becomes an ecclesiological crisis – a crisis for Christian 
theologians who try to say what the church is and should be. In the following pages, I intend to 
focus on the way that some theologies can promote an ecclesiological crisis when their doctrines 
effectively blind us to the war these kingdoms wage within us by encouraging us to assert (until 
we feel it to be true) that the church is our number one priority and the fundamental determiner 
of our thinking and acting, keeping us from recognizing ourselves as the faithful Roman citizens 
we often are.2 
 It is true that this ecclesial crisis is a Christian symptom of the challenge modernity and 
modern life brings to all religions. Once defined by rituals, liturgical cycles, feasts, and fasts, our 
lives are now defined by the disintegrating rush of the workweek and the high holy days of the 
gods of consumerism. Nonetheless, ecclesiology contributes to this crisis by proposing a false 
way out of this challenge. For the past few decades in systematic theology it has become 
increasingly fashionable to lay the blame for the problems of the church on liberalism, a word 
often disparagingly forced out of the reluctant mouths of some contemporary theologians. The 
solution becomes somehow to get around liberalism, often by stressing Christian practices and 
narratives or by offering a Christian re-reading of the history of thought that shows how 
liberalism is a heretical parasite on Christian theology and that Christianity is rhetorically more 
attractive because it is more just, peaceful, etc. For the purposes of this essay, I will rather 
broadly label these detractors “postliberal,” insofar as, in one way or another, they intend to 
make the church “absorb” the world (but more on that in a moment). Normally, I prefer 
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2 I distinguish between the words ecclesial and ecclesiological. The latter refers to the way theologians think about 
the former, which refers to the ins and outs of church life. Another way to put it would be to say that ecclesial refers 
to concrete Christian practice in communion with the people of God, whereas ecclesiology is the abstraction of that 
process into concepts. 
terminological precision over theological shorthand, but the latter can sometimes better serve 
clarity by alluding to similarities between formally distinct schools that their respective labels 
might make us overlook. Critics of these postliberals (liberal and otherwise) have generally 
attacked their postmodern philosophical presuppositions, their readings of particular figures, or 
their metacritical method that makes sweeping statements about historical epochs and schools of 
thought. This chapter takes a different approach. In a way, my critique of these figures is not 
theoretical but practical. In particular it is ecclesiological. 
 Postliberal ecclesiology can be attractive because it stresses traditional orthodoxy and 
community. It thus provides theological conservatives with a rationale for continuing to practice 
their faith (they believe) in the way it has always been practiced, which it does by stressing the 
importance of a counter-cultural Christian identity formed through participation in the church. 
There is much truth to the claim that Christian identity must be formed by the narratives of the 
scriptures, reinforced by the practices and rituals of the people of God, and that this dynamic 
relationship between narrative and ritual is what will preserve the Christian church from being 
disintegrated by the forces of modernity. However, postliberal ecclesiology is an inadequate 
solution. I intend to show that, existing in a parasitic relationship to modernity, postliberal 
ecclesiology exacerbates the internal conflict between Christ and Pilate, characteristic of the 
ecclesial crisis described above, into a full-blown Christian cognitive dissonance by presuming a 
false “unidirectional” relationship between church and world.
 There is internal diversity within postliberal ecclesiology, a diversity that will be captured 
by establishing a range between two ecclesiological extremes, both of which have a common 
correlate in George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine (which many saw as expanding upon the 
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narrative theology of Hans Frei).3 Therefore, the first section will briefly summarize the 
argument of The Nature of Doctrine, which includes a subsequent exegetical critique posed by 
Miroslav Volf. This introduction to Lindbeck will be followed by showing how Stanley 
Hauerwas develops what has been called a “sectarian” understanding of the church in secular 
culture, and then the “triumphalism” of John Milbank will be presented. The conclusion will 
again take up Volf’s exegetical critique and apply it to the ecclesiologies of both Milbank and 
Hauerwas, focusing especially on its implications for Christian practice. 
Intratextualism and the Interpretive Community
 This section will show how what began as what Lindbeck called an “ad hoc” reflection 
on theological method can be taken in both sectarian and triumphalist ecclesiological directions, 
because the postliberal intratextual or “cultural-linguistic alternative” to liberal methods 
advocated in The Nature of Doctrine, ends up being less about the text and more about the 
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3  Paul DeHart has recently argued that the popular reception of George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine 
misunderstood how liberal Lindbeck’s argument was. The differences between Chicago and Yale had much more to 
do with popular reception of Lindbeck than what he actually said.  DeHart’s insight was in many ways anticipated 
by Gary L. Comstock, who as early as 1987 suggested that the “Chicagoans” and the “Yaleys” were actually 
performing two similar types of narrative theology, one wherein the meaning of the text was found in correlating it 
to the contemporary situation, and the other wherein the meaning was supposed to derive from the text itself. 
Nevertheless, in neither case is meaning achieved without the narrative of a community. Gary L. Comstock, “Two 
Types of Narrative Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, no. 4 (1987). DeHart goes further 
by suggesting that, while the difference between postliberalism and liberalism has been exaggerated by popular 
theological polemic, the difference between Frei and Lindbeck has been under-stressed. According to DeHart, 
though Frei and Lindbeck have been depicted as “collaborating in the definition of a new, ‘postliberal’ option now 
offered to contemporary theologians,” when their methodology is re-situated vis-à-vis their dogmatic claims, 
significant differences between the two emerge (191). In particular, Frei’s understanding of the church knowing 
itself to be a witness to the kingdom of God requires sustained witness to the New Testament depiction of Jesus 
Christ, the meaning of which must be constantly re-evaluated from “ever new cultural vantage points” (244). See 
DeHart, 191, 244, and 142-48. For a concise and illuminating example of this narrative, wherein Frei and Lindbeck 
are depicted as a methodological David and Jonathan, facing down twin hoards of liberalism on the one hand and 
fundamentalism on the other, see Gary J. Dorrien, “A Third Way in Theology? The Origins of Postliberalism,” 
Christian Century 118, no. 20 (2001). Though I am in agreement with DeHart, and am particularly dependent on the 
links he draws between the shared objectives of postliberalism and radical orthodoxy, my concern is not necessarily 
with misreadings of Lindbeck. Instead, I am focusing on the way that popular reception of his methodology (the 
very object of DeHart’s critique) was incorporated into the ecclesiologies of Milbank and Hauerwas. In other words, 
in this essay, I take the misreading of Lindbeck as normative (because it is).
community that interprets it.4 Broadly, postliberalism as a method argues that Christian theology 
need cede no ground to modernity’s challenge to orthodoxy, but rely wholly on the revelation of 
God in Christ, to which the scriptures bear witness, not only for the answers it gives but even the 
questions it is allowed to ask.5 My focus being the church, my intent is not to present a 
genealogy of postliberalism or a “proper” reading of The Nature of Doctrine. As a watershed 
moment in contemporary Christian theology, this book is important not only because it marks the 
beginning of increasingly dug-in conflicts between two putatively distinct schools of thought, but 
in this section for the way it appears in the work of Hauerwas and Milbank. When I say it 
appears in the work of these two thinkers, I am not arguing for dependence but correspondence 
in order to extend an important critique of Lindbeck to their ecclesiologies as well. 
 Though The Nature of Doctrine is fundamentally an ecumenical work that tries to 
explicate “the criteria we [theologians] implicitly employ when we say that…some doctrinal 
differences are church-dividing and others are not,”6 as Lindbeck himself observed ten years 
after its publication, it was received differently. What he intended to be an “unsystematic” 
precursor to a longer ecumenical work about how to overcome doctrinal divisions emerged at a 
time when theological conservatives were turning to postmodern emphases on narrated reality to 
advocate for doctrinal orthodoxy.7 Because Lindbeck’s criticism of perceived “liberal” methods 
deployed similar concepts, his book was quickly taken up and to a certain extent reinterpreted by 
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Age, ed. James J. Buckley, Radical Traditions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002 [1994]), 198.
5 It thus considers itself in some way continuing the early work of Barth. See Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 
trans., Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford, 1933).  Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, 
trans., Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Row, 1957 [1928]).
6 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville: 
Westerminster John Knox, 1984), 7.
7 Lindbeck, “Foreword to the German Edition of the Nature of Doctrine,” 196-200. Quotes are from 198 and 199.
that group. In the words of Paul DeHart, “[A] significant proportion of the theological 
community apparently became convinced that the main point of Lindbeck’s book was to 
repudiate all liberal theology and promote a ‘turn’ to a new ‘method’ under the banner of 
postliberalism.”8  
 Lindbeck seemed to have posited two untenable extremes in order to offer a new, third 
way of retaining doctrinal orthodoxy in a postmodern setting. On one end, propositionalism 
presumes a one-to-one correspondence between doctrinal expressions and reality, which 
Lindbeck quickly dismissed. Though he acknowledges that some take this view seriously, the 
short shrift he gives it implies approval of philosophical developments by individuals like 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, which allegedly have shown the absence of stable linguistic signifiers, 
such that there is never a perfect correspondence between any expression and a “real” thing “out 
there.”9 He spilled substantially more ink refuting experiential-expressivism or symbolism on the 
other end of the spectrum.10 Symbolism is rightly suggestive of Paul Tillich as Lindbeck’s 
interlocutor on this point. For symbolists like Tillich, doctrinal expressions are “noninformative 
and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations.”11 Or, in 
Tillich’s own words when describing faith:
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8 DeHart, 33-34.
9 As an ecumenist, he also raised the problem that if doctrines are either true or false, then ecumenism can only 
happen in the mode of proselytization. “Thus,” says Lindbeck, “on this view, doctrinal reconciliation without 
capitulation is impossible because there is no significant sense in which the meaning of a doctrine can change while 
remaining the same.”  Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 16-19, 37-38.
10 Between the two lies a kind of hybrid, which holds that propositions correspond to real things that are nonetheless 
absolutely transcendent and unknowable. Finding the “complicated intellectual gymnastics” of this approach 
unconvincing, Lindbeck quickly dismissed it. Later he indicated that he considered it just another form of 
experiential-expressivism. Thus, in chapter one he cites Bernard Lonergan as an example of this hybrid method, but 
in chapter two he becomes an example of the experiential-expressivist approach. This suggests he considers the 
hybrid and symbolism functionally equivalent. Ibid., 17, 31-32.
11 Ibid., 16.
 God is the basic symbol of faith, but not the only one. All the qualities we 
attribute to him, power, love, justice, are taken from finite experiences and 
applied symbolically to that which is beyond finitude and infinity. If faith calls 
God “almighty,” it uses the human experience of power in order to symbolize the 
content of its infinite concern, but it does not describe a highest being who can do 
as he pleases. So it is with all the other qualities and with all the actions, past, 
present and future, which men attribute to God. They are symbols taken from our 
daily experience, and not information about what God did once upon a time or 
will do sometime in the future.12  
Here, language is not about the object defined but the adherent’s intentions. The symbol is an 
expression of her desire to encounter (though always incompletely) the infinite reality at the 
heart of all religious experience. Symbols must therefore change with language whenever they 
become inadequate entry-points for such divine communion. Lindbeck takes this to mean that 
there are two senses of doctrine for the experiential-expressivist. First, doctrine is the religious 
expression constantly demanding reinterpretation. Second, and conversely, (true) doctrine is the 
(first order) experience underlying the (second order) expression. Thus Lindbeck concludes,  
“For experiential-expressive symbolists…religiously significant meanings can vary while 
doctrines remain the same, and conversely, doctrines can alter without change of meaning.”13 It 
seems to Lindbeck that as a consequence of this oxymoronic double-meaning, symbolism can 
only reach the most “banal” conclusions.14 To say for instance, as Tillich does in Dynamics of 
Faith, that all people have faith in something, or that religious people have faith in the Absolute, 
as far as Lindbeck is concerned, is a “banality” because it ignores the more important question of 
the function of faith for belief and practice in a particular religious context. This brings us to 
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13 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 17.
14 Thus Lindbeck writes, “The datum that all religious recommend something which can be called 'love' toward that 
which is taken to be most important ('God') is a banality as uninteresting as the fact that all languages are (or were) 
spoken.” Ibid., 42.
Lindbeck’s alternative to these extremes.
 Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic alternative,” or intratextualism has been described as “an 
extended reflection on an analogy.”15 In truth, Lindbeck never defines intratextualism so much as 
he describes it through an interrelated series of metaphors. His basic thesis is that religion is like 
a language. Though many implications can be drawn from this this, for our purposes we need to 
focus on only two. First, drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein, Lindbeck argues that, like 
language, religion does not express the way the world really is but irrevocably shapes our 
perceptions of it.16 It thus comprises a “cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that 
shapes the entirety of life and thought … somewhat like a Kantian a priori, although in this case 
the a priori is a set of acquired skills that could be different.”17 As a “set of acquired skills” it is 
therefore, in the second place, something that is best learned through immersion. Mastery 
requires not only speaking another language, but thinking in it, which can only be learned over 
time and with much practice. (This second implication will be important when we turn to 
Hauerwas in the next section.)    
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15 James J. Buckley, “Radical Traditions: Evangelical, Catholic, and Postliberal,” in The Church in a Postliberal 
Age, ed. James J. Buckley, Radical Traditions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), xi.
16 This is not actually what Wittgenstein says. Lindbeck seems to reduce truth to conformity to the rules of the game, 
eschewing the idea that language/religion communicates anything “objectively” true about the outside world, but 
Wittgenstein’s point is more subtle. He famously critiques Augustine’s theory of language as a collection of 
objective signifiers for subjective experience in order to develop a theory that language is a network of relationships 
we inhabit. Yet, Wittgenstein clearly states that his intent is not to do away with the idea that language refers to 
objects. Of his critical foil, Wittgenstein writes, “Augustine…does describe a system of communication; only not 
everything we call language is this system.” Thus language as objective correspondence between sign and signified 
is not wrong, only incomplete. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans., G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 3. Emphasis mine. There seems to be a more dynamic relationship between 
language and experience (religious practice and objective truths) than Lindbeck recognizes. A more faithful reading 
of Wittgenstein should suggest to Lindbeck that, though religion irrevocably shapes our experience of the world, this 
does not preclude religion being shaped by the world. See also Molly Claire Haslam, “Language as Expression: A 
Wittgensteinian Critique of the Cultural-Linguistic Approach to Religion,” American Journal of Theology & 
Philosophy 28, no. 2 (2007): esp. 245-50.
17 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 33. 
 Intratextualism does not preclude propositions or experiences, but subordinates both to 
their role in shaping the thought-world of the adherent.18 A propositional “array of beliefs” and 
practices form a nexus of communal rituals “expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, or 
sentiments”19 that constitute a “set of acquired skills,” generating “basic attitudes, feelings, or 
sentiments.”20 Few would deny that religious adherents have experiences that symbols express. 
For example, an American may salute her country’s flag because she is patriotic, but Lindbeck’s 
point is that she came to know herself as patriotic because of ritualized reverence for the flag 
taught from an early age. For Lindbeck the symbol and the practices around it take precedence 
over the symbolized. The symbol and the rituals together create the experience. Nor does 
Lindbeck deny that religions make propositional truth claims. But the point for him is not their 
ontological truth. To ask if something really happened is to ask the wrong question. The truth of 
something is not in its objective correspondence to the outside world, as if there were such a 
thing as an outside to the narratives of the religious adherent, but in its intrasystematic coherence 
to other symbols, gestures, and propositional truth claims within the intratextual nexus of the 
religion. In Lindbeck’s own words, “The function of church doctrines that becomes most 
prominent in this perspective is their use, not as expressive symbols [experiential-expressivism] 
or as truth claims [propositionalism], but as communally authoritative rules of discourse, 
attitude, and action.”21 To ask about the truth of something is to ask if it conforms to the doctrinal 
“rules” – be they implicit or explicit – of the religion. Thus if religion is like language, then the 
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18 Ibid., 34-35.  
19 Ibid., 33. Emphasis mine.
20 Ibid., 64.
21 Ibid., 18.
theologian is like a grammarian. The grammarian is not an apologist, justifying why English 
tends to put the verb after a noun instead of at the end of the sentence, like German. Nor is she a 
fact checker, tasked with determining the objective accuracy of the language. The grammarian 
only judges the internal consistency of linguistic expressions for her or his own particular 
language. If someone says, “This cat be blue,” the grammarian’s job is not to determine whether 
or not there is a real blue cat, only if the sentence itself corresponds to the explicit and implicit 
rules of the language. The theologian affirms the truth of religious propositions in the same way. 
 In the oft-cited words of Lindbeck, “Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the 
scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, 
so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text.”22 For Christian theology, he 
sees the “text” of intratextualism primarily as the Bible, which he call’s Christianity’s “lexical 
core.”23 The same was assumed by at least some of Lindbeck’s interpreters.24 But is limiting the 
text to the written word of the Bible sufficient given that, Lindbeck says, religion is a 
“communal” phenomenon whose doctrines comprise an a priori linguistic framework for its 
individual adherents?25 Lindbeck himself says that the text is the “biblical narratives” that are 
always already “interrelated in certain specified ways,” ways that are at least partially determined 
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22 Ibid., 118.
23 Ibid., 81.
24 For example, William Placher wrote an article summarizing some of his basic concerns about postliberalism 
(lumping Frei and Lindbeck together as proponents of this new “school”) shortly after the publication of The Nature 
of Doctrine. These concerns focused on the viability of seeing wider culture out from within the world of the Bible, 
narratively interpreted. He thus understood intratextualism to provide the theoretical apparatus by which to apply 
Frei’s narrative hermenteutic to contemporary theology. If biblical narrative (Frei) is the what of Christian doctrine, 
Placher said, intratextualism (Lindbeck) is the how. William C. Placher, “Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology : A 
Conflict of Interpretations,” Modern Theology 4, no. 1 (1987): 38.  The same is true of Volf, as we shall see below. 
Miroslav Volf, “Theology, Meaning, and Power: A Conversation with George Lindbeck on Theology and the Nature 
of Christian Difference,” in The Nature of Confession: Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, ed. Timothy 
R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1996).  
25 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 33.Emphasis mine. 
by “later doctrinal developments” considered authoritative by different church traditions.26 In 
other words, the meaning of the Bible is priorly positioned by what Jonathan Wilson has called 
the “community of interpretation.”27 If there is never a text without a reading of that text, and if 
that reading is communal, then the text of intratextualism must include the community for which 
the Bible is the authoritative book.28 Defending Lindbeck against charges of relativism, his 
fellow Lutheran, Peter J. Thuesen invokes Lindbeck’s concept of intrasystematic coherence, 
which subordinates the ontological truth of a doctrine to its consistency vis-à-vis other doctrines 
of a particular religious community, as the “gold standard” of truth of Christianity. Thus, 
Thuesen says that for Lindbeck a doctrine is true if it is true for the church. “The determinate 
settings,” he writes, “which make truth possible are communal, liturgical activities such as 
adoration, proclamation, obedience, promise-hearing and promise-keeping. Thus, for example, 
when a Christian congregation asserts in the creed that Christ rose on the third day, this 
proposition has truth-potential by virtue of the liturgical context in which it is uttered.”29  
 This broader sense of the text as the community that interprets it adds new meaning to 
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26 Of those “doctrinal developments” Lindbeck seems to have the homoousion in mind, saying that it comprises the 
lexicon of Christianity. But the fact that an extrabiblical concept could be authoritative for the majority of Christians 
only underscores my point that Lindbeck does not understand the “text” of intratextuality to be simply the Bible but 
mostly the people reading, interpreting, and applying it. Ibid., 80-81.    
27 Jonathan R. Wilson, “Toward a New Evangelical Paradignm of Biblical Authority,” in The Nature of Confession: 
Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1996), 158.
28 This is not the same as a critical conversation between the reader and the text like the kind David Tracy advocates. 
It simply means that for Lindbeck truth is not a question of ontology or historicity but intrasystematic 
correspondence with other doctrines. For a summary of the differences between the way Tracy and Lindbeck 
conceive of truth, see Richard Lints, “The Postpositivist Choice : Tracy or Lindbeck?,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 61, no. 4 (1993).  On the intrasystematic nature of truth for Lindbeck, see ibid., 660.
29 With apparently unnoticed irony Thuesen goes on to add that the true theology only happens in the liturgical 
context of the church. Academic treatises by academic theologians in academic contexts do not count as “real” 
theology because they are not incorporated into the liturgical life of the church. Peter J. Thuesen, “George Lindbeck 
on Truth,” Lutheran Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1996): 50.  Emphasis mine. 
Lindbeck’s statement that the text “absorbs the world, rather than the world the text.”30  Miroslav 
Volf sees in this statement “a strong sense of Christian identity within changing cultures…”  
Lindbeck seemed to him to be saying that, though the world may change, the church’s core 
beliefs can stay the same. This is because, according to Volf, there seems to be a “unidirectional” 
relationship between the text and the world. If the job of the text is to absorb the world, and not 
the other way around, then the world cannot tell us how to interpret the text. Volf thinks this is 
infeasible. He observes, “We can look at our culture through the lenses of religious texts only as 
we look at these texts through the lenses of our culture. The notion of inhabiting the biblical story 
is hermeneutically naive because it presupposes that those who are faced with the biblical story 
can be completely ‘dislodged’ from their extratextual dwelling places and ‘resettled’ into 
intratextual homes.”31 To reinforce his point Volf notes that not even Lindbeck can follow his 
own principle insofar as he relies heavily on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s regulative theory of 
language, as well as Clifford Geertz’s work on the role of language in human development and 
the construction of reality, to develop his own regulative theory of doctrine.32 Neither man is 
Peter, Paul, or Jesus, yet their extrabiblical philosophies have informed the way Lindbeck 
himself has thought about the relationship between the Christian, the text, and the truth. 
 This has implications for the church. The problem of trying to interpret the world out 
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30 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 118.
31 Volf’s critique of Lindbeck could stand to be more nuanced, for Lindbeck does not seem to stress an absolute 
unidirectionality like Volf thinks he does. Lindbeck just seems to want the text to shape our view of the world more 
than the world shapes our reading of the text. Nonetheless, my concern is not to defend Lindbeck or to offer a better 
reading of him than that given by those who made The Nature of Doctrine the dividing line between liberal and 
postliberal theology. My point is to examine the ecclesiological implications of this standard misreading, and to 
apply its critiques to those who stress a similar unidirectionality between the church and the world. Volf, 51. Though 
Kathryn Tanner believes theology operates from within “a Christian cultural context,” she criticizes static views of 
culture, which unidirectionality presumes. See Tanner, 69, also 38-58.
32 See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 20, 33, 37-39, 107, 130. Volf, 49.
from within Bible takes on new significance if the Bible is inclusive of the church, for it suggests 
that a similarly unidirectional relationship between church and culture is equally infeasible. Our 
interpretive community is not the only community that positions our reading of the Bible and the 
world outside it. Try as we might to be shaped solely by this text, there are inevitably other 
stories that influence us. The outside world also informs the way we think about the Bible and 
the church that allegedly tells us what it means. This raises question about the ways Stanley 
Hauerwas and John Milbank assert that the church is – or should be – the primary factor in 
constructing individual subjectivities, thereby organizing social and political life. Maintaining 
the perdurance of such infeasible ecclesial unidirectionality may be a kind of ecclesiological 
fallacy that contributes to our ecclesial crisis. I will expand this point of critique in the final 
section of this chapter. 
 Intratextualism Applied: Sectarian and Triumphalist Postliberal Ecclesiology
 In this section we will consider the implications of George Lindbeck’s interpretative 
community for a doctrine of the church in two ecclesiological extremes. On the one hand, 
Stanley Hauerwas stresses the church as a counter-cultural institution which, as Lindbeck said, 
plays a pivotal role in the shaping of subjectivities. In Hauerwas’ view, the church, in a manner 
of speaking, “makes” Christians who understand themselves to be a separate people, formed by 
and loyal to the church, not modern secular society. Hauerwas thus assumes and accentuates 
what Volf called Lindbeck’s “unidirectionality” between text and world, making explicit the 
implication that the text in this case is the church. Likewise, John Milbank has stressed that 
absorbing the world is the mission of the church, “bringing every thought into captivity to the 
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obedience of Christ.”33 While Hauerwas tends to eschew Christian triumphalism in favor of 
presuming a minority Christian community constantly at odds with secular culture, Milbank is 
self-consciously “Constantinian.” He wants the church to be the dominant organizer of society 
(through which our subjectivities are shaped). Though Milbank’s triumphalistic neo-Christendom 
seems to be at odds with Hauerwas’s counter-cultural sectarianism, they are united in the way 
each conceives of the limen between church and culture and in their mutual production of 
Christian cognitive dissonance.34 It is the way they distinguish between church and culture that 
concerns us. 
Stanley Hauerwas’s Postliberal Sectarianism
  Though he studied at Yale and names Lindbeck among the theologians from whom he 
has learned “about the narrative character of theological convictions,”35 Stanley Hauerwas rarely 
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33 1 Cor. 10.5, NKJV.
34 I am not the only one who sees this connection. Arne Rasmusson, a defender of Hauerwas, repeatedly draws 
comparisons between his and Milbank’s ecclesiologies, particularly as it is supposed to exist as a counter-narrative 
to modern liberalism or the modern nation-state. See Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political 
Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jurgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas ([S.l.]: Lund Univ Pr, 
1994), 174ff, esp. 274. 
35 Hauerwas’ account of Lindbeck’s influence on his theology is not entirely consistent. In his recent autobiography, 
he downplays Lindbeck’s influence on his thought, noting that Lindbeck was away at Vatican II while Hauerwas 
was at Yale, and suggesting that he came to similar positions as Lindbeck mostly on his own. Stanley Hauerwas, 
Hannah's Child: A Theologian's Memoir (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 49-86-87. Yet Hauerwas earlier credited  
Lindbeck as being formative for his own thinking, listing him among “Professor Frei…David Kelsey…Ron 
Thiemann, James McClendon, and many others.” Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, 
World, and Living in Between (Durham, NC: Labyrinth, 1988), 54. See also Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, 
“The Gift of the Church and the Gifts God Gives It,” in Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (Malden, Ma ; 
Oxford ; Carlton, Australia: Blackwell, 2004), 13-14. Given how rarely Hauerwas cites Lindbeck directly, it is 
possible that not even Hauerwas is aware of when he is “channeling” his thought. But these links have been noted by 
others. For instance, Theo Hobson pins the blame for postliberalism on Barth for failing to continue with the anti-
authoritarian/anti-ecclesial tendency of his early work. He says this was picked up by Lindbeck who influenced the 
work of both Hauerwas an Milbank. Theo Hobson, “Ecclesiological Fundamentalism,” Modern Believing 45, no. 4 
(2004). It is also worth noting that Lindbeck himself observed certain “affinities” between his early work and 
Hauerwas’s advocacy of a post-Constantinian, counter-cultural Christianity. George A. Lindbeck, “Confession and 
Community: An Israel-Like View of the Church,” Christian Century 107, no. 16 (1990): 492. Lindbeck, “Foreword 
to the German Edition of the Nature of Doctrine.”
cites Lindbeck as a formative influence on his ecclesiology.36 Though the point of presenting 
Lindbeck’s thought in the last section was not to show how Hauerwas’ depends upon him in this 
one, briefly mentioning what appear to be some unstated (and perhaps unrecognized) 
genealogical links will help us know what points of correspondence to look for. Hauerwas sees 
the church as a counter-cultural sect whose mission is to make disciples wholly formed by what 
we might call the politics of the kingdom of God rather than the politics of the state (in 
Hauerwas’ case, the United States). Thus, Paul DeHart has observed that under the pen of 
Hauerwas, Lindbeck’s interpretive community (which in The Nature of Doctrine could be any 
community) became the church threatened by liberalism.37 Hauerwas seems to have amplified 
Lindbeck’s critique of symbolist translation of traditional theology into “extrabiblical” concepts 
and applied it to the Christian community itself. By succumbing to the temptation to translate the 
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36 He more often cites Yoder as his most important influence, an intellectual biography that has gained wide 
currency in many theological circles. Yet recent scholarship is beginning to show that there are significant 
differences between Hauerwas and Yoder. Chief among these was Yoder himself. See Gerald W. Schlabach, 
“Continuity and Sacrament, or Not: Hauerwas, Yoder, and Their Deep Difference,” Journal of the Society of 
Christian Ethics 27, no. 2 (2007): esp. 192. Schlabach reminds us that Yoder’s final book was a deliberate attempt to 
differentiate himself from Hauerwas. There is no doubt that Hauerwas and Yoder remained friends, but that is no 
reason to conflate their projects, which is so often the case. Thus, in For the Nations (a title surely meant to answer 
Hauerwas’ Against the Nations), Yoder sets out to differentiate himself, somewhat, from those who have embraced a 
certain kind of ecclesiological sectarianism, among them Hauerwas (whom Yoder names). Yoder intends to 
demonstrate, through this collection of essays, that the fundamental purpose of the church is not to embody an 
alternative to society, but to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ to it. Withdrawal depends upon the world’s 
response to that proclamation. See John Howard Yoder, For the Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 3-9 (in particular notes 6 and 9), 180-98, 237-45. Nathan Kerr, in particular, has recently 
shown that, though allies, Yoder and Hauerwas are most divided in how each thinks of the politics of the church 
(insofar as the kingdom of God is the ground of that politics). Nathan R. Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The 
Politics of Christian Mission (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 128-34.  
37 In an illuminating passage on how Hauerwas’s defense against this charge was influential in shaping postliberal 
ecclesiology, DeHart writes, “Hauerwas … invested Lindbeck’s carefully moderated statements about 
‘sectarianism’ with a sense of crisis, and a cultural combativeness, which were quite his own. Suddenly a recondite 
discussion of theological method had become a question of the very survival of the church’s witness in a secular 
culture. The rejection of theological liberalism was subsumed with a rejection of ‘liberalism’ in the socio-political 
sense, a sweeping denunciation of the very shape of post-Enlightenment society and ethics in the West. Where 
Hauerwas's charismatic persona and acerbic voice were influential, theological method no longer seemed quite the 
main issue. Now the call of postliberalism was addressed to a church threatened with apostasy, with corruption by 
the ‘liberal’ consensus of the modern Western consumerist and capitalist democracies (and the ‘progressive’ 
theologies which provided them religious cover). It was a call back from compromise, to be a counter-cultural 
witness against the blandishments of contemporary American society.” DeHart, 36-37.
gospel into a popular idiom, the peculiarity of its message gets reconfigured into a socially 
acceptable, but religiously neutral, set of moral platitudes, transforming the church from the 
singularly unique sacrament of the kingdom of God,38 into what Hauerwas has called a “lifestyle 
enclave” (significantly called the threat of apostasy by Paul DeHart).39 As Lindbeck said that 
learning “to become religious – no less than to become culturally or linguistically competent – is 
to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training,”40 Hauerwas has made this communal 
training the raison d'être of the church itself.41
 Hauerwas has thus combined a “Yale School” emphasis on “narrative theology” with 
John Howard Yoder’s work on the political implications of the gospel to conceive of the church 
37
38 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame: Fides, 1974), 240 
(footnote 41).
39 Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom?: How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation 
Are Bad Ideas (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991), 96. DeHart, 36.
40 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 35.
41 Hauerwas, After Christendom?, 93ff.
as a person-forming alternative to the modern secular.42 In Resident Aliens, which Hauerwas 
wrote with William Willimon, the authors call for the church to inhabit a kind of tribal mentality 
vis-à-vis modernity (insofar as they pine for the days of a pre-Constantinian and thus counter-
cultural church in a post-Constantinian culture). The premise of Resident Aliens is that the 
“politics as defined by the gospel” are incommensurate with the politics of secular society.43 
There are church politics and there are secular politics, and the two shall never meet. To make 
their case, the authors use H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture as their critical foil, a book 
they call “a prime example of repressive tolerance” that characterizes liberal society.44 The 
problem with Niebuhr’s understanding of the way the church is to relate to the world, the authors 
say, is simply this: the message of the gospel is not Christ and anything, just Christ! Niebuhr’s 
mistake, they argue, is one shared by all liberalism: to see the church as an institution within 
38
42 John Bowlin has detected a shift in Hauerwas’ methodology (and thus his ecclesiology) in his recent book, 
Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary (with Romand Coles). He says that Hauerwas now seems to be 
“post-post-liberal.” No longer is Hauerwas concerned to defend the supremacy of the gospel vis-à-vis other 
narratives. Rather, he sees in Hauerwas’ openness to the work of radical democracy “a concession to the fact that the 
churches quite often need extra-ecclesial assistance in order to understand their own convictions, their own 
narratives.” Rather than speak about the gospels reinterpreting the work of groups like the Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF) or the Nonviolent Student Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Hauerwas admits that these groups 
can help the church understand its own mission. Furthermore, Bowlin also observes that Hauerwas seems to have 
exchanged his one-time emphasis on the Aristotelian virtues (because these can become idols the church uses to cut 
itself off from the world) for an emphasis on practices. J. Bowlin, “Just Democracy, Just Church: Hauerwas and 
Coles on Radical Democracy and Christianity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 64, no. 1: 85-86, 88. However, I am 
not persuaded by Bowlin’s reading for a couple of reasons. In the first place, Hauerwas’ emphasis on practices is not 
new. If anything, it is a return to the argument about learning to be Christian in earlier works. Hauerwas, After 
Christendom?, 93-111. Secondly, much of Bowlin’s evidence for this shift to a more “vulnerable” understanding of 
the gospel comes not from Hauerwas but from a portion of the book written by his co-author. In a rather informal 
letter written to Hauerwas, Romand Coles talks about vulnerability of the gospel to critique Hauerwas’ Christian 
exclusivism. Romand Coles, “Letter of July 17, 2006,” in Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: 
Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian, Theopolitical Visions (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 
42-44. At no point in the book did Hauerwas recant his “Christian jealousy.” He only insisted it was not a problem 
for an effective but “distrustful alliance” between Christians and other activists. Stanley Hauerwas, “A Haunting 
Possibility: Christianity and Radical Democracy,” in Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: 
Conversation between a Radical Democrat and a Christian, Theopolitical Visions (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 
18. 
43 Stanley and William H. Willimon Hauerwas, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1989), 30.
44 Ibid., 41.
secular society rather than a “radical alternative” to it.45
 The ecclesiological implications of this counterposition are more apparent in After 
Christendom? (which Hauerwas dubbed the sequel to Resident Aliens). There Hauerwas argued 
that Christianity is not a set of beliefs (as liberalism thinks), but it is fundamentally membership 
in a community – the church.46  Of course this implies, “There is no salvation outside the 
church,” but there is more going on here than that famous dictum suggests.47 Soteriological 
questions aside, Hauerwas seems to be saying that, for the Christian, nothing outside the church 
is worthy of her consideration and support except insofar as it is ultimately put to the service of 
the church. The church, Hauerwas argues, is its own polis. That is why he rejects the category of 
ethics, because it is based on the liberal Enlightenment notion that goodness can be divorced 
from community-based practices. For Hauerwas, to say, “There is no salvation outside the 
church” is to invoke the so-called New Testament church’s early surety in its visible, and visibly 
counter-cultural, purity. He thus approvingly quotes Denny Weaver who wrote that the ancient 
church “existed over against the world or in a state of confrontation with the world.”48 For 
Hauerwas, this must be the attitude of the true church today.
 The mission of the church is simply to be this “different kind of community,”49 a people 
who live solely by the political demands of the gospel, not the secular. The exclusiveness of the 
39
45 Ibid., 45.  
46 Hence Hobson’s observation that “His [Hauerwas’s] rhetoric constantly flirts with chiliasm, as if salvation is to be 
achieved through the establishment of a pure Christian community. Hobson: 54.  
47 Cyprian, The Letters of St. Cyprian of Carthage, ed. Walter J. Burghardt and Thomas Comerford Lawler, trans., G. 
W. Clark, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation, vol. IV (New York: Newman, 1989), 
Ep. 73.21.2. 
48 Quoted in Hauerwas, After Christendom?, 36.
49 In Ibid., 22.
church upon the life of the believer, in absolute contradistinction to modern liberalism, makes it 
hard not to conclude that even tacit support of the secular nation state is not tantamount to 
apostasy.50 As we have seen, like Lindbeck, Hauerwas stresses the communal nature of the 
church in the formation of individuals. The church makes Christians by inculcating them into a 
kind of craft (like brick-laying) or a tradition. The church is a way of life that one can only learn 
by doing it.51 This train of thought is continued in Sanctify Them in the Truth, where Hauerwas 
attempts to deploy the concept of narrative to show how the “cultural linguistic practice” of the 
church churns out, somewhat like a machine, gospel-practicing, secular-renouncing Christians.52  
 Calling this ecclesiology sectarian is not without precedent. James Gustafson and others 
have raised similar points.53 Hauerwas’ strong reaction to Gustafson makes his essay worth 
examining more closely. Gustafon actually does not concern himself entirely with Hauerwas’ 
40
50 This, because it would be a rejection of gospel-politics. Ibid., 96.
51 See ibid., 93-111.
52 Quoted from Emmanuel Katongole in Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 188.  See also 77-103, 123-42, 191-200.  
53 See also Gloria H. Albrecht, “Myself and Other Characters : A Feminist Liberationist Critique of Hauerwas's 
Ethics of Christian Character,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1992). Wilson D. Miscamble, “Sectarian 
Passivism?,” Theology Today 44, no. 1 (1987). Michael J. Quirk, “Beyond Sectarianism?,” Theology Today 44, no. 1 
(1987). Arne Rasmusson defends Hauerwas against this charge. His argument, in part, is that Hauerwas’ critics beg 
the question by assuming Troeltsch’s distinction between the church (which has a positive connotation) and the sect 
(which has a negative connotation). This leads to a blending of pejorative theological connotations of sect as 
heterodox and the sociological definition of sect as an isolated community. Rasmusson insists that Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology transcends these categories. His is not a sect but a polis, which indicates that the church is a community 
with a story, and thus a politics, that counters the politics of the modern nation-state. Rasmusson, 183-89, 210-230, 
231-34, 245-47. In my opinion, Rasmusson has committed two related errors. First, he has stacked the deck by 
defining sect so pejoratively. Troeltsch defines the sect much more benignly. He writes of the sect, “Their attitude 
towards the world, the State, and Society may be indifferent, tolerant, or hostile, since they have no desire to control 
and incorporate these forms of social life; on the contrary, they tend to avoid them; their aim is usually either to 
tolerate their presence alongside of their own body, or even to replace these social institutions by their own society.” 
This is a rather broad description of a “sect.” Thus, in the second place, Rasmusson’s definition of the church as a 
polis – a counter-political community – conforms to Troeltsch’s actual description of a sect. In other words, 
Troeltsch definition of a sect is Rasmusson’s definition of the church. Therefore, it is not entirely clear against whom 
Rasmusson is arguing. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans., Olive Wyon, vol. 1 
(New York: MacMillan, 1931), 330-31. Rasmusson has basically repeated the argument Hauerwas himself made in 
“Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up,” Theology Today 44, no. 1 (1987): 87. Furthermore, in the case of both authors, 
the question is not whether Hauerwas intends to be a sectarian but whether his ecclesiology defines the church in a 
sectarian way. 
ecclesiology, but his concern extends to those methods, whereby “some historic point gets 
frozen” and “becomes the basis for contemporary faith and life.”54 In an address to the Catholic 
Theological Society of America, he credited George Lindbeck in particular with providing the 
theological basis for a point of view that makes “the task of doctrine…to maintain an aspect of 
culture called Christianity.”55 The crux of Gustafson’s argument focuses on the way the 
“sectarian” theologians have been misreading the Barthian tradition as well as Niebuhr (their 
foil) to justify their assumption that “the Church or the Christian community is sociologically 
and culturally isolable from the wider society and culture of which it is a part.”56 Again, 
Gustafson actually devotes very little attention to a critique of Hauerwas, whom he mentions 
only as example of Lindbeckianism “expressed in ethics.”57 Hauerwas’ reaction was stronger 
than Gustafson’s critique and reveals what the former takes to be at stake in his ecclesiology. 
 Hauerwas balked at the apparent charge of “sectarianism.” He defends himself against 
Gustafson’s perceived attack, in large part, by referring to his previous writings, which he says 
demonstrate how Christians can be of great service to secular culture. However, the manner of 
his apology indicates that he may have misunderstood what is at stake in the accusation.58 Citing 
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54 Gustafson’s critique does focus on methodological issues, given its timing – a year after The Nature of Doctrine 
was published – as well as the attention it devotes to Lindbeck himself. However, as the term “sectarian” implies, he 
also has teased out some of the ecclesiological implications of Lindbeck’s methodology. The crux of his argument 
was that postliberal methodology is conceptually flawed because the church is always already implicated in its 
culture. By foregrounding the incendiary term “sectarianism” (however benignly intended) in his critique of 
postliberal methodologies, Gustafson helped focus subsequent debate about this method specifically on its 
ecclesiological implications. He helped make the debate over postliberal method an ecclesiological one, especially 
as Hauerwas responded to him. James Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church 
and the University,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 40, no. (1985): 84. Hauerwas, 
Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between 1-21. 
55 Gustafson: 86.
56 Ibid.: 90.
57 Ibid.: 88.
58 Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between 1-21.  
Vision and Virtue, Hauerwas says that he has always maintained “that insofar as the church can 
reclaim its integrity as a community of virtue, it can be of great service to liberal societies.”59 
However, the nature of this service is not entirely clear. In that book Hauerwas does devote an 
essay to the subject of the common good, which we might associate with liberal society. His 
argument is that the common good is not to be achieved by the oppressiveness of a morally 
neutral pluralism, but by the moralization of politics. He says (in somewhat ambiguous terms) 
that this moralization happens not from the church making pronouncements on political issues, 
but simply by being itself.60 What exactly the “self” the church is remains unclear, but later 
Hauerwas does indicate how the church becomes itself. In a statement reminiscent of Lindbeck’s 
critiques of experiential-expressivism, Hauerwas writes, 
“[T]heologians continue to foster the idea that the church’s mission is to translate 
the gospel into the pieties of contemporary culture – that her mission is to 
spiritualize our civilization and our lives by identifying the current moralisms 
with the meaningfulness of salvation…but such a view of the church’s mission, I 
would argue, is theologically askew. The church is not called to build culture or to 
supply the moral tone of civilization, old or new. The church is called to preach 
that the kingdom of God has come close in the person and work of Jesus Christ. It 
is only as the church becomes a community separate from the predominant culture 
that she has the space and rest from which to speak the truth to that culture.”61  
Thus, the “service” he advocates is premised on the church counterposing itself to its 
“predominant culture” in order to stand as a kind of unique alternative to it. 
 Continuing his response to Gustafson, an exasperated Hauerwas declares that such 
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59 In Ibid., 77-103, 123-42, 191-200. 
60 Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, 234-40.  
61 Ibid., 245. Emphasis mine.
writings will probably not persuade “those who are convinced I am a ‘withdrawn’ sectarian.”62 
This response is ironic since Hauerwas has done little to address the charge that his ecclesiology 
does not allow for a constructive engagement of culture. In fact, his above defense only 
underscored the need for the church to draw divisions between itself and its surrounding culture. 
 Hauerwas’ apology suggests he misunderstands the charge. He seems to think he is being 
accused of wanting the church to “withdraw” into a kind of “holy huddle,” but Gustafson’s point 
is not that sectarians advocate ecclesial separation. He only uses the word “withdraw” once, and 
then to describe its impossibility. He does not say that Hauerwas wants the church to withdraw 
from society. His point is about the intellectual integrity of the postliberal perspective, which he 
says ignores the fact that Christian morality is shaped by extra-ecclesial institutions in which 
Christians participate. Because such participation is inevitable, Gustafson says, “[E]ither 
Christians are put into positions of intense inner conflict, or they must withdraw from 
participation in any structures which would presumably compromise their fidelity to Jesus.”63 In 
other words, sectarianism is not so much an accusation as a point of critique that stems from an 
inference. He is saying that withdrawal from society is the only option if one is to avoid the 
otherwise inevitable Christian cognitive dissonance that results from living as if the narratives of 
the church were the only narratives that mattered for Christian morality. Hauerwas is not a 
sectarian in the sense that he believes the church can or should retreat from culture, but in that he 
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62 Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between 7. Emphasis mine.
63 William J. Weston has made a similar complaint of Hauerwas’ doctrine of the church. On the one hand Hauerwas 
wants to make the church the subject of the Christian’s exclusive loyalty, defined by taking a stance against modern 
secular culture. On the other he wants a church that is “open” to the world around it and can work with extra-
ecclesial institutions to make that world better. Weston complains that “Hauerwas wants to have his cake and eat it, 
too.” The result being that Hauerwas’ ecclesiology lands squarely on the side of sectarianism with no way of 
accounting for the goal of constructive engagement with culture. See William J. Weston, “The Invisible Church : 
The Missing Element in Hauerwas' a Community of Character,” Journal of Religious Studies 13, no. 2 (1987): 104.
believes it is possible to be Christian as if the politics and practices of the gospel are the only 
kind of politics and practices that shape us. It is the fundamentally antagonistic relationship 
Hauerwas presumes between the church and secular society that makes his ecclesiological 
position sectarian.64  
John Milbank’s Postliberal Triumphalism
 Though to a certain extent the charge of “sectarianism” might aptly apply to Milbank as 
well as Hauerwas, triumphalism is a better descriptor for his view of the church because, if for 
Hauerwas the relationship between the church and society is one of political antagonism, for 
John Milbank it is one of discursive conquest. The church is the eschatological realization of the 
kingdom of God in history when it becomes not just the dominant institution in society, but 
society itself, regulating human behavior (Sittlichkeit) through the proper ordering of human 
thought and language. Milbank explicitly sees his project as a development on the work of 
Lindbeck (as well as Frei, whom he lumps together with him). After summarizing this 
connection, I will present Milbank’s ecclesiology in the context of his critique of modernity to 
see how, building on Augustine, he intends to take all thoughts captive not to Christ, per se, but 
to the institution that is the earthly realization of his mission. 
 Though (again) my intent is not to show that Milbank depends on Lindbeck, it is worth 
noting that he directly credits George Lindbeck (as well as Frei) for the development of his own 
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64 Some may object that it is inappropriate for me to accuse an ethicist of having anything like an ecclesiology. Such 
an objection would be ironic given Hauerwas’s own refusal to distinguish between the two fields. Every ethics 
presupposes a theology, he would say. Insofar as he makes asseverations as something of a popular theologian, a 
critical examination of his theology is appropriate. Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church 
Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2000), 117-128.
ecclesiology, for calling “us back to narrative as being that alone which can ‘identify’ God for 
us.”65 He does think Lindbeck needs some modification, however, but only to make the 
presumed methodological implications of Nature of Doctrine more deliberately ecclesiological. 
Milbank’s main critique of Lindbeck relates to the static way he thinks about narrative. As stated 
above, though Lindbeck does not come out and say it, an implication of his methodology is that 
the interpretive community is tantamount to the text of intratextualism, inasmuch as the rituals 
and narratives of that community shape its reading of its physical text (its “book”). Milbank 
builds on this idea by finding problematic the way that Lindbeck conceives of the “performance” 
of these narratives, which he thinks of as being “defined in advance by the exemplary narratives 
of Jesus,” as if those narratives were deposited at some point in time and now all we must do is 
live within them (and how a particular cultural-linguistic community could receive such a 
deposit as “something new” remains an aporia in Lindbeck’s theology), as if we were not 
constantly taking them up again and reinterpreting them in new situations.66 As a result of living 
in these “fixed narratives,” Milbank says, “There is no real possibility here for Christianity to 
exert a critical influence on its cultural receptacles, nor for these in turn to criticize 
Christianity.”67 To a certain extent the church may operate in those narratives, but the church is 
not a character within them as Lindbeck seems to presume. If that were the case, the church 
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65 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 
387.
66 Thus when it comes to christology, Milbank argues that when we read the Gospels we must focus “more upon the 
kingdom than upon Jesus.” The coming of Jesus, Milbank claims, is simultaneous with the coming of the church, 
“Jesus figures…simply as the founder, the beginning, the first of many.” The work of Christ is therefore only salvific 
insofar as it is realized in this community. Jesus does not atone but he makes atonement possible in the church, 
which means that the work of Christ is yet to be realized. “Christ’s full incarnate appearance,” Milbank says, “lies 
always ahead of us.” The Incarnation is not yet complete until it is complete in the church. John Milbank, The Word 
Made Strange (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 148, 150, 152.
67 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 388.
would have no way of critically reflecting upon its sources of theology – that which dictates to 
the church what it is. From Milbank's perspective, it is as if Lindbeck's view of the church’s 
relationship to the Bible is like a person held captive to the Matrix, unable to evaluate or critique 
the story in which she also is being told. Thus, in Milbank’s estimation, for Lindbeck to think of 
the story of Christ as a paradigm upon which church doctrine is based unmoors Jesus from 
history, and thus also dehistoricizes the church that looks to him for its own story.
 Milbank intends to “correct” Lindbeck by making explicit the priority of the interpretive 
community: the text of Christianity is not Jesus but, in a manner of speaking, the church. But the 
narratives of the church have not been deposited in history anymore than the narratives of Jesus. 
This book is still open. Though Milbank says the church is actually part of another narrative – 
the realization of the kingdom – he indicates that the church is that through which the kingdom is 
to be realized. In a passage so pregnant with meaning it must be quoted in its entirety, Milbank 
writes, 
 For we do not relate to the story of Christ by schematically applying its 
categories to the empirical content of whatever we encounter. Instead, we 
interpret this narrative in a response which inserts us in a narrative relation to the 
‘original’ story. First and foremost, the Church stands in a narrative relationship to 
Jesus and the Gospels, within a story that subsumes both. This must be the case, 
because no historical story is ever ‘over and done with’. Furthermore, the New 
Testament itself does not preach any denial of historicity, nor any disappearance 
of our own personalities into the monistic truth of Christ. Quite to the contrary, 
Jesus’s mission is seen as inseparable from his preaching of the Kingdom, and 
inauguration of a new sort of community, the Church. Salvation is available for us 
after Christ, because we can be incorporated into the community which he 
founded, and the response of this community to Christ is made possible by the 
response to the divine Son of the divine Spirit, from whom it receives the love 
that flows between Son and Father. The association of the Church with the 
response of the Spirit which arises ‘after’ the Son, and yet is fully divine, shows 
that the new community belongs from the beginning within the new narrative 
manifestation of God. Hence the metanarrative is not just the story of Jesus, it is 
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the continuing story of the Church, already realized in a finally exemplary way by 
Christ, yet still to be realized universally, in harmony with Christ, and yet 
differently, by all generations of Christians.
Though Milbank says the church and Jesus and the Gospels are “subsumed” by a single story, the 
church is nonetheless the culmination of that story. Milbank rightly says that Christ is 
inseparable from his mission, which includes “the preaching of the Kingdom” and the 
“inauguration of a new sort of community.”68 
 Milbank does not indicate that this mission is a two-step process, but both comprise the 
singular mission of Jesus in a way that seems to conflate the preaching of the kingdom with the 
establishment of the church. I indicated above preference for Yoder’s idea that the ministry of 
Jesus was to establish the church to be a foretaste of the kingdom, but for Yoder the church’s 
conformity to the kingdom is regulated by its adherence to Jesus. Even Lindbeck seems to intend 
Jesus (or the Bible’s testimony about him) to be the narrative norm for judging the validity of 
Christian doctrine. For Milbank, however, this priority is reversed insofar as “the story of Jesus” 
is included in “the continuing story of the church.”69 Milbank takes up Lindbeck’s idea that the 
church is an intratextual community, conforming the world to itself rather than adapting itself to 
the world, but he is even more confident in the integrity of the church than Lindbeck because for 
Milbank the central axis around which the church revolves and against which its doctrines can be 
tested is the church itself. The priority Yoder gave Christ vis-à-vis the church as a foretaste of the 
kingdom appears to have been reversed by Milbank. That is not to say that the church does not 
err. Indeed, most of Theology and Social Theory blames the church – or at least church 
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theologians – for giving rise to modernity, liberalism, and nihilism. Yet these errors do not call 
into question the fundamental priority the self-understanding of the church has for the triumph of 
the kingdom on earth. It just means that, if modernity is the “bastard child” of “bad” Christian 
theology (fathered by Duns Scotus70), then “good” Christian theology (radical orthodoxy) must 
work all the more to right our ecclesial course.
 The church’s conquest of the secular is not physical, but insofar as it is ideological it is 
visible. (An early article which I will discuss at length in the next chapter confirms this. In it, 
Milbank says the church must visibly absorb the secular by making penance the currency of a 
visible ecclesial economy, thereby exposing the coercion and violence of the secular.71) For 
Milbank, by demonstrating the unfreedom of secular liberalism, with its ideas of human rights 
and individual liberty, the church shows itself to be a more peaceful and free alternative to the it. 
The secular is characterized by a simple understanding of space that tries to account for all the 
parts within the larger whole. Milbank argues for the peace of the visible church on the grounds 
that it understands space differently; its understanding of the relationship between the parts and 
the whole is more complex and less organized. Within the church the parts are arranged within 
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70 Only theology can address this problem because it was theology that created it. The secular begins by reimagining 
the relationship between God and the world. Though Milbank acknowledges that Kant and Descartes played a large 
role in the philosophical structuring of modernity, it was Duns Scotus who laid its foundations. Thomistic 
metaphysics, following Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa, recognized that God did not exist in the same way that 
creatures exist. God’s essence is God’s existence. Creatures exist as a gift – by participation in God’s existence. 
Therefore, Thomas Aquinas understood the worth of a creature to derive solely from its dependence upon God. But 
Scotist univocal metaphysics “flattens out” being, so that existence is something that both God and creatures share. 
What this does, Milbank argues, is release humanity from dependence upon the divine by positing creaturely self-
subsistence. James K. A. Smith sums up this perspective saying, “Scotus’s univocal ontology … reduces God while 
at the same time exalting creatures; the result is a double idolatry that stands in contrast to Aquinas’s metaphysics of 
participation.” The Scotist idolization of the creature enabled Kant completely to occlude any participation between 
finite and infinite being, and Descartes to posit the existence of God solely from the perspective of the self-
awareness of the individual, disembodied soul, etc. See ibid., 278-325. Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 47. John 
Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, 
Radical Orthodoxy (New York: Routledge, 2001), 33-35. James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: 
Mapping  a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 98.
71 John Milbank, “An Essay against Secular Order,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 15, no. 2 (1987).
the whole. There are, for instance, canons which specify the political structures and individual 
practices normative for all the churches. On the other hand, in complex space the parts also 
deconstruct the whole. In the Orthodox Church, for instance, there are some canons that are 
simply “dead” (such as those requiring all bishops to memorize the Psalter), with no real 
explanation for why they are dead. They simply no longer conform to the will of the body. I 
mention Orthodoxy because in his essay “The Last of the Last,” Milbank expands upon the idea 
of complex space to explain how power-differentials operate in such a system. There he indicates 
that he has the Orthodox doctrine of conciliarity in mind.72 In Orthodoxy synods may meet to 
decide on a course of action, or even doctrine, for the whole church, but the synod is only 
considered legitimate if it is succeeded by the “Amen” of the people. Thus the parts – the 
“official” rulings of the council of bishops – are deconstructed by the whole church’s refusal to 
recognize them, thereby declaring the council not really to have been a council at all. In this way 
ecclesial relationships are orderly without being ordered, peaceful without being coerced. 
 Thus, in the conclusion of Theology and Social Theory Milbank imagines the triumphant 
church – the church that has persuasively exposed all the heresies of modernity, fully to “take 
every thought captive to Christ”73 – as “the Other City,” the kingdom of God on earth. While it is 
true, Milbank says, that the church gave rise to the problems of modernity, liberalism and 
nihilism, it is even more true that the church is the answer to them. As Milbank said in “Against 
Secular Reason,” salvation is completely corporate, to be saved from one kind of polis into 
another kind of polis (the parallel to Hauerwas is worth noting). For Milbank, the choice is 
simple, “In the midst of history, the judgment of God has already happened. And either the 
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73 2 Cor. 10:5, paraphrased.
Church enacts the vision of paradisal community which this judgment opens out, or else it 
promotes a hellish society beyond any terrors known to antiquity…”74 This statement indicates 
that Milbank understands the final judgment of God not to come at some point in the future, but, 
in a manner of speaking, the parousia has already happened.  The sheep already have been 
separated from the goats, and it is up to the church to realize this judgment through the 
instantiation of its own ontology of peace in the way I described above. The significance of this 
eschatology is that Milbank makes the kingdom realizable in the visible church in history. The 
judgment of God waits upon us to realize it. This visible City, critiquing and correcting itself not 
by “Protestant” excision but by a constant “metanarratival” self-deconstruction, like a constantly 
growing and changing Gothic cathedral, inaugurates and is itself the fulfillment of this peace.
 I will say more about the relationship between the church and the kingdom in the next 
chapter. The point now is only to observe how John Milbank’s confidence in the visible Christian 
community and its mission makes this ecclesiology triumphalist. Like Hauerwas, Milbank has 
identified Christian salvation as incorporation into a visible community (the conceptual problems 
of refusing to distinguish between the true and the visible church – as Milbank does – will be 
saved for later). But unlike Hauerwas, the mission of the church is not to continue itself by 
inculcating Christian offspring in the “craft” of Christianity. It is to expose modernity as the 
heresy it is. Because the mission of Christ – indeed the narrative of Christ from which the church 
draws its inspiration – is the church itself, then to take all thoughts captive to Christ actually 
means to take all thoughts captive to the church. Though Milbank does not deny the necessity of 
coercion, he prefers to think of this approach as persuasion. The weapon in this war with 
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modernity is rhetoric, and the peace of Christ will come when we moderns learn to accept this 
new view of history, wherein no thought is thinkable without thinking of Christ manifestly 
continued in his church. 
Postliberal Ecclesiology and Christian Cognitive Dissonance
 This section will draw the preceding presentations to a close by arguing that, despite the 
substantial differences between Milbankian triumphalism and Hauerwasian sectarianism, their 
accounts of the narthex are functionally nearly identical. Again, the narthex in this essay refers to 
the way we relate church and secular culture at the level of contemporary Christian practice – the 
“nitty gritty” of everyday discipleship. In doing so, it will raise the problem that my constructive 
alternative will work to overcome, tying the first methodological section together with the 
second ecclesiological section by applying Volf’s critique of Lindbeck to Hauerwas and 
Milbank’s similar visions of the relationship between the church and secular culture.
 One advantage of Milbank and Hauerwas’ ecclesiologies is that they seem to remove 
much of the ambiguity that comes from living in modern society. We express our loyalty to 
Christ’s kingdom in the church. True! But for Milbank and Hauerwas the church is in 
contradistinction to  nearly every thought and institution we associate with modern secular 
society. To be Christian is not to be liberal, democratic (for its own sake), capitalist, etc. For 
them, Yes to Christ’s kingdom requires a deliberate No to the secular. Each may conceive of this 
Yes and No differently. Generally speaking, Milbank focuses on intellectual and rhetorical 
triumph over modernity that, by exposing its heresies, sublates it to the visible peace of the 
church. Hauerwas, on the other hand, focuses on reinvigorating a pre-Constantinian sense of the 
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Christian church as a sect in the midst of modernity. For him, the church’s job is to focus on its 
own particularity, thereby resisting all forms of “Niebuhrianism” that would tempt us to water 
down gospel truth by translating our narratives – that can only be communally enacted – into 
extra biblical idioms. While the application of these ecclesiologies takes different forms, what 
unites them is the sharp boundary they draw between the church and the secular. This could 
explain the appeal they increasingly have among theological conservatives and disaffected 
evangelicals. Each allows individuals to stress in some way or another the traditional beliefs and 
practices of the church in the face of an increasingly fragmented and fragmenting society. In 
short, postliberal ecclesiology attractively promises the church and its doctrines as stable ground 
in the often disorienting and disintegrating effects secular culture can have on Christian 
discipleship.
 The charge Volf made against Lindbeck shows the problem with this ecclesiological 
perspective. The church is no more impermeable to the world than is the postliberal text. Just as 
the reader approaches the text pre-formed by her culture, the Christian exists in an interactive 
relationship between the church and the secular.75 The church cannot absorb the world anymore 
than Bible can because neither is a static entity. Both are only insofar as they are acted upon by 
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always already inside each other. Tanner, 93ff.
the people who encounter them. The Bible is our reading of it. The church is our participation in 
it. That does not mean either the Bible or the church is reducible to our subjective experiences of 
them, only that neither Bible nor church can be separated from our subjective experiences. Like 
scripture, the meaning of the church changes depending upon the people who are in it. To say 
otherwise would make the church not an instrument of God’s salvation in the world, but a kind of 
totem or perhaps the artifact of a bygone era. If the church has life today it is because it is made 
up of real, living human beings, people who operate in the world and are shaped by it, people 
who shop and vote and pay taxes. In all these actions, we not only find ourselves shaped by the 
secular, but we support the secular. If the church is its people who inhabit both the church and 
the secular at the same time – if the body of Christ is porous – then for the church to be is to be 
counterposed to the secular. The house of God thus divided cannot stand (Mark 3:25). 
 That is not to say that is not a certain appeal to the way Milbank and Hauerwas 
counterpose the church to the secular. They do have the effect of driving Christians into their 
narratives of the church and its scriptures in an honest attempt to live out from within them, but 
this benefit comes at too high a cost. Namely, it is to be Christian with blinders on. That is a 
strong claim, I know. Milbank and Hauerwas would not unjustifiably protest that they are well 
aware that the relationship between the church and secular culture is quite complex and 
interpenetrative. Does not Hauerwas call for tactical alliances between the church and other, non-
Christian groups? Does not Milbank himself appropriate sources antagonistic to the gospel in his 
own metanarrative? I have no doubt that scholars of such intellectual caliber as Milbank and 
Hauerwas are fully aware of the church’s embeddedness in its cultural environs. My point, 
however, is that their ecclesiologies do not account for such embeddedness at the level of 
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Christian practice. It is hard to see how participating in a system against which each so sharply 
counterposes the church – either as an object of rhetorical conquest or a perpetual communal foil 
– does not make our inevitable support of the secular and our participation in it tantamount to 
passive apostasy. Both are aware of the fact of ecclesial engagement with the secular, but there is 
no explanation of how, from within the high walls of the church, such engagements with the 
“enemy” are not deals with the devil. This Christian cognitive dissonance – insisting that we are 
exclusively shaped by the narratives of the church and the gospel when, in fact, we are not (and I 
suspect at some level we know we are not) – is what Gustafson warned us about.76 This is an 
ecclesiological crisis insofar as theologians do not account for the inevitable perichoresis 
between church and secular within the life of the church in a way that informs consistent 
Christian discipleship. 
 The church must not imagine itself as if the people it receives are not in some way pre-
formed (and constantly re-formed) by the world. What it needs instead is a theological account of 
itself in the world. Yet this theological account of the secular must not be made at the expense of 
the postliberal emphasis on Christian identity in the body of Christ. First, from a purely 
pragmatic and strategic standpoint, the religious communities that thrive in modern society are 
those that stress their differences from it. This is fortunate because, secondly, though the New 
Testament bears a diverse witness to Jesus Christ, there is a remarkable unity of testimony when 
it comes to the people who bear his name. The church is “a royal priesthood, a holy nation, 
[God’s] own special people” (1 Peter 2:9). Paul’s lengthy lists of Christian ethical commitments 
(such as in Ephesians 3 and Galatians 5:16-6:10) are not legalistic injunctions that must be 
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followed to avoid divine wrath (though they might be that) but the characteristics of an 
eschatological people, of a people he expects to live differently than the world that is “passing 
away” (1 Corinthians 7:31). So, while Milbank and Hauerwas’ insistence on the unique identity 
of the church is misconceived, from the perspective of the New Testament it is not necessarily 
misinformed. What we need instead is to account for the presence of the secular in the narthex 
while simultaneously preserving Milbank and Hauerwas’ laudable emphasis on ecclesial identity. 
Conclusion
 The ultimate aim of this essay is to develop such an alternative to postliberal 
ecclesiology. The vision of the church Milbank and Hauerwas espouse has a certain appeal we 
should not ignore. As I said in the introduction to this essay, modern secular society has a 
disintegrating influence on the church. This goes beyond purely intellectual challenges to faith, 
which in the history of modern theology have been rehearsed almost to death. In terms of 
practice, which most concerns us, this disintegration is experienced in the way individuals’ sense 
of themselves – who they are and how they behave in the world – is unwittingly shaped by extra-
Christian and extra-biblical forces, and the struggle to reconcile themselves to their influence. 
The market calls us homo economicus rather than imago Dei. Likewise, science invites us to 
think of ourselves not as uniquely crafted beings but the products of evolutionary forces – 
remarkable, but not inherently so. The state calls upon us to see ourselves as citizens rather than 
disciples. In the absence of often conflictual and ever-shifting identity markers, the invitation to 
think of ourselves first and foremost as baptized, and the call to stand with a troop against an 
identified enemy, can be quite appealing. It is inconsistent, but appealing. Therefore, postliberal 
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ecclesiology requires an “high church” response.77 
 Such a response is required because, as I argued above, sharp lines of demarcation 
between church and culture lead to Christian practice that is no less problematic. We cannot 
know how to relate ourselves to the influences the secular has upon us if we are blind to them. It 
is thus that I referred to postliberal ecclesiology as indicating an ecclesiological crisis. Being a 
disciple is difficult enough without being called to accidental ignorance regarding all the ways 
we are influenced by and support the secular in our everyday actions. Christian discipleship is 
never perfect, never fully consistent, but surely it can be less in-consistent than that! 
 In the fourth chapter, I am going to begin developing an alternative to postliberal 
ecclesiology that stresses ecclesial identity without counterposing the church to the secular, but 
such a call requires us first to inspect a little closer the streams that flow into Milbank and 
Hauerwas’ comparable account of the church-world limen. This, because this chapter has only 
pointed out the problem postliberal ecclesiology creates for Christian practice. I have not 
identified the source of that problem – why postliberal ecclesiology is able to draw such a sharp 
line between church and secular culture – which is necessary to for an alternative to explain how 
to avoid it. 
 An ecclesiology of the narthex concerns itself with the relationship between the church 
and the world, seeking an engaged ecclesiology that stresses the unique identity of the church. As 
it turns out, so I shall argue in a moment, the way to accomplish both ends is to focus on the 
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77 Admittedly, liberal theology offers a highly consistent account of the relationship between the church and the 
secular. The church is regarded as an institution inherently subject to change. I do not want to be seen as dismissing 
liberal theology, but this is not the place to discuss it. Insofar as I am constructing an alternative to postliberal 
ecclesiology, I can rightly be seen appealing to Hauerwas and Milbank’s theological audience. As far as that 
objective is concerned, a liberal view of the church is a tactical dead end. For a synoptic account of liberal theology's 
vision of the church and the world, see Peter C. Hodgson, Liberal Theology: A Radical Vision (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2007).
presence of the kingdom of God in the church and the world. In other words, a consistent 
account of Christian practice in secular culture, coordinates church, world, and the kingdom, 
while preserving a postliberal stress on the uniqueness of the church. The excessive confidence 
of postliberal ecclesiology and the inconsistent Christian practice to which it leads, as it turns 
out, is funded by a misunderstanding of those three terms (church, world, and kingdom). In 
chapter three I will argue that both Milbank and Hauerwas think of the kingdom of God in the 
church and against the world when, in fact, so I will say in chapters four and following, to 
prioritize Christian identity while accounting for our support of and formation by the secular, we 
must see the kingdom of God as that which gives life to both.
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CHAPTER III
THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE CHURCH:
REINFORCING CHRISTIAN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
The kingdom of God does not come with observation…
 Luke 17:20
 The kingdom of God hides. We think we know where to find it because we have 
experienced it in the church. We have felt the kingdom in the kiss of peace, in warm wine on our 
tongues, and in the “perfected praise” of jabbering infants who do not know they are supposed to 
be quiet during the homily (Matthew 21:16). At least, we think these things are the kingdom 
happening. It is hard to know for sure where the kingdom happens when angels look like the 
intense piety of aged widows. To glimpse a wing peeking out from under an overcoat would be 
more assuring. Yet, this ambiguity is as God intended. “Blessed are those who have not seen and 
yet have believed” (John 20:29). This is perhaps because too much certainty is a dangerous thing 
in a fallen world. Already prone to believe we are right despite the evidence, the last thing we 
need is the presumption of divine assurance of our own veracity. So, it is a good thing that we 
have to experience the kingdom of God in soggy bread, holy hugs, and infants’ squeals. Were we 
not so conditioned to look for the kingdom of God in the ambiguous things of life, we might find 
ourselves possessed of an excessive and false confidence in our own holiness, and the sinfulness, 
heresy, or apostasy of everything else. 
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 Of course, this failure to see the church and the world as they really are is the problem of 
Christian cognitive dissonance. Though Christian cognitive dissonance can have many causes, 
chapter one laid most of the blame on ecclesiologies that apply the methodological 
unidirectionality of George Lindbeck to the church. It is worth repeating that the previous 
chapter did not lay the blame on Lindbeck himself. Any suggestion of dependence was 
secondary to an argument for analogy. To wit, in the ecclesiologies of Milbank and Hauerwas, 
the church is to culture as Lindbeck’s text is to culture; therefore, Volf’s critique against 
Lindbeck’s unidirectionality can also apply to their ecclesiologies, the logic of which should see 
any consorting with the secular “enemy” as apostasy. That neither author would admit such 
confirms the cognitive dissonance of their respective ecclesiological extremes. Whatever 
dependence there may be upon Lindbeck is certainly a factor in these extremes, but it is not the 
only cause. If it were, then my argument would involve critiquing and correcting Lindbeck or 
their readings of him.1
 Christian cognitive dissonance comes from an ecclesiology that defines itself against 
secular culture, but such definitions are made possible by excessive confidence in the capacity of 
the visible church to stand as some kind of purer alternative to or critic of the secular, points of 
view which are funded by a realized eschatology. The last chapter already indicated that Milbank 
and Hauerwas tend to identify the church with the kingdom of God. This chapter will make that 
claim outright. In particular, it will show that the way Milbank and Hauerwas collapse the 
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1 My intention to focus on practice is thus partly informed by Francesca Aran Murphy’s observation about the nature 
of contemporary theology. Murphy has observed in her recent book that theology nowadays seems to focus 
increasingly on methodology at the expense of doctrine (which method is supposed to serve). We are not “doing” 
theology because we are bickering about how we are doing theology, with the result that how we do theology 
becomes the theology we end up doing. Thus, method itself, she says, has become the content of much 
contemporary theology. Francesca Aran Murphy, God Is Not a Story: Realism Revisited (New York: Oxford, 2007), 
5.
kingdom of God into the visible church leaves their respective ecclesiological extremes as the 
only practical options. 
 In other words, cognitively dissonant ecclesiologies rest on a foundation of realized 
eschatology. In this chapter I am going to make the case that Milbank and Hauerwas identify the 
visible church with the kingdom of God, but I am going to develop this argument in Augustinian 
terms. Though other scholars have argued that Milbank and Hauerwas conflate the church and 
the kingdom, I propose, in Augustinian terms, that they confuse the “visible” and “invisible” 
church, which allows for a bit more precision, getting across the same basic point without 
running the risk of separating the two (the kingdom and the church).2 The kingdom of God is 
present in the church, after all (a conviction upon which the alternative I propose later will rely). 
To make the equivalent claim, however, that Milbank and Hauerwas fail to distinguish between 
the “visible” church and the “City of God” (which correspond to what modern scholars mean by 
the church and the kingdom3) is to state, more specifically, that they fail to distinguish between 
the clearly imperfect church we have before us now and its own eschatological perfection (also 
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2  I am thus reiterating in different words what others have already said. Nicholas Lash, “Not Exactly Politics or 
Power,” Modern Theology 8, no. 4 (1992): 362. Aidan Nichols, “'Non Tali Auxilio': John Milbank's Suasion to 
Orthodoxy,” New Blackfriars 73, no. 861 (1992): 331-32. Kerr, 123-24.
3 For instance, though Moltmann is critical of Augustine’s eschatology, he does rightly recognize the equivalence 
between what Augustine called the heavenly city and what we mean to day by the kingdom of God. Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit:  A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1991), 180-82. Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans., Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 138. 
proleptically present in it).4 It implies that they see this fallen church as in some sense already 
perfect. The second reason for developing this thesis in Augustinian terms is that it funds a focus 
on Christian practice, particularly when it comes to the presence of the kingdom of God in our 
eucharistic gatherings, but more on this in the final chapter. In this chapter, I will develop my 
argument first by presenting their readings of Augustine on the church, then comparing it to what 
Augustine actually said, and finally showing how their refusal of what I will call the Augustinian 
distinction (between the “visible” and “invisible” church5) leads to their respective 
ecclesiological extremes. 
Refusing the “Invisible” Church
 Some theologians reject the concept of the “invisible” church because they feel it 
prioritizes an imagined “perfect” body over this broken one. Serene Jones’ work is typical of a 
perspective that prefers a “messy church” to an “invisible” one.6 Though I do not want to take 
away from a more thorough discussion of Augustine below, a word or two about his ecclesiology 
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4 Others have observed how both tend toward a realized eschatology. On the realized eschatology of Hauerwas see 
Mark Gingerich, “The Church as Kingdom: The Kingdom of God in the Writings of Stanley Hauerwas and John 
Howard Yoder,” Didaskalia (Otterburne, Man.) 19, no. 1 (2008). Gingerich appears to have filtered his reading of 
Yoder through Hauerwas, thereby largely conflating the two. John B. Thomson observes that Hauerwas’ attempt to 
“purge” the church of the uncleanness of its liberal adulterations amounts to “a scaled-down version of the 
Constantinian settlement,” insofar as it intends to be “a distinctive society with a distribution of powers that are not 
solely clerically led and cultically focused.” John B. Thomson, The Ecclesiology of Stanley Hauerwas : A Christian 
Theology of Liberation, Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology & Biblical Studies (Aldershot, Hants, 
England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 206-7. The same is true of Milbank, who, in “Last of the Last,” 
practically equates the eschaton with radical orthodoxy when he writes, “Theologians who may be the last of the last 
still have an ecclesial task before them,” which is the fusion of “High mediaevalism” with “Christian socialism,” i.e. 
the radically orthodox project. Milbank, Being Reconciled, 137. 
5 My use of inverted commas around these terms indicates that I do not think they are the most precise for 
Augustine’s ecclesiology. More on that below. 
6  Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace, Guides to Theological Inquiry 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 174. See also Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume 2: The Works of God, 
vol. 2 (New York: Oxford, 1999), 174. Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity, 
ed. Alan G. Padgett, Sacra Doctrina: Christian Theology for a Postmodern Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 
270. Volf is actually dealing with the Westminster Confession, not Augustine, but insofar as the former is a reading 
of the latter, it is reasonable to see this as a rejection of Augustine's ecclesiology on this point as well. 
might helpfully clarify my subsequent critique of Milbank and Hauerwas’ misreading of him. I 
mentioned Jones’ preference for a “messy” ecclesial body because she exemplifies a common 
misperception about the difference between the “visible” and “invisible” church. As I will say in 
more detail later, Augustine understood ecclesial invisibility actually to foreground ecclesial 
“messiness.” In other words, he and Jones are in agreement on their preference for “messy” 
bodies. As a bishop, Augustine was keenly aware of the moral weaknesses of his congregants. He 
also had to contend with the Donatists, who divided the church by insisting on a visibly pure 
communion. The visible-invisible distinction allowed Augustine to counter their claims by 
insisting that God’s salvation was present, despite the visible sinfulness of the church. In other 
words, it enabled Augustine to insist that in this fallen church, God’s salvation is still present.
 Furthermore, this distinction keeps the body of Christ from falling into hubris, the kind 
that can beset postliberal ecclesiologies. Milbank and Hauerwas reject ecclesial invisibility in 
favor of the particularity of the church either in triumph over or as an alternative to secular 
culture. Neither would claim the church is a perfect institution, but that is not the point. 
Admissions of some ecclesial blemishes are undermined by the way they reject ecclesial 
“invisibility.” In their concern that this distinction robs the church of a substantive critique of the 
modern secular, they weaken the eschatological thrust of Augustine’s ecclesiology by making 
dangerously clear a kingdom it seems God would have be ambiguous. Because Hauerwas’ 
reading of Augustine seems to depend on Milbank, we begin with the Briton. 
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Postmodern Critical Augustinian Ecclesiology
 In recent years Milbank has turned toward the nouvelle theologie and sophiology, but his 
debt to Augustine is early and significant.7 The emergence of radical orthodoxy (originally 
postmodern critical Augustinianism) is generally considered to have begun with the publication 
of Theology and Social Theory.8 However, in many ways an essay published a few years prior, 
“Against Secular Order,” is a surprisingly readable, more specifically ecclesiological, synopsis of 
what would become the argument of Theology and Social Theory. Though this particular essay 
offers more precise insight into Milbank’s reading of Augustine’s ecclesiology, we begin by 
situating it within the context of his metanarrative, without which his vision of the church makes 
little sense. 
 In a way, Milbank’s method is his ecclesiology insofar as “the situating of oneself within 
such a continuing narrative [which theology gives] is what it means to belong to the Church, to 
be Christian.”9 In other words, to be Christian is to have one’s own story located in the ongoing 
story of the people of God. This understanding of salvation, which from this perspective is 
entirely communal, is a Christian appropriation of the insights of postmodernism. One of the 
accidental gifts of postmodernism to theology is the destabilization of modernity’s fixed 
essences. Claims that once required allegedly stable epistemic ground have given way to a kind 
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7 See John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand 
Rapids, Mich; London: Eerdmans, 2005). And John Milbank, “Sophiology and Theurgy: The New Theological 
Horizon,” in Encounter between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World through the 
Word, ed. Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).
8 John Milbank, “'Postmodern Critical Augustinianism': A Short Summa in Forty Two Responses to Unasked 
Questions,” Modern Theology 7, no. 3 (1991). This essay seems to have been intended to draw further attention to 
the book and to situate it as the beginning of a “movement.” 
9 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 253.
of narratival fluidity that mirrors faith. With no sure ground ever to stand upon, the world is once 
again, at every moment, creatio ex nihilo. Like the creation in Genesis, Milbank says, we inhabit, 
“A reality suspended between nothing and infinity…a reality without substance, composed only 
of relational differences and ceaseless alterations.”10 However, it turns out this postmodern gift to 
the church comes with some negative consequences. If life is nothing but the “ceaseless 
alterations” of narratives, with no clear criteria for choosing one narrative over another, then any 
narrative is as good as any other. Life becomes a nihilistic version of “King of the Mountain.” 
One set of stories reigns for a time only to be dethroned by another equally valid set. Like the 
child’s game, the only arbiter between narratives is dominium. Postmodernism, says Milbank, 
thus leads to nihilism and ontological violence.11 What we choose to believe (no matter how 
horrific) is, in the end, just a matter of preference and force.
 Methodology shifts to ecclesiology when we consider that Milbank’s solution to this 
postmodern problem is the Christian narrative of “peaceable difference.” This “difference” is not 
just the narrative provided by the church. It is the church itself!12 To accept the Christian 
narrative simply is to be incorporated into a community where difference is not erased but 
embraced in the inclusiveness of agape. The church is the “overcoming of secular power” in “an 
ecclesiastical counter-history…in which historical individuals find their true identity and their 
salvation,” insofar as the church stands as an alternative to the postmodern rule of pure 
dominium.13 The Christian narrative is thus the church’s embrace of difference without violence. 
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10  Milbank, “Postmodern Augustinianism,” 227. 
11 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 278ff.
12 See Kenneth Surin, “Rewriting the Ontological Script of Liberation: On the Question of Finding a New Kind of 
Political Subject,” in Theology and the Political: The New Debate, ed. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj 
*i+ek, Sic (Durham: Duke, 2005), 258-59.
13 Milbank, “Against Secular Order,” 199.
We think the Gospels are about Jesus, wrongly! They are about Jesus only insofar as they are 
about us – his body.14 To be sure, Jesus is born, suffers, is resurrected and (perhaps most 
importantly) ascends, but this is all to make way for “the hypostatic descent of the Spirit” to 
unite the followers of Jesus together in his name.15 Thus, says Milbank, in the Gospels “Jesus 
figures…simply as the founder, the beginning, the first of many.”16 Therefore Jesus was only 
incarnate in a very narrow sense. In “coming to earth” he was being Incarnate, but the 
Incarnation of the Word is not yet complete until it is complete in the church. Says Milbank, 
“Christ’s full incarnate appearance lies always ahead of us – if we love the brethren…”17 Despite 
what Paul seems to say in Galatians 3:8, in the church we continue to recognize differences in 
sex, race, and class. The important aspect of the incarnation is that, in embracing Christ, the 
church embraces all the humanity he assumed. It is not as if difference does not exist. We see 
Jews and Greeks, slave and free, men and women, but we love them.
 This peaceable community is nothing if it is “invisible” because only a “visible” 
community can overcome secular power. In “Against Secular Order,” Milbank says he intends to 
use Augustine’s “post-modernist” renarration of Roman history to correct the largely apolitical 
ecclesiology of Lubac,18 but, Milbank adds, Augustine himself needs revision when it comes to 
the way he distinguishes between the “visible” and “invisible” church.19 In The City of God 
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14 Milbank wrongly attributes this reading of the relationship between Jesus and the church to Frei. The latter 
presumes the New Testament to be normative for the church’s understanding of the identity and presence of Jesus 
Christ in the church, not the other way around. See Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical 
Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), esp. 45ff, 86ff.
15 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 105.
16 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 150.
17 Ibid., 152.
18 Milbank, “Against Secular Order,” 210.
19 Ibid.: 199ff.
Milbank believes Augustine comes close to subordinating the dominium of Rome to the peace of 
the church, but his project fails fully to trace the implications of his ecclesiology. In this 
allegedly “postmodern” exposure of Rome as an empire built upon violence, Augustine retells 
Roman history as the history of the triumph of Christ in the church.20 Thus, in Milbank’s 
estimation, “Augustine effectively treats Roman culture as a ‘text’ in which myth and action are 
fundamentally at one, and claims to expose meanings of this ‘text’ of which the Romans could 
not be consistently aware without removing the corner-stone of illusion upon which their society 
was based.”21 Unfortunately, according to Milbank, Augustine made the mistake of presuming 
the perdurance of the earthly city with the heavenly city until the end of time. This distinction, 
which was both ecclesiological and eschatological, allowed for the toleration of Roman coercion, 
and thus it opened up a space for the exercise of pure dominium, which, as we have already seen, 
is now the fundamental characteristic of postmodernity. 
 Milbank tries to address this apparent problem by making Augustine more Hegelian. He 
says that Hegel’s meditations on “bourgeois property and exchange relations…connects Hegel’s 
philosophy of history to Augustine’s philosophy of history.”22 Because forgiveness cannot be 
given, since we are never able to catch up to the effects of our sins, we are always already put 
into a relationship of mutual indebtedness. This mutual, infinite indebtedness is constitutive of 
the mutual, infinite obligation characteristic of ecclesial peace. Perpetual penance negates the 
“chains of offense and revenge” that constitutes the Roman economy, creating true peace through 
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20 Given that Milbank makes a similar attempt in Theology and Social Theory, it is not too much of a stretch to say 
that Milbank sees Augustine as an intellectual precursor to himself. Though more generous to Milbank than I am, 
James K. A. Smith makes a similar observation. See Smith, 46.
21 Milbank, “Against Secular Order,” 208.
22 Ibid.: 214.
patience and humility, a “life of co-inherence, of constant bearing of each other’s burdens…”23 
In sum, Hegel’s philosophy of history corrects Augustine’s ecclesiology by making “visible” that 
which Augustine left “invisible.” Presumably this would not have been necessary had Augustine 
not distinguished between the “visible” and “invisible” church in the first place. Instead, in an 
important statement that reveals what he takes to be the fundamental implication Augustine’s 
alleged ecclesiological “failure,” Milbank says that the “positive content” of the church 
“becomes invisible and the world is once against ‘handed over to Pilate.’”24  
 Milbank’s criticism of Augustine thus relates to the way he reconciles the fallen church 
now with its perfection in the kingdom. For Milbank the telos of the church is to make “visible” 
the “invisible” through the conquest of the secular in history. He reads Augustine in a way that 
undermines the presence of the “invisible” saints in the visibly mixed body. That is why Milbank 
(wrongly) rejects Augustine’s understanding that “the true Church, the Civitas Dei” is “the 
collection of true believers, known only to God,” calling this view “almost totally erroneous.” “25 
He appreciates how Augustine believes the accession of the church in history means “the realm 
of absolute dominium can progressively recede in time,” but he claims that this recession is 
undermined by the belief that human sinfulness perdures until the eschatological “end of 
history.” In short, he criticizes Augustine for believing that “as long as time persists, there will be 
some sin, and therefore a need for its regulation through worldly dominium and the worldly 
peace.”26 
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24 Ibid.: 214. Emphasis mine. 
25 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 404.
26 Ibid., 405.
 I will save a full critique of this reading of Augustine for later, but before moving on to 
see how Hauerwas makes use of Augustine’s ecclesiology, let us pause to take stock of the main 
difference between Augustine and Milbank’s appropriation of him. Augustine left the end of 
history as God’s triumph, coming about when the last of the elect (only God knows) comes into 
the visibly mixed church. After that, the kingdom would come, the wheat would be separated 
from the chaff, and the church would become a visibly perfect body.27 Though at times Milbank 
seems to recognize a notional difference between the empirical fact of ecclesial imperfection 
(Augustine’s mixed body) and the church’s eschatological perfection, Milbank nonetheless sees 
the end of history as the triumph of the church over the secular. Though he would probably insist 
that this work of the church is more synergistic than I have suggested, when all is said and done, 
the kingdom comes because of the church and in the church, whereas for Augustine it comes in 
spite of the church. Augustine’s distinction between the mixed “visible” body and the pure 
“invisible” body (within the visible church) inserts a healthy amount of ambiguity into our 
confidence in the purity of the church’s intentions and actions. That ambiguity is removed in 
Milbank’s conflation of what Augustine left distinct. Otherwise the conquest of secular 
dominium cannot happen. The distinction Augustine held in order to foreground the fallenness of 
the church, holding out hope for its coming perfection in the kingdom of God, is thus explained 
away in Milbank as something that robs the church of its essence by prohibiting a narratival 
conquest of the secular. 
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27 See Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, ed. Betty Radice, trans., Henry Bettenson, 
Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin, 1972), XX.4-5.
A “Constantinian” in Hauerwas’ Church
 Like Milbank, Stanley Hauerwas collapses the kingdom of God into the “visible” church, 
which is best seen in the way he misreads Augustine’s juxtaposition between the heavenly city 
and the earthly city into a counterposition between “the church” and Rome, which in the context 
of his critique, is proxy for the secular. Though Hauerwas has shown more of an interest in 
Augustine in recent years, to my knowledge he addresses his doctrine of the church only in a few 
pages of After Christendom and more recently in an essay in Christianity, Democracy, and the 
Radical Ordinary.28 Of these two works, the first is more explicitly ecclesiological. The second 
assumes the argument of the first, helpfully clarifying points here and there. Therefore, the 
following analysis will focus on After Christendom, invoking Radical Ordinary as needed. 
 Hauerwas tried to use Augustine to make a case for the Christian’s uncompromising 
commitment to the peace of God in the church. Thus, Hauerwas’ reading of Augustine’s 
ecclesiology intends a critique of what he sees as the American church’s thoroughgoing 
domestication. Martyrdom is the starkest expression of this commitment. Christians in the 
Roman era were tempted to offer sacrifice to caesar. Our American “pinch of incense” is a more 
subtle and more dangerous cultural legitimacy, granted if only we translate our particular 
theological claims into broad ethical principles, forming the bases for peaceful co-existence with 
other groups in the “neutral” territory of the secular.29 Yet, for both Rome and America, the 
uniqueness of the church is under assault by “the pretentious power” of the state.30 Christianity, 
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28 For Hauerwas's interest in Augustine, see Stanley Hauerwas and Charlie Collier, “Review Essay: Paul J Griffiths 
Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity,” Pro Ecclesia 13, no. 4 (2004). Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, 
“How the Church Managed before There Was Ethics,” in Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (Malden, Ma ; 
Oxford ; Carlton, Australia: Blackwell, 2004). 
29 Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (Durham: Duke, 1992), 23ff.
30 Hauerwas, After Christendom?, 36.
says Hauerwas, has never been a set of abstract philosophical or ethical teachings, but a tribe!31 
One cannot read a book or craft widely interpretable ecumenical statements to join a tribe. One 
must be initiated, which, for the church, requires immersion in the complex narratives and ritual 
practices of the community.32 Therefore, today’s church must rediscover what the first Christians 
knew: not its “teachings” but the church itself was the instrument of God’s salvation. This means 
that the church must learn to resist the temptation to compromise by turning itself into some kind 
of “handbook” for healthy living. In short, “Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye 
separate, saith the Lord” (2 Corinthians 2:15, 17, KJV). Though a “Constantinian,” Hauerwas 
believes that Augustine’s distinction between the earthly and heavenly cities can help the church 
learn to adopt the necessary uncompromising posture toward liberal, secular culture, teaching 
“the church to survive, if not triumph, in such a world.”33 The lesson, Hauerwas says, Augustine 
teaches is that “genuine politics is about the art of dying,” which “places the church at cross 
purposes with the politics of liberalism.”34 
 Of course, Hauerwas continues, Augustine can present a bit of a challenge because he is 
often read in a “liberal,” Niebuhrian way. To wit, Hauerwas says Reinhold Niebuhr invoked the 
distinction between the earthly city and the city of God to justify the privatization of particular 
religious commitments for the sake of living in the “public,” earthly city. Apparently, Niebuhr’s 
sin here was to stress the “comingling” of the heavenly in the earthly city, wherein Christian 
pilgrims are to work for the good of an “earthly peace,” improving it by “leavening” the earthly 
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32 See also Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretative Power of the Christian Story,” 
Journal of Religious Ethics 8, no. 1 (1980). Stanley Hauerwas, “The Gesture of a Truthful Story: The Church And 
“Religious Education”,” Encounter 43, no. 4 (1982).
33 Hauerwas, After Christendom?, 39.
34 Ibid., 43.
city with the love of the church. In Hauerwas’ estimation, this alleged misreading transforms the 
church from a concrete community with untranslatable truth claims (i.e. a tribe) into an abstract 
religious principle of compromise.35 
 Hauerwas reads Augustine differently. For him, the point of The City of God is to show 
that the church, not the secular polis, is the only legitimate community.36 Attempting to follow 
Rowan Williams’ interpretation of Book XIX of The City of God, he says that justice is defined 
by Augustine as giving each person her due. Because Rome does not give God the worship owed 
God, then Rome lacks justice. Therefore, it is not a commonwealth. The only true 
commonwealth is the church, which possesses justice because it worships God. Christians have 
to live in society, which makes some coercion inevitable (due to the fact that law is only 
enforceable with the threat of punishment), but such coercion is not Niebuhrian compromise 
insofar as one intends education in virtue. 
 Essentially, Hauerwas says, the Christian lives in society, but is always somewhat 
indifferent to it. Hauerwas thus refers to the “insoluble dilemma” of a Christian emperor, faced 
with the possibility of war, to make this point. Because his intention in this reference needs 
exegesis (i.e. it is not very clear), an extended presentation of this point is in order. Noting that 
Augustine can sometimes “wax lyrical about the Christian emperor,” who desires to educate his 
citizens in virtue, Hauerwas adds the following caveat:
 Yet the Christian ruler, even one like Theodosius I, is in an insoluble 
dilemma. For the city of God as such, according to Augustine, can never go to war 
even in self-defense. This is true even though the death of the city is of a different 
order than the death of an individual. The individual may find death a happy 
release, but the death of a state means the dissolution of those bonds of speech 
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and meaning that make us rational and human. Yet the church cannot use war to 
preserve itself since she knows the true bonds of human speech are preserved in 
God’s eternal will and the ordo of the universe as a whole. The church is not 
dependent on any human system for its survival.37
Hauerwas goes on to conclude from this dilemma that “the church [is] at cross purposes with the 
politics of liberalism, built as it is on the denial of death and sacrifice.”38 What should be the 
Christian emperor’s willingness to let the state die testifies to the incommensurable relationship 
between the two. 
 Hauerwas describes the “dilemma” of the Christian emperor in a way more akin to the 
temptation faced by the martyrs. Except this time, the emperor does not stand between the lions 
on the one hand and life on the other; he stands between earthly security and the peace of God 
found in the church. I have already discussed at length this stark choice between the church and 
liberalism/the secular in Hauerwas’ theology. Seeing how Hauerwas comes to this conclusion by 
misreading Augustine shows that this contrast rests upon the foundations of a realized 
eschatology that all but identifies the peace of the kingdom with the peace of the visible church. 
In short, the above is not the proper conclusion to draw from Book XIX of the City of God. 
Because Hauerwas relies heavily Williams’ reading of Augustine,39 seemingly filtered through 
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39 Indeed, based upon his endnotes, there is little evidence that Hauerwas has given any sustained attention to the 
primary material itself, which could explain why he misreads both Augustine and Williams. I do not want to be 
overly polemical by bringing up a seemingly minor point, but the way an author summarizes his source says a great 
deal about his degree of understanding of it. Hauerwas seems not to have taken the time needed fully to digest 
Williams’ argument, evidenced in the fact that in several places, Hauerwas nearly quotes Williams’ verbatim. He just 
changes a word or two. For instance, Hauerwas talks about the “art of dying,” whereas Williams uses the phrase “a 
discipline of dying” to describe the Christians’ faith in “God’s eternal and immutable providence” in the face of the 
possible dissolution of the state at war. Though this is hardly rock-solid evidence for Hauerwas’ misreading, as many 
a writing teacher has told her students, repeated paraphrasing often does suggest a failure fully to grasp the source’s 
claims. Ibid. Rowan Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God,” Milltown Studies 19/20, no. 
(1987): 67.
Theology and Social Theory,40 seeing how this misreads Augustine requires some attention to 
Williams’ argument. Hauerwas draws on Augustine to counterpose the church to the secular, but, 
as it turns out, William’s point is more “Niebuhrian.” 
 Williams’ essay on Book XIX of the City of God is a response to Hanna Arendt, who 
criticized Augustine for allegedly annihilating standards of good citizenship by making a 
“spiritual” city the ultimate concern of Christians. Thus, she concludes, he makes the public not a 
good in itself.41 Williams agrees with that conclusion, but argues that the Christian’s commitment 
to the heavenly city actually makes the public more just and peaceful than it would otherwise 
have been. A member of the heavenly city is committed to the state only insofar as the peace of 
the secular is a secondary good, but, Williams argues, this commitment can make the state better 
because Christian peace is not coercion but caritas. The peace of the church stabilizes the public 
insofar as it is not imposed on people from the outside, but arises out of their own “volition,” so 
to speak. Unlike the external coercion of Roman unity, Christians are united by love “in the bond 
of peace” (Ephesians 4:3). Thus, Williams argues that the “Christian community” makes the 
earthly polis more secure insofar as the public is a beneficiary of the genuine peace of the 
heavenly city, disseminated through the church into culture. Williams agrees with Niebuhr that 
the love of the church leavens the “secular” state.42 However, this improvement of the public has 
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41 According to Arendt, Christianity had introduced to the Greeks and Romans the idea that the public was not a 
good in itself because this world was passing away. From this background, she says Augustine attempted, “To find a 
bond between people strong enough to replace the world.” This bond was charity. Thus what began to hold people 
together was not a sense of the common good but a sense that the church should form one body, “modeled on the 
relationships between the members of a family because these were known to be non-political and even antipolitical.” 
She credits Augustine’s promotion of Christian charity with being the beginning of a modern rebellion against the 
limits of human existence because for Augustine, she says, the motive for work in the world was no longer the world 
itself but an obligation to another, higher one, lived out in the church. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd 
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), 53-54.
42 Niebuhr, 134-137, also 116.
one important caveat: when it comes to war, Arendt does have a point. In those cases, sometimes 
the Christian must let the state die. Thus, says Williams, “There can be no crusade, no victory at 
any price: he [the Christian emperor] has the alarming task of discerning the point at which what 
he is defending has ceased to be defensible because the means of defence beyond this point 
undermine the real justice in the state by implicitly treating it as an absolute, to be preserved at 
all costs.”43
 Hauerwas reads this dilemma in a way that seems to solve it by implying that the proper 
course for a Christian emperor faced with war is to let the state die, whereas Williams’ point is 
more nuanced. Hauerwas seems to have missed that the tension he rightly reads between the 
earthly peace and the peace of the heavenly city is worked out in the pre-eschatological mixture 
of the two. Thus, though Augustine does say that the heavenly city refuses to wage war to defend 
itself, he also says that a Christian can go to war, and he is clear that the visible church and the 
saints within it are beneficiaries of the earthly peace won by violence.44 Thus, he advised Count 
Bonifatius to remain a general because the church would better be served by the protection of his 
army.45 In other words, though the church may not directly engage in war to defend itself, its 
members may engage in a war to defend the state, from which the saints in the visible church 
benefit. 
 It seems that Hauerwas has read his own prior counterposition between church and 
culture into the good bishop’s more complex ecclesiology. This brings us, finally, to the way his 
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Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 104-63.
45 See Serge Lancel, Saint Augustine, trans., Antonia Nevill (London: SCM, 2002), 470ff.
counterposition between the church and the secular collapses the kingdom of God into the 
church. Because this conflation is revealed in an extended passage, to avoid confusion, I quote it 
in its entirety, emphasizing important statements that highlight Hauerwas’ misreading. Hauerwas 
has just finished critiquing Niebuhr’s reading of Augustine and offered his own, when he says, 
 The standard response to those who emphasize Augustine’s account of the 
church is that such an emphasis on the church confuses the church with the city of 
God. The latter is not and cannot be instantiated in society or church. Yet such a 
reading of Augustine, a reading that is almost required by commitment to liberal 
social order, fails to see that Augustine does not think of the two cities as two 
distinct human associations. 
It is unclear the conclusion Hauerwas wants his reader to draw from the above statement. In his 
attempt to dismiss his “liberal” critics’ reading of Augustine, he seems actually to accept it, 
confirming their accusation. His response to the charge of confusing the church with the city of 
God is that Augustine does not keep the two cities distinct. This rebuttal suggests that Hauerwas 
is confused about the relationship between the two cities and the church in Augustine’s theology. 
His conclusion does not follow from his argument. Of course Augustine does not separate the 
heavenly and the earthly city, but that is not the accusation leveled against Hauerwas. He is not 
accused of confusing the heavenly city with the earthly city but of confusing the heavenly city 
with the church. Therefore, Hauerwas’ defense does not address the charge. Assuming he means 
to defend himself, there are only two ways to make sense of this rebuttal. In saying that 
Augustine does not separate the two cities, Hauerwas could mean to identify the church with the 
earthly city. That would mean Hauerwas intends to argue that the church and the world are not 
two distinct human associations, but that conclusion would contradict the rest of his ecclesiology, 
which (again) depends on sharply contrasting church and secular culture. Nor would such a 
response answer the charge of confusing the church with the kingdom. The other possibility is 
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that Hauerwas could mean to argue that the church and the heavenly city are not two distinct 
human associations. In that case, he would actually be accepting the charge, meaning to conflate 
the church with the kingdom. Admittedly, neither conclusion is entirely clear from the passage at 
hand, but the latter does make slightly more sense in light of the way I have already argued 
Hauerwas reads his own counterpositional ecclesiology into Williams. Hauerwas seems to say 
that it is acceptable to confuse the church with the kingdom because, he believes, Augustine does 
the same. That said, I do not want to be uncharitable to Hauerwas. The fact, as I have argued, that  
he misreads Augustine’s ecclesiology in Williams makes also makes it possible that he simply 
did not realize he was not answering his hypothetical critics’ charge. In that case, then, at 
minimum, it is reasonable to say that Hauerwas’ short retort does not respond to the accusation. 
Really, from the perspective of Augustine’s own ecclesiology, Hauerwas’ statement about the 
two cities not being two distinct associations should take the air out of his argument. In that case, 
there can be no basis for claiming that the politics of the secular and the politics of the church are 
incommensurate (this side of the eschaton). 
 With all due respect to Hauerwas, it seems that he has greatly misunderstood Augustine’s 
ecclesiology in a way that moves Augustine’s eschaton into the present. As Hauerwas reads Book 
XIX of the City of God, Augustine juxtaposes the church to Rome. However, Williams is more 
careful in his presentation of Augustine, who actually talks less about the church and more about 
the saints who abide in it. This point is more than a terminological quibble. In Augustine’s 
ecclesiology, as we will see more clearly in a moment, the difference between the saints and the 
church is significant. Put simply, Augustine’s reference to the saints is eschatological. He is 
talking not about the whole church but the elect in it, who will be shown to be the true and 
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perfected body in the kingdom of God. Consistent with my presentation of Hauerwas’ reading of 
Augustine above, talking about the church rather than the saints suggests a present contrast 
between the church and culture, whereas focusing on the saints stresses the present imperfection 
of the church that will finally be worked out in the eschaton. Thus, Book XIX of The City of God 
is less an ecclesiology than the beginning of his eschatology – which Augustine continues to 
develop in subsequent books – insofar as he tries to explain how the kingdom of God can be 
partially realized in the present.46 Hauerwas’ less precise terminology is significant in the way 
that it promotes confusion of what Augustine leaves more distinct: the “visible” church and the 
kingdom of God. Augustine draws a contrast between this life in mixed-up pilgrimage and the 
life of the saints to come, a contrast that gets flattened out on Hauerwas’ ecclesiological canvas. 
Perhaps Hauerwas has not realized that, for Augustine, the heavenly city is in the church, but the 
church is not the heavenly city. That would explain why he seems to miss that, this side of the 
eschaton, the two cities (the saints and Rome) are really implicated in each other. 
 Though Hauerwas does not presume the absolute present perfection of the church, in his 
efforts to make the church a visible alternative to the modern secular, his reading of Augustine 
does tend to collapse Augustine’s eschatological “saints” into the present “visible” church, 
particularly in Hauerwas’ seeming misunderstanding that the church and Rome always already 
interpenetrate each other.47 I do not want to belabor the point, but it is worth noting that 
Hauerwas virtually replicates this same argument and its conflation in an essay written almost 
twenty years later. Addressing the political philosophy of his friend, Romand Coles, Hauerwas 
invokes Augustine as an example of the disruptive politics of Christianity. The church, he says, 
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can interrupt Roman coercion because its glory is sought not in the violence of earthly conquest 
but in martyrdom. It is the church’s remembrance of its martyrs that makes it a radical political 
community. Says Hauerwas, “In short, a community shaped by the memory of the martyrs makes 
possible a patient people capable of the slow, hard work of a politics of place, because they are 
not driven by the politics of fear.”48 Such a community is possible because the nonviolence of the 
church forms “a people who are not only capable of working for justice, but who are themselves 
just.”49 Thus, consistent with Hauerwas’ ecclesiology presented in the first chapter, the purpose 
of the church is to instill in its members virtues necessary to embody an alternative to the 
modern, secular state. Again, the emphasis for Augustine is not so much on the church being an 
alternative to Rome, but leavening Rome with its own peace to make what we would call the 
secular “better” (so to speak). In sum, the difference between Augustine and Hauerwas is that 
Augustine more clearly recognizes that the saints are also Roman and that Christians are also 
American, whereas, as Hauerwas reads Augustine, the two never meet. 
The Necessity of the “Invisible” Church
 The previous section attempted to show how Milbank and Hauerwas tend to collapse the 
eschatological perfection of the church in the heavenly city into its present manifestation (though 
both would rightly be quick to insist that the present church is not perfect). The next section will 
attempt to show how this contributes to their cognitively dissonant ecclesiological extremes, but 
to get to that point we need to consider why Augustine felt it necessary to distinguish between 
the “visible” and “invisible” church in the first place. My intent in this section is twofold. First, it 
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is to help us see, through an examination of the history, what can happen when we fail properly 
to distinguish between the church and its eschatological perfection; in so doing, I also want 
implicitly to demonstrate the necessity of the Augustinian distinction for Christian practice. 
 The controversies Augustine dealt with in his own life as a pastor and theologian 
demonstrate the need for this distinction to preserve ecclesial “messiness” by showing what 
happens when we want to realize the kingdom in the present. In other words, in this section, we 
turn to the history that Milbank and Hauerwas partly repeat. This does require a brief foray into 
some of the issues that informed Augustine’s ecclesiology. Augustine is sometimes depicted as 
an aloof academic, pontificating about things like predestination and the damnation of 
unbaptized infants from his intellectual ivory tower, when the fact of the matter is that he 
developed his theology “in the trenches.”50 So, to understand the necessity of the Augustinian 
distinction, we need to understand the pastoral issues at play, which go back to the controversies 
he inherited from Tertullian and Cyprian. 
Background to the Augustinian Distinction 
 The controversy that occupied most of Augustine’s pastoral life (and laid the groundwork 
for his reaction to the Pelagians) was Donatism.51 The roots of Donatism and Augustine’s 
response to it are derived from two different ways of synthesizing the theologies of Tertullian 
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trying to catch up to whatever controversy he was embroiled in. In many ways he was like John Wesley, whom 
Albert Outler called a “folk theologian.” Developing his “unsystematic” theology by careful study in reaction to 
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Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies, 3rd ed. (Norwich: Canterbury, 2002). 
51 See J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace ( Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 
1980), esp. 53-88. 
and Cyprian, both of whom were reacting to culture in different ways. Tertullian emphasized a 
visibly pure church in a hostile culture, governed by the charismata of the Holy Spirit. Cyprian 
placed an equally strong emphasis on the Holy Spirit, “domesticated” by the episcopal collegia, 
as a tacit acknowledgment of inevitable ecclesial adjustment to culture. We turn first to 
Tertullian.
 The view that Tertullian started out as a catholic, only to be seduced later by the 
Montanist “heresy,” has been thoroughly discredited.52 To be sure, Tertullian thought of the 
church as a community of rigorous discipline.53 He was almost certainly drawn to the New 
Prophecy movement because he saw an unacceptable loosening of moral standards among his 
fellow catholics, as some of his later “anti-Psychic” writings suggest.54 He was able to join this 
movement without schism (in his opinion) because of the way he thought of spiritual authority in 
the church. Though he believed in apostolic succession,55 he believed the true church was one 
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Fathers, ed. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (Albany, OR: Ages Software, 1997), 11-12.
55 In his Prescription Against Heretics he challenged his opponents to produce records showing a line of succession 
back to an apostolic founder. Tertullian, “Prescription against Heretics,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. A. Roberts and 
J. Donaldson (Albany, OR: Ages Software, 1997), 32.
that held on to the apostles’ teaching – the rule of faith.56 The apostles and their episcopal 
successors were subordinate to that which had been delivered by Christ and disseminated to the 
orthodox by the continued work of the Spirit. Thus, when the pope (either of Carthage or Rome) 
granted a general indulgence to adulterers, Tertullian objected on the grounds that he had no such 
authority. Tertullian’s own words reveal a great deal about the nature of the church and the power 
of forgiveness in it. 
For, in accordance with the person of Peter, it is to spiritual men that this power 
will correspondently appertain, either to an apostle or else to a prophet. For the 
very Church itself is, properly and principally, the Spirit Himself, in whom is the 
Trinity of the One Divinity – Father, Son. [sic] and Holy Spirit. (The Spirit) 
combines that Church which the Lord has made to consist in “three.” And thus, 
from that time forward, every number (of persons) who may have combined 
together in faith is accounted “a Church,” from the Author and Consecrator (of the 
Church). And accordingly “the Church” it is true, will forgive sins: but (it will be) 
the Church of the Spirit, by means of a spiritual man; not the Church which 
consists of a number of bishops. For the right and arbitrament is the Lord’s, not 
the servant’s; God’s himself, not the priest’s.57
Tertullian stresses that the power to forgive sins belongs to God alone, in the person of the Holy 
Spirit. Applied to the church, “spiritual,” in this context, seems to refer to those who act in 
accordance with the Spirit. Obviously, prophet fits the bill, but so might bishop. Tertullian uses 
the rule of faith to subordinate the episcopacy to the Holy Spirit by saying that decisions about 
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forgiveness are valid only if they are decisions that the Spirit herself would make.58 The church 
is not simply a hierarchical institution; the church is, in a certain sense, “the Spirit,” herself.59 
 Cyprian later emphasized Tertullian’s stress on the power of the Holy Spirit to forgive 
sins, which he seemingly incommensurately joined to an emphasis on the episcopate.60 His 
pastoral reasons for doing this stem from the Decian persecution, when some Christians, who 
had offered sacrifice, presented martyrs’ letters to the clergy that demanded immediate 
reconciliation to the church on the promise of their intercessions on behalf of the lapsed. Laxist 
presbyters, who readmitted the lapsed, challenged both the authority of the bishop and the unity 
of the church between the faithful and fallen. Cyprian reunited the church and reasserted his 
authority over it, by arguing that this side of heaven the power of forgiveness lay not with the 
martyrs but with the college of  bishops in good standing with the catholic church.61 After all, 
Jesus had breathed the Holy Spirit into the apostles, and with her the power of forgiveness, 
saying, “And what thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever 
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thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven.”62 Therefore, lacking the Holy Spirit, no 
forgiveness could be found in a schismatic fellowship.63 In saying this, Cyprian domesticated 
Tertullian’s pneumatology in order to extend the logic of idolatry to schism. To sacrifice to an 
idol was not simply to break trust with Christ, but to become ritually unclean – contaminated by 
demons.64 The same applied to those who communed with, or sought forgiveness in, a schismatic 
church. To commune with an idolater was to be contaminated by his sin. Cyprian insisted on 
rebaptism of those converted in schism because, without the Holy Spirit, their rites were 
basically pagan. Thus, as J. Patout Burns writes, “Cyprian concluded that the rituals of the 
schismatics polluted those who received them in the same way that the rites of idolatry 
contaminated those who participated in them, even involuntarily.”65 
 The Donatists further extended this logic to ordination, whereby the Holy Spirit in the 
collegia was passed on to the new bishop. The schism began when some African bishops, who 
would become the Donatists, opposed the election of Caecilianus to the powerful See of 
Carthage, claiming that one of the bishops who ordained him had been a traditore. Therefore, 
like a laxist’s baptism, this ordination was polluting. Without the power of the Holy Spirit, 
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Caecilianus and those who remained in communion with him could receive no forgiveness. 
Rather than “properly” re-ordain Caecilianus, the Donatists ordained their own rival bishop and 
said that any “so-called” Christians outside their communion were apostate. In this way, the once 
catholic church had become a shadow of its former glory, confined now to a pure North African 
“remnant.” The Donatists, from their perspective remained the true church. Everyone else, at 
least as far as their eternal destinies was concerned, was as good as pagan. 
" A final word must be said about Augustine’s response to the Donatists because it 
generates some controversy and because it speaks to Hauerwas and Milbank’s misreading of his 
ecclesiology, particularly as it relates to one of the outcomes of collapsing the kingdom into the 
church, to be addressed below. Augustine is sometimes chastised by contemporary theologians 
for calling upon the military to force an end to the schism. In Augustine’s defense, this appeal 
came late in his life, after many years of Donatist violence, largely motivated out of concern that 
Donatist laypersons who wanted to join the “true church” were being prevented from doing so by 
their bishops. This was not a campaign for Christian empire, about which Augustine was much 
less enthusiastic than most of his contemporaries.66 He believed the church could enjoy certain 
benefits from having a Christian emperor, but this did not make the empire Christian.67 One 
advantage was the ability to call upon the state to engage in what Augustine saw as a campaign 
of liberation, not the expansion of the boundaries of “Christendom.” 68
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66 This came to Augustine late in his life. Says Markus, “Now, as an old man, he came to see clearly that what he 
wished to repudiate was not merely a passing mood of elation. It was nothing less than the almost universal tradition 
of Christian thinking about the Roman Empire during the fourth century.” R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and 
Society in the Theology of Saint Augustine, Rev ed. (New York: Cambridge, 1970), 53ff.
67 See Augustine, V.25.
68 Lancel, 271-304.
The Necessity of the Augustinian Distinction
" Seeing how Tertullian and Cyprian contributed to the Donatist controversy reveals the 
necessity of the Augustinian distinction and its implications for the relationship between the 
church and the kingdom of God. Hauerwas and Milbank refuse ecclesial “invisibility” in order 
that the church might be a more concrete alternative to the secular, but we will see in a moment 
that Augustine’s response to the logic of Donatism deployed this distinction in a way that 
stressed the church’s concreteness, particularly in the power of the Spirit in the love of the saints. 
Augustine was able to affirm that this “messy” church was still the site of God’s salvation, not as 
an alternative to the world, but the prolepsis of the kingdom of God within it.
 Augustine’s answer to Donatism was a Tertullianic correction of Cyprian. Tertullian could 
not have conceived of a mixed body. His church was a minority sect in a still largely hostile 
society. Cyprian still pastored the persecuted church, but one that was drawing an increasing 
number of converts, thus being more readily accepted into Roman society. In his 
acknowledgment that recommunicated apostates may yet find themselves declared “goats” at the 
last judgment, we find a de facto distinction between the “visible” church and the “invisible” 
church, but not in any formal or systematic way.69 As the schism wore on, the Donatists 
increasingly tended toward a Tertullianic emphasis on visible purity premised on a Cyprianic 
understanding of the power of the Holy Spirit, whereas Augustine developed the Cyprianic 
acknowledgment of visible ecclesial impurity modulated by a Tertullianic emphasis on the 
Spirit’s freedom. 
 Augustine had to reject Cyprian’s view that the Spirit resided in the episcopal college 
because it was the same position held by the Donatists. It both “justified” and motivated the 
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69 See Burns, Cyprian, 70-71.
schism. So Augustine went back to Tertullian to place the power of forgiveness not in the bishop 
but in the whole church. In one sermon, remarkable for the power it gives to the laity, Augustine 
talks about the “binding and loosing” both Cyprian and Tertullian addressed. For him, this power 
of the Spirit does not reside only in a bishop or a prophet but all the saints who (with the angels 
of God) together form the totus Christus – Head and body.70 He extends forgiveness by 
interpreting Matthew 16:18-19 (”And I also say to you that you are Peter…”) to John 21 and 
Acts 9.4. In the first, Christ questions Peter after his denial. Augustine reasons that if Peter refers 
to the whole church in Matthew, then he must refer to the whole church in John. Thus Christ asks 
the church, do you love me? And the church answers back, “You know that I love you” (See vv. 
15-17). But then Augustine questions the way in which the church loves Christ, who is in 
heaven. As Dostoevsky knew, in the foil of Ivan Karamazov, one cannot truly love an abstract 
principle.71 We can only truly love faces. Thus, the church’s love of Christ is proven in the 
second passage, where Christ identifies himself with the church itself (in the context of Acts, the 
persecuted and martyred saints). When Christ asks the church, “Do you love me?” it is the 
church asking this question of itself, but not in any abstract sense. The question is in the face of 
every sister and brother we meet: “Do you love me?” Love is proved in the answer, and that 
proof is nothing less than the church – the visible evidence of the saints’ collective affirmation of 
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70 Augustine’s concept of the “whole Christ” is most apparent in his expositions on the Psalter, being the 
hermeneutical key whereby he was able to attribute some statements in the Psalter to the heavenly Christ, some to 
Christ in the kenosis of his humanity, others to Christ in his people – the church – and still others to all three at once. 
See, for instance, Augustine, “Fourth Discourse on Psalm 30,” in St. Augustine on the Psalms, Ancient Christian 
Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1961), 5. The translators offer a pithy 
explanation of this concept in Dame Scholastica Hebgin and Dame Felicitas Corrigan, “Introduction,” in St. 
Augustine on the Psalms, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation (Westminster, MD: 
Newman, 1960), 9ff.
71 Ivan says, “I must make one confession…I could never understand how one can love one’s neighbors. It’s just 
one’s neighbors, to my mind, that one can’t love, though one might love those who live at a distance…For anyone to 
love a man, he must be hidden, for as soon as he shows his face, love is gone.” Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers 
Karamazov, trans., Constance Garnett (New York: New American Library, 1999), 230. 
each other in Christ, which is a gift of the Spirit. Salvation must be a gift because, without the 
Holy Spirit, it is impossible to love God more than self – to love God, and others for God’s sake, 
with the love that God is. Thus, Augustine overcomes Donatism by making the “vertical” 
forgiveness offered by Christ effective in the “horizontal” love of the members of his body have 
for each other.72
" Forgiveness-as-love is the beginning of the difference between what we commonly call 
the “visible” and “invisible” church, terms I have adopted for convenience, but which 
Augustine’s understanding of forgiveness reveals to be not very precise. Properly speaking, the 
church is not “invisible,” just ambiguous. What I have been calling the “invisible” church refers 
to those true believers – the saints – which comprise the citizens of the heavenly city on 
pilgrimage, abiding for now in the fallen, empirical church.73 The church is ambiguous because, 
while Augustine could be certain that wherever there was a catholic church, there were at least 
“two or three” saints in it (in keeping with the promise of Matthew 18:20), he could never know 
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72 Under the pen of the Roman pontiff, Matthew 16:18-19 is cited as evidence that Peter’s successor has the power 
to bind and loose. This passage reads, “And I also say to you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build My 
church, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it. And I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, 
and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.” 
For Cyprian, the Petrine foundation of the church referred to the collegia (which included the Roman papacy). 
Commenting on this same passage, Cyprian applies it not to a single bishop but the entire episcopate, saying, “From 
this source flows the appointment of bishops and the organization of the Church, with bishop succeeding bishop 
down through the course of time, so that the Church is founded upon the bishops and every act of the Church is 
governed through these same appointed leaders.” Cyprian, The Letters of St. Cyprian of Carthage, ed. Johannes 
Quasten, Walter J. Burghardt, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, trans., G. W. Clark, Ancient Christian Writers: The 
Works of the Fathers in Translation, vol. 44 (New York: Newman, 1984), Ep. 33. Augustine went much further! Like 
Tertullian, he applied this passage to the episcopate only insofar as bishops were members of the catholic church. 
“And what am I to say?” Augustine asks his congregation, “That it is only we [bishops] who bind, only we [bishops] 
who loose? No, you also bind, you also loose.” Augustine, Essential Sermons, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans., Edmund 
O.P. Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: : New City Press, 
2007), 229N.2. For ease of reference, when citing Augustine's sermons, I will always refer to the sermon and 
paragraph numbers, even in an edited collection. 
73 I am aware that the latter term comes with some philosophical baggage. I use it in its most basic sense to refer to 
the church we see and touch, a church that is “sinful” because it has sinners and hypocrites in it. 
for sure which individual was a saint.74 The ambiguous nature of the true church stems from this 
fact, that, on the one hand, the love of the saints for each other, and for the sinners and hypocrites 
in their fellowship, is what cements the empirical church together, but, on the other hand, one 
can never positively know, within any given fellowship, who is truly a saint (though heinous 
deeds without contrition might show who is truly a sinner).75 Thus Augustine could point to any 
catholic church and say, “There is the true church!” He just could not say for certain, “And that 
person is in it!” 
" Forgiveness-as-love undermined the perpetually-schismatic logic of Donatism in two 
ways. First, making salvation the gift of love (the gift of a pure heart rather than the work of a 
pure bishop) undermined pretensions to visible purity. If what saves us cannot be seen – love, 
“poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who was given to us” (Rom 5:5) – then there can be no 
boasting about the church being a concrete alternative to Rome or (in the case of the Donatists) 
to the catholics.76 In the second place, stressing “invisible” love ironically foregrounds the 
empirical church. Contrary to what seem to be the concerns of Milbank and Hauerwas, love does 
not leave the church without “substance.” The church was still able to offer a critical word to the 
world, but also (perhaps especially) to itself. This, because love as the standard of forgiveness 
means that, although we cannot always be certain when the true church is present in the world, 
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74 One poignant example of Augustine’s awareness of the importance of intention comes from On Virginity. 
Dedicated virgins had a high status in the church. Yet Augustine warns that this outward dedication is not a clear 
indication of inner-intent. In a way, virgins are in greater danger because they might become proud of the esteem 
others bestow on them. See Augustine, “Of Holy Virginity,” in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip 
Schaff (Albany, OR: AGES Software, 1997), 33ff.
75 Augustine actually compared their love to the planks of Noah’s Ark, an Old Testament type of the church, within 
which abide clean and unclean animals – saints and sinners – representing the mixed body. Therefore, without the 
caritas of the elect there would be no visible church at all. See Augustine, City of God, XV.27. Also, Augustine, 
“Sermon 264: On the Ascension of the Lord,” in Sermons, ed. John E. Rotelle (New Rochelle, New York: New City 
Press, 1993), 5.
76 See Augustine, The Trinity, trans., Edmund O.P. Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st 
Century, vol. 5 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1991), VII.1.6, VIII.5.12ff, XV.5.13.
we can at times be certain of its absence. In Augustine’s own case, he stressed unity as the 
concrete effect of loving Christ in the face of one’s sisters and brothers to critique the Donatists. 
Their refusal of unity proved, for Augustine, the absence of charity.77 Thus this “invisible” 
standard of forgiveness somewhat ironically stresses the necessity of the visible body, but in a 
more empirically honest way, by underscoring its brokenness. The Augustinian distinction allows 
one to affirm that salvation is found “in here,” even if, this side of the eschaton “in here” can 
look an awful lot like “out there.” 
" By focusing on the concrete effects of love, Augustine was still able to affirm that the 
kingdom of God is present in the church, while acknowledge the empirical fact of its fallenness. 
He could stress the reality of sin in the church as equally as he could stress its necessity for 
salvation. This allowed him to say that the kingdom of God is present in the church even if the 
church is not the kingdom. The way Augustine understood the kingdom to be present among the 
saints needs to be addressed for a moment because it further explains the relationship between 
the “visible” and “invisible” church, and because it shows that what makes the church the church 
is the kingdom of God, a point that will become more important later. For Augustine, the 
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77 There is some evidence that he wanted to be more accommodating to those who were Donatist by circumstance 
rather than by choice. Augustine writes, “But the spiritual, or those who are steadily advancing with pious exertion 
towards this end, do not stray without the pale; since even when, by some perversity or necessity among men, they 
seem to be driven forth, they are more approved than if they had remained within, since they are in no degree roused 
to contend against the Church, but remain rooted in the strongest foundation of Christian charity on the solid rock of 
unity.” Emphasis mine. This would seem to suggest that those who are driven from the Church by external 
circumstance abide in the true church because they would be catholic if they could. It may be that in this statement 
we are seeing here evidence of an undeveloped stream of thought, perhaps one that not even Augustine recognized, 
himself. Personally, I am more inclined to think that Augustine believed Donatists by circumstance were truly 
catholic (he is too smart not to have seen that consequence of his logic), but to say that out loud, in an unambiguous 
way, would undermine the purpose of the polemic, which was to bring an end to the schism. Augustine, “Baptism, 
against the Donatists,” in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff (Albany, OR: AGES Software, 
1997), I.17.26. In a similar way he lays the foundation for what later theologians would call a “baptism by desire.” 
In the case of the thief on the cross and Cornelius he writes, “I find that not only martyrdom for the sake of Christ 
may supply what was wanting of baptism, but also faith and conversion of heart, if recourse may not be had to the 
celebration of the mystery of baptism for want of time. For neither was that thief crucified for the name of Christ, 
but as the reward of his own deeds; nor did he suffer because he believed, but he believed while suffering.” He is 
quick to add that we should be baptized. To think it unnecessary is prideful. Only necessity legitimates a baptism by 
desire. Ibid., IV.22.30.
kingdom of God “happens” in the love of the community to which its worship testifies, 
especially its eucharist. In the words of Gerald Bonner, “[F]or Augustine, time intersects with 
eternity in the action of the Eucharist.” 78 This intersection is not something magical. Rather, it 
rests upon Augustine’s robust understanding of catholicity. His understanding of the power of the 
eucharist for the believer was an advance on the more materialistic, Greek perspective that 
preceded him.79 Namely, the power of the eucharist was in the way it presented the future of the 
church to its fallen present. 
" The power of the eucharist for Augustine was love. This made it, as Edward Kilmartin 
says, a sacrament of “deeper insertion into the body of Christ.” 80  Communion is both a sign and 
a summons. The church was the totus Christus – Christ in heaven, extended into his earthly body. 
Because this connection between the ecclesial body and its head is not yet complete, the 
eucharist is a sign of the perfection of the church in the love of the saints, imperfectly realized in 
this life, and a summons to more fully embody its own future. “Be what you can see,” Augustine 
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78 Gerald Bonner, “Augustine's Understanding of the Church as a Eucharistic Community,” in Saint Augustine the 
Bishop: A Book of Essays, ed. Fannie Lemoine and Christopher Kleinhenz (New York: Garland, 1994), 50.
79 Cyril of Alexandria is a typical example of this perspective, so too is Augustine’s near contemporary, Gregory of 
Nyssa. For both, the purpose of the eucharist was to replace this perishable body of the individual with the 
incorruptible body of Christ. Gregory Nyssen, “An Addresss on Religious Instruction,” in Christology of the Later 
Fathers, ed. Edward R. Hardy and Cyril C. Richardson, The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1954), par. 37. Cyril of Alexandria, “Interpretation or Comment on the Gospel According to John”, 
Calvin College http://www.ccel.org/ccel/pearse/morefathers/files/cyril_on_john_10_book10.htm (accessed 19 
March 2010). See also Cyril of Alexandria, On the Unity of Christ, trans., John A. McGuckin, Popular Patristics 
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's, 1995), 131-32. Augustine’s perspective does not necessarily contradict this one. He 
understands the body in a less individualistic way than the Greeks. Nonetheless, in both cases, the communicant 
becomes what she consumes: the body of Christ.. 
80 See Edward J.  Kilmartin, “The Eucharistic Gift: Augustine of Hippo's Tractate 27 on John 6:30-72,” in Preaching 
in the Patristic Age: Studies in Honor of Walter J. Burghardt, S.J. , ed. David G. Hunter (New York: Paulist, 1989), 
165. J. Patout Burns is right that Augustine was not necessarily opposed to a doctrine of “real presence,” only it was 
not an essential feature of his sacramentology. J. Patout Burns, “The Eucharist as the Foundation of Christian Unity 
in North African Theology,” Augustinian Studies 32, no. (2001).
said, “and receive what you are.” 81  Bonner’s language of intersection is helpful insofar as it 
testifies to the presence of the kingdom in the church without confusing the two. Time intersects 
with eternity in the eucharist, but the two do not blur. The unity of the eucharist witnesses to the 
presence of the kingdom in the church without confusing the church with that kingdom. In this 
way, one might say the church becomes an icon of its own perfection, for, like an icon, the 
church reveals the divine without becoming the divine it reveals (what makes an icon an icon is 
its non-identity to its archetype). That is what catholicity, in its most robust sense, means: the 
church is transtemporally and transpatially universal. When one church gathers around the bread 
and cup, the whole church –  in all places and times; past, present, and future – gathers with it. 
Thus, says Bonner, “Perhaps, by a kind of paradox…for Augustine, we are fed here on earth with 
the sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ in order that hereafter, with the angels, we may 
feed upon the Word Himself forever.” 82 Therefore, in the eucharist, the mixed empirical body 
receives a vision, ambiguously realized in the present, of its future perfection in the life to come 
in the kingdom of God. The eucharistic worship of the church makes it not only a contrast to the 
world but also to itself. In receiving the unity that it will someday fully embody, we become 
aware that we have not yet reached this perfection.
" The Augustinian distinction foregrounds the presently unrealized nature of the mixed 
church’s future purity. It thereby promotes the church’s humility with respect to itself. The 
Donatists insisted on a visibly pure body because they thought that sin could spread like a 
disease. Shifting the impetus for salvation from external causes like the episcopal genealogy of 
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81 We know this is a summons because Augustine adds, “Any who receive the sacrament of unity, and do not hold 
the bond of peace, do not receive the sacrament for their benefit, but a testimony against themselves.” This caution is 
an implicit command to be unified, not only in name (by being part of the empirical church) but in fact by having 
“one soul and one heart in God.” Augustine, Sermons, 272. Italics in original.
82 Bonner, “Eucharistic Community,” 54.
one’s baptizer to internal intentions retained the necessity of the empirical church for salvation 
by protecting the purity of the true church from the effects of (empirical) sin. Salvation is 
possible in a manifestly fallen church because what will be the perfected body of Christ abides 
(ambiguously) within it. Furthermore, foregrounding the difference between the empirical church 
and its future purity promotes the church’s humility with respect to the world. Augustine 
identifies the true church with the heavenly city in a proleptic sense. That is what it means to be 
on pilgrimage. In the eschaton the heavenly city will have been the true church, but in the 
meantime the mixed nature of these two cities in the empirical church requires uncertainty about 
the church’s judgment of the world, for the reason that the world and the church are always 
implicated in each other. With the necessity of this distinction and its effects in mind, we turn to 
consider the logical alternative: what happens when Milbank and Hauerwas collapse the 
empirical church into the true church, demonstrating how this conflation contributes to Christian 
cognitive dissonance by funding Hauerwas and Milbank’s respective ecclesiological extremes. 
The “Invisible” Church and Postliberal Ecclesiological Extremes
 As we have seen above, the Augustinian distinction is more honest about the way the 
church and the world really do interpenetrate each other. When I argued for the necessity of this 
distinction above, I said two effects of it were ecclesial humility with respect to itself and 
ecclesial humility with respect to the world. In the first case, the church recognizes that it can 
never guarantee its empirical purity because salvation is not its own work but the Spirit’s. In the 
second case, the church recognizes that, for that reason, she cannot be excessively confident in 
the finality of her judgments of “the world” because the “world” is a part of her, and this side of 
heaven we cannot tell where one ends and the other begins. As I see it, two equally bad 
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alternatives occur when these facts are not taken seriously. Below, we consider each alternative 
in turn.
Option 1: Neo-Donatist Sectarianism
 When the empirical church is the true church, the failure of the former to conform to the 
latter challenges pretensions to perfection. One way to meet this challenge is to do what the 
Donatist bishops did: ignore the facts and assert one’s own empirical purity. In the face of visible 
impurity, “circle the wagons!” The fact that Donatism did not exactly live up to its own standards 
lends itself to suggest that it was defined less by what it was (i.e. the actual avoidance of sinful 
contamination) and more by what it was not (the catholic church). Thus, Donatism seems to have 
sustained itself over the centuries by employing what Daniel Boyarin has called the “technology” 
of heresiology, a term he uses to describe a movement that develops its group identity by sharply 
distinguishing itself from a clearly identified “enemy.”83 This description seems to fit Donatism 
especially well, particularly as the controversy progressed and Donatist bishops became 
increasingly entrenched in a theologically flawed and historically false tradition.84 
 Donatism thus shows us the logical alternative to the Augustinian distinction. Insisting 
upon the necessity of the church for salvation in a way that makes the church concentric with the 
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83 Daniel Boyarin argued that in antiquity the “technology” of heresiology produced orthodoxy (in this case by 
contrasting itself to Judaism). Though I take some issue with the compendious way he applies this theory to a rather 
complex history, thinking of heresiology-as-technology can be a useful tool if used in a limited way. He is right that 
some groups identify themselves principally by what they are not. See below.
84 Lancel has noted that the location of Donatist “holdouts” suggests that being Donatist was a way of asserting 
indigenous African identity in the face of Roman occupation (and its “official” church).  This implies a positive 
principal was at work in Donatism as well. And it suggests a weakness in Boyarin’s application of heresiology, 
which I assume. Namely, it is possible to reduce everything to heresiology: being African is about not being Roman; 
being Roman is about not being a barbarian, etc. I think what this means is that the concept cannot be deployed too 
compendiously. (In other words, heresiology cannot explain everything or mostly everything.) One must make a 
judgment about the degree to which the identity of a group or movement happens by way of contrast. In the case of 
Donatism, given the inconsistent relationship between their justification for the schism and their own history (with a 
traditore founder), the term seems to fit. Lancel, 276, 279-80.
kingdom of God can lead to ever shrinking bodies of “true believers” that define themselves in 
“heresiological” counterposition to everyone else. When there is no way to protect the purity of 
the church from the impurity of its members, schism becomes a holy duty. The Donatists purged 
alleged apostates from their fellowship, lest their inclusion imply approval of such sin. Of 
course, the Donatists were clearly willing to “fudge” on their allegedly high moral standards, 
given the fact that some of their own founders were traditores, and, late in the controversy, 
bishops were more than ready to let violent bands of circumcellions maim and murder catholic 
opponents or Donatist “defectors.”85 This inconsistency only proves the fact that they were 
human, and that the church they thought they were did not actually exist.
 Hauerwasian ecclesiology is not much different. The difference between Hauerwas and 
the Donatists is only in degree, not in kind, for both are marked by this same aspiration for a 
visibly pure communion through the identification and exclusion of an “enemy.” Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology is neo-Donatist insofar as it operates by the same “heresiological” principle. The 
difference between the Donatist and catholic perspectives is that, whatever grievances one party 
might have had with the other at the beginning of the controversy, in the end, what made many 
Donatists Donatist was the refusal to be catholic.86 It is difficult to identify a positive principle 
around which Hauerwas organizes his vision of the church. As Robert Jenson, who offers a 
more-or-less favorable reading of Hauerwas, has complained, it is much easier to figure out what 
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85 Ibid., 280, 291, 301-2.
86 On that point, it is worth noting that not only is Hauerwas’ ecclesiology characterized by its self-differentiation 
from liberalism, but also from churches that allegedly fall under its spell. Hauerwas, says he is just as critical of “the 
church” as he is of liberalism. Though invocation of the church catholic in such a statement suggests that Hauerwas 
intends to indict all Christians equally, insofar as not all Christians are enraptured by the liberal gaze, it seems that 
some Christians more damned than others. Hauerwas, “Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up,” 92. 
his ecclesiology is against than what it is for.87 This is a fair assessment in light of Hauerwas’ 
own words, “Christianity is unintelligible without enemies.” Of course, this statement could be 
taken as one of Hauerwas’ deliberately incendiary remarks, which in context does not actually 
mean what at first appears. To some extent that is probably true. In the same passage he does 
identify the enemy of the church as militarism, saying that the church, is “an army against 
armies.”88 So, to be fair, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is not heresiological to the degree that pacifism 
becomes something positive around which he constructs his vision of the church. Nevertheless, 
with no little irony, the nature of the church’s own pacifism is rather militant itself. The church is 
against armies by developing a vigorous critique of the ideologies that fund them. So even this 
positive principle is turned into a point of counter-distinction. What exactly those ideologies are 
is not always clear. In Resident Aliens it was Constantinianism (the church sanctifying in any 
degree the deeds of the state),89 at other times it appears to be capitalism,90 or maybe “liberal 
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87 Jenson is a generous critic. He says that he often finds himself nodding along with Hauerwas, but then wondering 
what he is agreeing with. Though he casts his critique in terms of metaphysics, the crux of his complaint is that 
Hauerwas lacks a positive ecclesiology, particularly when it comes to the relationship between the church and the 
world or between the church and the kingdom. Robert W. Jenson, “The Hauerwas Project,” Modern Theology 8, no. 
3 (1992): 287ff.
88 Stanley Hauerwas, “No Enemy, No Christianity: Theology and Preaching between 'Worlds',” in The Future of 
Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann, ed. Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas Kucharz (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 31. Emphasis in original.
89 Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1989), 15ff.
90 What Hauerwas means by capitalism is not always clear. In A Better Hope, for instance, he claims to focus on 
capitalism, democracy, and postmodernity, yet the only essay in the collection that purports to be about capitalism 
ends up focusing on gay marriage. Hauerwas, A Better Hope, 47-51.
democracy,”91 all of which fall under a general aversion to the “narratives” of post-
Enlightenment “liberalism,” or what I have generally labeled the secular.92 In constructing a 
communal identity this way, one need not necessarily be clear on the nature of one’s enemy 
(witness xenophobia), only that “they” are not “us.” Likewise, in Hauerwas’ case, the church is 
just that which tells different stories about itself. He does not exactly say what those stories are. 
In the end, content seems not to matter as much as the fact that these stories are different.
 The problem with this kind of organizational identity is that it depends upon the 
perdurance of the other. Some Donatists held out even as the catholics became a strong majority. 
The tension between the two churches only began to be mitigated with the presence of a new 
threat (Arian Vandals).93 In the same way, it is not clear what Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is without 
liberalism. Though pacifism is positive, Hauerwas’ own militant form of it cannot survive 
without the nation state to be peaceful against. 
 I do not want to suggest that Hauerwas and those who find themselves nodding along 
with him (among which I must sometimes include myself) are doomed to fall into schism. My 
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91 He writes, “I surely cannot mean that the enemy of Christianity is liberal democracy. Such societies, after all, are 
so wonderfully tolerant. Surely you are not against tolerance? How can anyone be against freedom? Let me assure 
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us to discover God’s story for our lives.” Yet aside from the fact that we do not believe we write this story ourselves 
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from the peculiar things Christians do (and the fact that they are pacifist). Hauerwas, “No Enemy, No Christianity: 
Theology and Preaching between 'Worlds',” 32-33. See also Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: 
Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 91-115.
92 See Stanley Hauerwas and Mike Broadway, “The Irony of American Christianity : Reinhold Niebuhr on Church 
and State,” Insights 108, no. 1 (1992). Stanley Hauerwas, “Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life,” 
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Hauerwas, “Reforming Christian Social Ethics: Ten Theses,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and 
Michael G. Cartwright (Durham: Duke, 2001), 114.
93 Dale T. Irvin and Scott W. Sunquist, History of the World Christian Movement, vol. 1: Earliest Christianity to 
1453 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2001), 171-72.
only intent is to show that the absence of internal ecclesiological ambiguity that results from the 
way he relates the church to its eschatological perfection funds his tendency toward sectarianism. 
That is not to say that this shortcoming of Hauerwas is the only factor contributing to the way he 
relates the church to the secular; it is only to point out that the way he thinks about the presence 
of the kingdom of God in the church ends up promoting the kind of disjunction between 
Christian confession and practice that the last chapter linked to his ecclesiology. In other words, 
beneath this sectarian tendency, a major factor contributing to Christian cognitive dissonance, is 
a problematic understanding of the relationship between the church, the world, and the kingdom 
of God. 
Option 2: Neo-Eusebian Triumphalism
 Enacting empirical conformity to the church’s eschatological perfection as an imperative 
of its existence is only one alternative to the Augustinian distinction rejected by Hauerwas and 
Milbank. The other alternative is to compromise the standards of that perfection. In other words, 
if the empirical reality of the church cannot match the kingdom, then make the kingdom match 
the empirical reality of the church. I call this Neo-Eusebian triumphalism (something I already 
noted Augustine’s ecclesiology resists). Eusebius is sometimes unfairly maligned as encouraging 
the decline of a church tempted by imperial power, but there is something to be said for his 
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excessive and unChristian enthusiasm for the reign of Christ he saw manifest in Constantine.94 
One of the most troublesome displays of this enthusiasm involves the relationship between the 
arms of the empire and the arm of Christ. Following long-standing Greek tradition of depicting 
emperors as somehow divinely inspired, holding special concourse with the gods, Eusebius 
depicts Constantine himself as the recipient of divine revelation.95 This qualifies him to be God’s 
agent on earth. A better word than agent might be “enforcer,” for in doing the work of the state – 
both legislatively and militarily – Eusebius saw Constantine doing the work of God. For that 
reason, in driving out the barbarians and subjugating them to the state, Constantine is actually 
subjugating to Christ the demons, whom the barbarians serve. Thus, the fundamental 
characteristic of the Oration that concerns us is an identification of the empire with the church 
and the church with the kingdom. 
 Such an identification is not only the result but the intent of John Milbank’s ecclesiology. 
I do not intend to suggest that Milbank is in favor of a militant conquest of the state. Though in 
Being Reconciled he advocates a form of what might be called Christian espionage (not unlike 
the fundamentalist takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, witnessed in the 1980s96), for 
98
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96 See Susan M. Shaw and Tisa Lewis, “‘Once There Was a Camelot’: Women Doctoral Graduates of the Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 1982-1992, Talk About the Seminary, the Fundamentalist Takeover, and Their Lives 
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the most part this conquest is intellectual.97 He aspires once again to make theology the “queen 
of the sciences.”98 Nevertheless, he shares with Eusebius a perspective that identifies the work of 
an earthly organization with the work of Christ. In Eusebius’ case, for Constantine to conquer the 
barbarians was for Christ to conquer the demons. As far as Milbank goes, only the organization 
has changed. He envisions theology “taking every thought captive to Christ,”99 by which he 
means that no thought is thinkable without the church, insofar as Christ is only incarnate when 
he is fully incarnate in the church, which happens when theology has fully ascended to its proper 
place above all other forms of intellection.100 Thus, in neo-Eusebian triumphalism, the conquest 
of the church over the secular approximates the state’s conquest of the demons. Though not 
actual violence, the means of rhetorical violence and Christian espionage justifies the ends of 
theology’s intellectual conquest over the secular. As with Constantine, subordinating the world to 
the church is subordinating heresy to Jesus Christ.
 The danger of this triumphalism is that, as with its forebear, an empirically fallible 
institution is made proxy for the divine will. Without a clear distinction between the difference of 
the empirical church and its eschatological perfection, there is no way of judging when the 
actions of the church conform to the will of Christ, or when Christ is made to conform to the will 
of a fallen church. Milbank certainly acknowledges that the history of the church is a history of 
error; my point, however, is that the fundamentals of his ecclesiology have no way of accounting 
for such error. His refusal of the Augustinian distinction leads to  confidence in the empirical 
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98 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 382.
99 See 2 Cor. 10:5
100 See Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 123ff, 268ff.
purity of the church, which makes inevitable the dissonance between, on the one hand, 
acknowledging the presence of ecclesial sin while, on the other hand, having no way to explain 
it. Thus both Eusebius and Milbank contain in themselves the dangerous seeds of the ecclesial 
self-justification. Without the healthy ambiguity the invisible church provides, there is no way of 
clearly distinguishing the judgment of Christ from the judgment of the church (which will be 
judged as well). 
Conclusion
 This chapter asked how Milbank and Hauerwas are able to sustain the strict 
counterposition between the church and the secular that leads to Christian cognitive dissonance. 
As argued in Chapter Two, if we think about Milbank and Hauerwas’ ecclesiologies occupying 
opposite ends of a spectrum, one triumphalist and the other sectarian, their extremes meet in a 
shared understanding of the narthex. The above suggests that the foundations of that shared 
account of the church-world limen are eschatological. Collapsing the heavenly city into the 
visible church makes postliberal ecclesiology possible by enabling Milbank and Hauerwas to 
draw strict boundaries between the the kingdom realized in the church and the secular. It is what 
allows Milbank to identify the judgment of the church with the judgment of Christ, and it is what 
leads Hauerwas to relate the church to the secular heresiologically. 
 Insofar as the above is where the error in postliberal ecclesiology lies, it also indicates a 
solution by way of contrast: an alternative account of the narthex would need to prioritize the 
unique identity of the church while removing absolute surety about its judgments vis-à-vis the 
secular that come from the kind of realized eschaton we see in Milbank and Hauerwas. 
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Augustine’s account of the kingdom ambiguously present in the love of the saints partly points 
the way toward such a constructive alternative. In the first place, we saw above that he 
understands the eternal to penetrate time in the miracle of love – the caritas that holds the 
empirical church together. For him, the kingdom was present in the church, which made it, for 
lack of a better word, “special.” This suggests that developing a viable alternative to Milbank and 
Hauerwas’ understanding of the narthex, if it is to preserve ecclesial uniqueness in secular 
culture, must retain a similar sense that the church is the site of the kingdom’s unfolding. 
However, in the second place, Augustine’s doctrine of ecclesial “invisibility” suggests that this 
unfolding must be ambiguous with respect to its presence in the empirical church. Because the 
purity of the church was, for Augustine, not a matter observation but graced intention, he was 
able to open the church up to a certain amount of critique, both from itself and the “outside.” 
Donatists could accuse catholics of being sinners, and its bishops could confirm their 
observations. Thus, in sum, Augustine suggests that the way forward for us is to develop an 
account of the church-world limen that offers uniqueness without surety. This raises the question, 
If Augustine’s ecclesiology suggests such a constructive alternative to postliberal ecclesiology, 
why not stop with his distinction between the “visible” and “invisible” church? Is that not 
enough to account for the interpenetration of the church and the secular? In a word, No.
 Augustine’s ecclesiology is helpful but incomplete. It also points the way forward by way 
of relief. The Augustinian distinction resists ecclesiological hubris vis-à-vis culture that comes 
from collapsing the kingdom into the church, but it does not preclude it entirely. It is still 
possible to draw not an identical but a similar boundary between the church and the secular. 
Only, in this case, the boundary would be invisibly present in a visible communion, like the way 
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Augustine denied legitimacy to the Donatists. As noted above, Augustine was not able to say 
which members of the empirical church were members of the heavenly city, but he did confine 
its membership to the visible catholic church. Though few would want to make such a case 
today, from an Augustinian perspective it is theoretically possible to erect an “invisible” wall 
between the secular and the “true” church within a visibly imperfect communion. Such would 
result not in Christian cognitive dissonance, but a similar kind of spiritual schizophrenia insofar 
as the standard of discipleship would become an impossible standard of purging oneself and the 
church as a whole from secular influences, with the sad acknowledgment that such purification 
would be incomplete this side of the eschaton. As witnessed, for instance, in some antimodernist 
tendencies in Roman Catholicism in the past, even a church whose empirical holiness is 
ambiguous could still define itself over-against its surrounding culture.101 
 The above is not the inevitable result of Augustine’s ecclesiology but one possibility, 
which only means that our quest for a non-cognitively dissonant ecclesiological account of the 
narthex cannot stop at Hippo. The Augustinian distinction points to a way beyond 
counterpositional ecclesiologies positively in the ways I noted above (preserving ecclesial 
uniqueness by seeing the kingdom present in the church and opening the church to intra- and 
extra-ecclesial judgment by keeping that presence ambiguous), and by way of contrast (that 
isolating the kingdom to a visible communion still leaves open the possibility of a theoretical 
counterposition between church and culture). In particular, the limits of his ecclesiology suggest 
the need to prevent the church from making resistance to the secular an “invisible” standard of its 
102
101 This is true of any church, particularly my own Eastern Orthodox tradition, which in some circles is notorious for 
heresiologically defining itself against its culture and other churches. I single Roman Catholicism out, however, 
because, in terms of size and influence, it is the most significant church with an anti-modernist past that also owes a 
great ecclesiological debt to Augustine. 
own perfection to be realized in the eschaton. One way of meeting this need, I propose, is not to 
confine the kingdom of God to the visible church, but to consider the possibility of its presence 
in secular culture. 
 That proposition brings us to the constructive “turn” in this essay. The previous two 
chapters have focused on analyzing a problem. I have argued that the ecclesiologies of Milbank 
and Hauerwas share an account of the relationship between the church and secular culture that is 
functionally equivalent, and that such an account would require Christians who hold such views 
to practice their faith as if the secular did not influence them and as if they did not support it. 
Then, I argued that postliberal ecclesiology’s counterpositions to the world are funded by a 
realized eschatology that identifies the reign of God’s righteousness with the church itself, either 
in a sectarian or triumphalist way. In other words, surety about the “confines” of the kingdom 
can create false confidence in the church’s judgments about itself and its culture. 
 Following the advice of Augustine (both positively and by way of contrast), the 
remaining chapters invite us to consider a more symphonic account of the church-world limen. 
Ultimately, I want to show how we might grant the inevitable influence of the secular on the 
church and the support of the secular by the church tentative legitimacy by expanding the 
proleptic presence of the kingdom of God to culture itself. The end goal is thus to develop a more 
constructive and interactive account of the church-world limen, one that allows for their mutual 
interpenetration in Christian life, while still retaining an emphasis on ecclesial uniqueness (like 
that offered by postliberal ecclesiology) and with it, the consequent potential of ecclesial critique 
of, and resistance to, the secular on the basis of the church’s understanding of the revealed 
“content” of the kingdom of God. 
103
 The Byzantine language of symphonia bespeaks such a dynamism. It provides the basic 
architecture for an account of the church-world limen like the one I just described. Therefore, as 
a necessary precursor to developing such an account of the narthex for our secular context, the 
next chapter will present the basic components of symphonia, as the Byzantines conceived it, 
elucidating its theological – particularly eschatological – conceptual underpinnings, and, through 
a dialogue with a few modern thinkers who anticipated the project of this essay, point toward 
aspects of it that hold potential for its modern re-application to the church’s present situation. 
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PART II
ECCLESIAL SYMPHONIA:
A CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE
CHAPTER IV
SYMPHONIA:
THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE BYZANTINE POLITICAL IDEAL
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 Milbank and Hauerwas’ laudable desire to stress the presence of the kingdom in a 
concrete, particular community, does so in a way that leaves little choice but for the church to 
withdraw into heresiology or to bring the kingdom of God by an intellectual or rhetorical 
conquest, trapping disciples into a false counterposition between the church and the secular. An 
ecclesiology asks too much if the promise of surety and stability in an increasingly unstable 
world comes at the price of Christian authenticity. As we have seen, the extremes of postliberal 
ecclesiology require such a kind of “virtual” faith – a faith lived as if the church, and not the 
secular, were the sole source of our formation and object of our allegiance. Having witnessed 
that this cognitively dissonant faith is informed by a problematic understanding of the 
relationship between the kingdom of God and the church, this chapter begins the process of 
imagining an alternative way of relating the church to the secular by considering how the 
kingdom might be proleptically present in both. To begin constructing this symphonic view of 
the church-world limen, this chapter mines the rubble of Byzantium to see how it might be 
possible to stress the centrality of the church in the formation, development, and negotiation of 
Christian discipleship, while accounting for the truly porous boundary between the church and 
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the secular that exists in the lives of believers. In short, the Byzantines’ way of thinking about the 
kingdom of God in culture suggests how to relate church, world, and kingdom in a way that 
gives us ecclesial uniqueness without ecclesial surety. This sort of theological-archaeological 
expedition is the first of a three-part argument. An initial, critical trek into the way the 
Byzantines thought about the kingdom of God – the way it both authorized and criticized the 
structures of power under which people lived – will comprise the preliminary architecture for 
triangulating church, world, and kingdom. This chapter will not be making a case so much as it 
will be making observations about this triangulation. The second part of this argument, in the 
next two chapters, will develop the theological underpinnings necessary for this initial construct 
to be ported to our present context. 
 The Byzantines are a useful resource because they were keenly aware of the way that 
church and culture were inherently intermeshed. They believed that between the two there could 
be a symphonia – a harmony – wherein the church retained its fundamental commitment to the 
kingdom of God, while working in a provisionally constructive way with the institutions of 
broader society to make this fallen world a closer image of the life to come. The kingdom of God 
was for them, as we shall see, not only an eschatological ideal but also a missiological summons 
that comprised the raison d'être of the church itself. That is how they understood redemption. 
For them, as Fr. Alexander Schmemann later put it, the world was “the ‘matter’ of the Kingdom 
of God, called to be fulfilled and transfigured so that ultimately God may be ‘all in all things.’”1 
Therefore, this chapter offers the Byzantines as an example of the possible. They are not an 
example of what should be in the sense of a new Christian empire. Practically speaking, 
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Byzantium was triumphalist, possessed of a realized eschatology. Holding them up for emulation 
would only replicate the problem these chapters intend to overcome. In the remaining chapters, 
of concern is not the practice of their politics but the ideal of symphonia that informed it. Their 
worldview can inform an ecclesiology that is able to account for the interpenetrations between 
the church and the secular in the life of the believer as an expression of her primary commitment 
to Christ and his kingdom. This chapter thus begins the process of developing symphonia into an 
ecclesiology by introducing its traditional formulation, problems in the present, and the inchoate 
recognition of its possibilities in a post-imperial, post-Constantinian world. In particular, I intend 
to demonstrate that it was a faithful, albeit imperfect, response to the eschatological imperative at 
the heart of the gospel, reconciling the inevitable interpenetration between church and world 
(described above) in the life of the believer, by seeing both as conditionally authorized by, and 
thus subject to the judgment of, God’s kingdom.
 Developing this argument will take place in three parts. The first is archaeology: an 
exploration of the symphonic principle in the history of Byzantium. Because Byzantine political 
theology is prone to misunderstanding and misrepresentation, we will begin by clearing away a 
major myth about symphonia, followed by focusing on its eschatological components. I will 
argue that symphonia was a faithful expansion of the eschatological hope of the church for a 
changing cultural situation, and in the process, will highlight aspects of it that can apply to our 
post-Constantinian situation. The second section will lift out of the history and theology 
presented in the first section aspects of symphonia that are particularly applicable to our present 
context. Then, I will present the initial attempts of some modern Russian to tease out the 
potential within this political ideal to become a broader theory of culture. These “sophiologists” 
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do not yet develop symphonia into an ecclesiology for the narthex, but they do mark a trajectory 
for us to proceed by conceiving of symphonia in a less formal, more democratic way. Their 
insights thus anticipate the argument of this essay. They help distill symphonia down to its 
essential ecclesiological components, which the next chapter will develop.
Byzantine Symphonia
 The modern Orthodox theologian, Fr. Georges Florovsky, once described Byzantium as 
“an adventure in Christian politics.”2 In other words, Byzantium was an experiment, and a failed 
one at that! Or, as Florovsky concluded about this errand, “Byzantium collapsed as a Christian 
Kingdom, under the burden of its tremendous claim.”3 I daresay, a “holy kingdom” of some kind 
or another may be the most dangerous of all oxymorons. Earthly kingdoms are anything but holy. 
At best, they can be reasonably, partially just, but never holy, never righteous in the biblical 
sense. Only one kingdom will be holy, and it has not yet come. 
 Given Florovsky’s warning, the scholar who intends to offer even a marginally 
sympathetic reading of Byzantine political theology, like the one to follow, faces a problem. The 
Byzantine empire is the heir of the Constantine’s legacy, which can either be admired, maligned, 
or misunderstood, depending upon one’s theological prejudices. Though Florovsky’s is the 
dominant view among Orthodox scholars in the west, some “Eastern” theologians remain quite 
enthusiastic about Christendom (witness the increasingly close relations between the church and 
the state in modern Russia). They are inclined to ignore mountains of evidence against the 
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“benefits” of Christian empire and give undue significance to the molehills of materials 
indicating imperial sanctity. On the other hand, the history of Byzantium in the west often takes 
the opposite approach: Constantine was “faking it,” and his successors were all theocrats. From 
this view, what is properly called symphonia by more knowledgeable Byzantine historians was 
often called caesaropapism by older western polemicists. This perspective – that the emperor 
ruled the church like he ruled the state – has embedded itself so deeply into the popular 
mythology of the western theological imagination that it seems expedient, after a brief 
description of symphonia, intended to orient us to this political theology, to offer an initial 
response to the common presumption that eastern Christendom was caesaropapist. This will be 
followed by a closer look at the history and theology of the Byzantine ideal. By “sandwiching” 
an argument against caesaropapism between an initial definition and then more thorough 
description of symphonia, I hope not to seem repetitive or to distract from my argument. 
However, since symphonia is so often misunderstood in the west, explaining what it is not is just 
as important to comprehending it properly as saying what it is. 
An Initial Description of Symphonia
 One way of explaining the Byzantine political ideal of symphonia is to say that, under its 
auspices, Byzantine society sought a “balance” between church and state. This description is 
more or less adequate, but it does not do full justice to the Byzantine social imaginary. Thinking 
of church and state as two different things is a modern phenomenon. Furthermore, though the 
word symphonia appears in Byzantine law (as we shall see in a moment), it was not so much a 
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codified policy as a cultural ethos.4 Therefore, it is easier to describe than to define. To 
understand symphonia fully, one probably should be Byzantine. With that caution in mind, I offer 
the following tentative definition of symphonia, which I intend to be a makeshift lighthouse – a 
point of reference – that will be made firmer by a subsequent foray into the theological 
assumptions and history of the Byzantine empire. In the Byzantine empire, symphonia was a 
point of view wherein the church supported the work of the state insofar as the state conformed 
to the eschatological mission of the church, to realize God’s kingdom in the world around it. 
 Understanding how this balance was maintained requires stepping, as much as possible, 
into the Byzantines’ social imaginary. They simply knew that all institutions were to be 
complementary components of one Christonormic culture. The church was not an institution 
within society. The church was society. Therefore, a citizen’s commitment to the state was 
concurrent with, but also normed by, her commitment to Jesus Christ and his kingdom. The 
limited subordination of church and state to each other was fundamentally an effect of the reign 
of Christ being worked out in the world, particularly in the church’s response to it. 
 Of course, the reality rarely lived up to the ideal, but that is beside the point. Florovsky 
was right: Byzantium was a failed experiment, but it is from failed experiments that we often 
have the most to learn. This requires approaching the data, as much as possible, without 
prejudice. Therefore, limiting the following analysis to those aspects of Byzantine symphonia 
from which ecclesial symphonia (symphonia-as-ecclesiology) will later draw inspiration, we 
begin by distinguishing between actual Byzantine political theology and erroneous reports about 
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it, lest widely-accepted historical prejudice lead one to faulty conclusions about the applicability 
of symphonia for the contemporary church.
Symphonia, not Caesaropapism
 Typically, when scholars want to define symphonia, they quote the Sixth Novella of 
Emperor Justinian. There he writes, 
There are two great gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on 
high: the priesthood (3456789:) and the imperial dignity (;asile<a). The first 
serves divine things, while the latter directs and administers human affairs; both, 
however, proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, 
nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the 
priests, since it is for their (imperial) welfare that they constantly implore God. 
For, if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to 
God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted 
to their care, general harmony (sum=wn<a tis >ga?@) will result and whatever 
is beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race.5
This is an inadequate definition of symphonia. Properly interpreting this Novella requires 
situating it in the context of Byzantine history and theology. Otherwise, it seems to conform to a 
false concept that Philip Schaff helped to popularize. 
 Schaff called Byzantine political theology caesaropapist, a term that has gained wide 
currency. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church defines caesaropapism thusly, “The 
system whereby an absolute monarch has supreme control over the Church within his dominions 
and exercises it even in matters (e.g. doctrine) normally reserved to ecclesiastical authority. The 
term is most generally used of the authority exercised by the Byzantine emperors over the E. 
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patriarchates, esp. in the centuries immediately preceding the Schism of 1054.”6 In other words, 
the dominant view in the west is that the Byzantine church was under the thumb of its caesar. 
 This term actually reveals more about the biases of those who use it than it does the state 
of relations between church and empire.7 Thus, the Byzantine historian, Fr. John McGuckin, 
lambastes caesaropapism as “a caricaturing concept.”8 It is the conclusion drawn from a 
selective reading of Christian history by those predisposed to see it as a long slide into error 
(until the church was rescued by the Reformation). In short, according to this view, the Byzantine 
emperor ruled both church and state. In truth, however, the power differentials between imperium 
and ecclesia were far more complicated. 
 The problem with caesaropapism is revealed in the parts of the term itself. This 
theological shorthand is clearly intended more for polemic than accuracy. Fr. John Meyendorff 
points out that it makes two false claims. In the first place, it implies that the emperor was 
ordained, that he held some kind of priestly office. In the second place, it suggests that his 
sovereign priesthood was absolute, like a pope (so it polemicizes against Catholicism, too).9 But 
the history of Byzantium proves both claims false. The emperor was not a priest.10 No Byzantine 
emperor ever successfully dictated doctrine. They were responsible for calling councils and for 
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ratifying their decisions. They could even “stack” the councils in their own favor, but these 
imperial “tricks” were severely limited by the will of the people. Doctrines not generally 
approved by the clergy and the laity did not last.11
 Francis Dvornik, whose incredibly thorough two-volume history of Greek political 
philosophy also helped popularize the caesaropapist myth, has even gone so far as to suggest 
that alleged Byzantine caesaropapism has pagan roots, indicating that a kind of divine right 
might have predated Romans 13. The ancient Greeks tended to view their king not as a god, but 
as a divinely-appointed emissary – a mediator between heaven and earth – who had, if not 
conference with the gods, at minimum, a special status before them. His job was to represent the 
people before the gods and to enact their will among the people.12 The emperor was like a human 
god to his subjects, tasked with organizing political life into a harmony that reflected the divinely 
ordered harmony of nature.13 When Christianity came to prominence, says Dvornik, Christians 
simply replaced the Greek pantheon with Jesus. Thus, he concludes, Byzantine political theology 
was basically, “Hellenistic ideology in Christian garb.”14
 Dvornik’s analysis is half-right. There are probably some pagan roots to symphonia. After 
all, Christianity is inherently syncretistic. We despoil the Egyptians, often kleptomaniacally, so 
that we are only half aware that we are doing it. And, if we get caught, we make all kinds of 
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11 Roland Herbert Bainton, Christendom; a Short History of Christianity and Its Impact on Western Civilization, 
Harper Torchbooks. The Cloister Library (New York,: Harper & Row, 1966), 107-8.
12 We can see this sort of thing at work in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King. As the play opens, the suffering people of 
Thebes supplicate their ruler not, “because we regard you as equal to the gods,” they say, but because Oedipus is a 
man who has “divine support.” Sophocles, Oedipus the King, trans., Bernard M. W.  Knox (New York: Pocket 
Books, 2005), 6-7.
13 Dvornik, Byzantine Political Philosophy 1, 249-55.
14 Dvornik, Byzantine Political Philosophy 2, 720. 
excuses, trying to explain how what we stole was really ours the whole time.15 But our theft 
always involves a baptism of the object before it is incorporated into our (albeit mismatched) 
church decor. Obviously, this is not a perfect process. The baptism of the pagan does not always 
bring about the promised transformation. We have examples, like Eusebius, of individuals who 
fit Dvornik’s rather rigid mold quite well, but we have an equal number of examples of those 
who got the “balance” right, such as the five-times-exiled Athanasius, the martyred John 
Chrysostom, and a slew of rioting monks.16 Dvornik ignores such cases, says McGuckin, 
because he approaches his sources with a Harnackian bias, presuming the history of the church is 
one of gradual decline, owing to a Greek perversion of the original teachings of Jesus.17 That is 
why he highlights evidence of pagan corruption, and ignores that which suggests that maybe the 
emperor is not a Byzantine pope after all.18 
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15 Thus, following Philo, Justin Martyr claims that Plato got his ideas from Moses. Justin Martyr, “Horatory Address 
to the Greeks,” in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Albany, OR: Ages 
Software, 1997), 20. Gregory of Nyssa makes spoiling Egypt a Christian duty. He says, “Our guide in virtue 
commands someone who ‘borrows’ from wealthy Egyptians to receive such things as moral and natural philosophy, 
geometry, astronomy, dialectic, and whatever else is sought by those outside the Church, since these things will be 
useful when in time the divine sanctuary of mystery must be beautified with the riches of reason.” Gregory Nyssen, 
The Life of Moses, trans., Abraham J.  Malherbe and Everett Ferguson, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: 
Paulist, 1978), par. 115.
16 Edward Siecienski has recently suggested that theologians need to pay more attention to the tradition of “holy 
disobedience” in the history of the church, especially when it came to monks. Edward Siecienski, “Holy 
Disobedience: Resistance to Secular and Ecclesiastical Authority in the Orthodox Tradition,” in The Third Annual 
Conference of the Sophia Institute: Power and Authority in Eastern Christian Experience (New York: 2010).
17 Harnack says the essence of Christianity (the original title of his book: Das Wesen des Christentums) is found in 
the religious consciousness awakened by the teachings of Jesus, embodied in the first Christians, mostly centering 
around the kingdom of God (understood as the rule of God in the heart of the individual Christian), God and human 
dignity, and universal love. Paul inadvertently contributed to the adulteration of this essence by spreading this 
teaching to the Gentiles, where it began to be translated into the terms of Greek philosophy. In itself this is not a 
problem, until the “alien accretions” of Greek mythology and polytheism made their way into the church, producing 
the chimera of Roman Catholicism and “Greek Catholicism,” only later to be purified by the Protestant 
Reformation. Thus, it would seem, that Christianity all but disappeared in the Middle Ages, until it was rescued by 
Luther. Adolf von Harnack, What Is Christianity?, trans., Thomas Bailey Saunders (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1957), 
33-34, 51-74, 197-281. Quotation is taken from p. 269.
18 McGuckin, “The Legacy of the 13th Apostle,” 259ff.
History and Theology of Symphonia
 In actuality, the Byzantines saw their emperor neither as a divine emissary nor a pope. He 
was more like king David. If the Byzantines did inherit a concept of divine right, symphonia 
subsumes it under the theology of covenant, an understanding of power that went a long way 
toward limiting the king’s authority. His sweeping power of the administrative affairs of the 
church – the appointment of bishops and enforcement of clerical discipline – derived from his 
divinely ordained vocation. The same thing applied to his enforcement of orthodoxy as the law 
of the land. Making church law state law was his way of being obedient to God in the station in 
which he had been placed.19 The Byzantines, like most Christians until fairly recently in our 
history, knew that the duties of a monarch could not be separated from the duties of a Christian, 
in the same way that the righteous kings of the Old Testament were expected to abolish idolatry 
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19 Asterios Gerostergios presents a highly favorable picture of the piety of the emperor and the limits to his authority 
(in this case Justinian). He points out that from the Byzantine perspective, the enforcement of orthodoxy was a 
matter of national security because the success of the empire depended on divine approval. Gerostergios’ book is 
intended to show that Justinian’s imperial policies were an expression of his own deep devotion to God, not 
opportunistic attempts to gain and keep power. Gerostergios deserves credit for raising a possible explanation for 
Justinian’s policies against Jews, pagans, and heretics that is less cynical than what one might find in much modern 
scholarship. However, in the end, his case is unconvincing. Though he presents a wealth of primary material 
balanced by modern commentary on it that does not agree with his own thesis, when there are two ways of 
interpreting an event, the author always comes down on the side of the more generous reading. Thus he dismisses 
the negative reports of the Secret History of Procopios, upon which modern scholarship relies for information about 
Justinian’s policies, as intending to defame Justinian. Gerostergios acknowledges that Justinian involved himself in 
internal Jewish affairs, but he says this is because the Jews dragged him into their squabbles. He attempted to coerce 
rather than force a conversion. His policies against Samaritans and Manichees were harsh, but only because he saw 
them as a threat to the empire. His policies against pagans were severe, but were not strictly enforced. It was a “big 
stick” designed to get them to convert to the true faith. But the major strike against his thesis is the methodological 
approach to the material. Gerostergios seems to think it is possible to look back into the past and read the personal 
intentions and piety of an individual with a fair amount of certitude. Personally, psychologizing the dead is a 
practice I find highly questionable. Asterios Gerostergios, Justinian the Great: The Emperor and Saint (Belmont, 
MA: Institute for Byzantine & Modern Greek Studies, 1982), 65-154, 202. Nevertheless, Gerostergios is probably 
correct about the relationship between piety and national security. Justinian probably believed what everyone else in 
his empire believed: operating with a social imaginary in which exclusion of the divine was unthinkable, they all 
knew that the security of their empire and the success of their military depended in large part on the piety of at least 
some people (in particular monastics). John Moorhead, Justinian (New York: Longman, 1994), 118.
and enforce Torah law.20 But in the case of biblical monarchs, divine appointment was a sword 
that cut both ways. The same was true of the Byzantine king. He could be a David, or he could 
be a Saul, maybe even a Manasseh (2 Kings 21). Seeing the Byzantine king as a type of Old 
Testament king put biblical strictures on his authority, making obedience to the emperor depend 
upon his obedience to the Heavenly King. As McGuckin writes, “When God chooses a king, so 
the Byzantines learned from their scripture, God can also ‘unchoose’ him. Although it is true, 
therefore, that Byzantine religious philosophy afforded the emperor the role of prophetic priest-
king, its model was the Davidic one that heavily underlined the ‘tentative’ nature of this sacred 
role; not its absolute force.”21 
 This principle of cooperation conditioned on obedience – on conformity to a divine 
standard – is the heart of the symphonic ideal. The authority of a king came from God, insofar as 
the king was godly. Otherwise, obedience required resistance. 
 There is a popular myth that prior to Constantine the church was more or less a pure 
community with a tightly controlled discipline, a persecuted minority whose eschatological hope 
sustained it in a hostile culture. When Constantine came to power, so this myth goes, the church 
was tempted by the promise of imperial prestige, so it traded the kingdom of God for 30 pieces 
of silver, fancier vestments, and few extra churches. Constantinianism spelled the end of New 
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20 Some might wonder at my preference for the term Old Testament over Hebrew Bible. I agree that the term implies 
supersessionism, and I lament that fact. I wish the tradition had settled on a different way to designate the division in 
its canon. That said, however, I see an equally disagreeable problem with calling the first half of the Christian Bible 
the Hebrew Bible, for it implies that the Old Testament and Tanakh are equivalent when they are not. The Old 
Testament books end with Malachi, which foretells the coming of John the Baptist and the Messiah. The Tanakh 
ends with the return from exile. Christian Bibles tends to give the Old Testament a Christian interpretation, whereas 
the dominant translation of the Tanakh (from the JPS) tends to make a deliberate effort to prevent Christians from 
finding predictions of the Messiah in the Prophets and Psalms. Suggesting equivalence between the two can be a 
more dangerous kind of supersessionism by blinding Christians to the dogmatic differences between themselves and 
their Jewish friends. This can lead Christians to interpret Judaism according to the dictates of their own faith. At 
least preserving the terminological distinction foregrounds the difference between these sister religions. 
21 McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, 382. Emphasis mine.
Testament Christianity and its hope for the kingdom, which it now identified with the empire.22 
At least, that is the story. The problem with this myth is its idealization of “primitive” 
Christianity (which only knew an imperial ideology, just of Christ) and its presumption that 
Constantinian Christianity could be characterized by such radical discontinuity with its past.23 
There is certainly some truth to the Constantinian narrative. After Constantine, many in the 
church did tend toward a realized eschatology. (On this point, we have already seen the 
enthusiasm of Eusebius.) Nonetheless, the fact that the emperor’s authority was conditioned by 
adherence to the Heavenly King suggests that perhaps Byzantine eschatology was not so realized 
as we are sometimes led to believe. The history shows (as we shall see momentarily) that the 
kingdom of God remained a standard against which earthly kingdoms, even Christian ones, 
could be judged.24 This suggests that the Byzantines did not wholly abandon the eschatological 
hope of the early church. Symphonia was the name they gave this hope for a new social situation. 
For all its practical shortcomings, symphonia was an honest attempt to respond to the biblical 
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22 This story has become so widely accepted that it is hard to know whom to cite in support of it. Harnack. Justo 
Gonzalez. Moltmann. Hauerwas. Peter J. Leithart’s well-researched account of the life of Constantine, his 
conversion, and the pagan-Roman milieu that shaped his and the consciousness of every one of his contemporaries 
(a consciousness that understands religion to be what we would probably call superstition) convincingly calls into 
question this narrative of the fall of the church in the fourth century. In all probability, Constantine’s conversion, 
though gradual, was legitimate by the standards of the day. Nor did it bring about a radical shift in the practice of 
Christianity. Peter J. Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twighlight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010). Though it is probable that many entered the church for opportunistic 
reasons (which are only abhorrent by our definition of what makes for a “legitimate” conversion), Christian faith 
was not necessarily any less pure in the in the fourth century than in the first. Assuming the Pauline Epistles give an 
accurate account of New Testament Christianity, then members of the church were prone to factionalism (1 
Corinthians 1:10ff), idolatry (10:14-22), classism (11:17-22), and incest (5:1-8). 
23 In a recent paper, George Demacopoulos pointed out that the narratives of Christianity assume an imperial 
context. Demacopoulos calls for coming to terms with this fact, not necessarily because imperialism is undesirable 
so much as it is impracticable. The point, however, is that Christianity did not come to think of itself in imperial 
terms with Constantine. Prior to Constantine they just imagined the kingdom of God as another kind of empire. All 
of the Bible was written during a time when empire was the norm. It is naive to think that Christianity would not 
have adopted the imagery and concepts of its culture, even if it transformed them. George E. Demacopoulos, 
“Rethinking the Papal-Imperial Relationship During the Tenure of Gregory the Great,” in The Third Annual 
Conference of the Sophia Institute: Power and Authority in Eastern Christian Experience (New York: 2010). 
24 The epistles of Paul suggest that we have no grounds for placing halos on the heads of New Testament Christians. 
They were, more or less, as pure as Christians today (See, for instance, 1 Cor. 5, 6, 10, and 11).
message of the kingdom of God in a setting wherein the church had gone from being a 
persecuted minority to the official religion of the empire. 
 According to Vigen Guroian, the church after Constantine tried to understand and 
reinterpret the New Testament faith in the light of what seemed like new revelation.25 As he says, 
“The Byzantine and Russian political theologies have come and gone without changing 
significantly Orthodox theology or the Church’s understanding of its mission.”26 Symphonia was 
how the church lived its eschatological mission in a context wherein it was increasingly 
enmeshed with culture. Prior to Constantine, the church thought of itself as the proleptic 
embodiment of the kingdom of God. It was not the kingdom itself but a “foretaste” of the life to 
come, striving to be in the present what God would one day make it in the future. The ascension 
of Constantine expanded the scope of this purpose for the church’s existence (i.e. proleptically to 
embody the kingdom in itself). Now, so far as it was able, the church would make the world 
itself into a prolepsis of the kingdom as well.27 In the persecuted church, Christian social 
teaching focused on the non-compatibility between the kingdoms of God and caesar, but this was 
not because Rome was inherently evil (witness Romans 13). Rather, the church resisted Rome 
because Rome resisted the reign of Christ, pretentiously claiming to be the embodiment of a 
perfected social order. But when prideful Rome bent its neck to Christ, in the Christian emperor 
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25 This claim is pretty remarkable given some of Guroian’s affinities with Hauerwas. See Vigen Guroian, “Tradition 
and Ethics: Prospects in a Liberal Society,” Modern Theology 7, no. 3 (1991). Vigen Guroian, “Human Rights and 
Modern Western Faith : An Orthodox Christian Assessment,” Journal of Religious Ethics 26, no. 2 (1998). Vigen 
Guroian, “Liturgy and the Lost Eschatological Vision of Christian Ethics,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 
20, no. (2000): esp. 230ff. On the whole, it seems that Guroian is a moderate supporter of the “free church” theology 
of Yoder and Hauerwas (which he seems to conflate). He notes that they offer an “important critique” of 
Constantinianism, even if he finds their view of the history a bit too “dim.” Vigen Guroian, Ethics after 
Christendom: Toward an Ecclesial Christian Ethic (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 22.
26 Vigen Guroian, “Notes toward an Eastern Orthodox Ethic,” Journal of Religious Ethics 9, no. 2 (1981): 237.
27 Vigen Guroian, “The Problem of an Orthodox Social Ethic: Diaspora Reflections,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 
21, no. 4 (1984): 713-15.
Constantine, the church was invited to apply its intra-ecclesial mission more broadly, “to make 
the Kingdom of God present by redeeming and transfiguring the world,” says Guroian.28 As the 
people of God had sought to sanctify themselves, they now sought to sanctify society itself 
through the cooperative interactions of church and government.
 This covenantal perspective on the Byzantine monarchy helps us properly interpret the 
meaning of the Sixth Novella (quoted above). Modern scholarship may give the Novella too 
much weight. Fr. John Meyendorff points out that it is actually a preamble to a rather mundane 
document about the behavior of priests. The history of Byzantium reveals far more about the 
“balance” the people tried to achieve between the affairs of church and the affairs of state than a 
few hastily written lines about “harmony.” Nonetheless, the Sixth Novella does offer a couple of 
important insights into some presuppositions behind the Byzantines’ symphonic worldview.29 In 
the first place, it clearly does not support a caesaropapist interpretation of imperial power. 
Justinian does not claim absolute authority over the church. He actually writes, “Hence, nothing 
should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests.” His power extends 
not to the whole church, just the priestly part of it. Given Meyendorff’s observation about the 
nature of this pre-amble, Justinian is probably referring to his responsibility to ensure that the 
priests are “free from blame” in order that their prayers might be more effective. His concerns 
thus have more to do with national security than theology.30 Secondly, the emperor’s limited 
authority is “granted from on high.”31 Consistent with McGuckin’s claim about conditional 
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28 Guroian, “Notes toward an Eastern Orthodox Ethic,” 237.
29 Meyendorff, Byzantine Legacy, 48-49.
30 See Moorhead, 118-21.
31 In Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions, 209-10.
imperial authority, the emperor’s power is not absolute but, like all authority, is subordinate to its 
source.32 We can also see a third presupposition informing this worldview: there is no religiously 
neutral space. A prophet, priest, and even a king could be used by God for the betterment of 
society. Thus Justinian elaborates on the Sixth Novella in the Seventh Novella, “The priesthood 
and the imperium do not differ very greatly. Nor are sacred things so very different from those of 
public and common interest.”33 This passage refers not to a similarity of operations but of ends. 
Sacred and civic affairs could work together for the common welfare. Justinian is not claiming 
the priesthood for himself anymore than he is saying that the state serves a “sacramental” 
function. His point is that God works through both. 
 The history of Byzantium shows how symphonia worked “on the ground,” so to speak. 
Harmony was an effect of good governance. It was a sign of the state’s service to the kingdom of 
God. The absence of harmony proved imperial overreach – the failure of the emperor to be 
obedient to the source of his authority. Thus Leo III passed an edict to eliminate the veneration of 
icons. Under the caesaropapist interpretation of Byzantine polity, this legislated dogma, 
accompanied by the deposition and appointment of bishops, and the convoking of an iconoclastic 
council, should have been final. Instead, it led to about 100 years of fierce resistance from clergy 
and laity alike, often under the threat of force. Interestingly, the empresses Irene and Theodora 
used the same formal procedures as Leo to reinstate icons. The reason their procedures worked 
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32 McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, 382.
33 In Ibid., 394.
and Leo’s failed is that their actions conformed to the will of the people, who in this case were 
the mouthpiece for the will of God.34 
 A similar phenomenon was twice repeated a few centuries later, during the Unionist 
controversies of Lyon and Florence (in the 13th and 15th centuries, respectively). Threatened by 
ever-advancing Turkish armies, Byzantine emperors convoked councils with their Roman 
counterparts, negotiating and affirming reunification with the Catholics in exchange for military 
assistance. In the case of Florence, the Greeks not only acknowledged papal supremacy, but also 
compromised on other significant doctrinal matters. However, in both cases, the councils were 
effectively ruled non-canonical, mostly by the laity.35 
 These two episodes conform to my initial description of symphonia as conditional 
cooperation between church and state as two aspects of one Christian society. They show that the 
emperor’s supposed authority depended upon his obedience to the will of Christ, which was 
ultimately revealed by the people under him. Though this “ethos” was somewhat chaotic, 
symphonia was still, in the words of Meyendorff, 
an authentic attempt to view human life in Christ as a whole: it did not admit any 
dichotomy between the spiritual and the material, the sacred and the secular, the 
individual and the social, or the doctrinal and the ethical, but recognized a certain 
polarity between “divine things” – essentially the sacramental communion of man 
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34 See Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Tradition, V2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom, 600-1700 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1974), 91-133. Leonid Ouspensky, Theology of the Icon, trans., Anthony Gythiel and Elizabeth 
Meyendorff, vol. 1 (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's, 1992), 107-17.
35 Pelikan, 271ff. Sergei Bulgakov discusses the doctrinal debates of these councils in great detail. Sergius Bulgakov, 
The Comforter, trans., Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 109-49. One might wonder how the refusal of 
unity might be an expression of God’s will, but that is beside the point. Like most things in life, whether or not anti-
unionism conformed to God’s will remains to be seen. The point is what this episode says about the power 
differentials between the emperor and the people he ruled as God’s alleged “agent.” Theologically, this episode 
shows that the people are were also the agents of God, understood to represent God’s will when the emperor was 
believed to have fallen short. In particular, Sergei Bulgakov cites it as an example of the Orthodox “twist” on 
conciliarity. Orthodox church polity, witnessed in these two episodes, is not hierarchical but conciliar. This means 
more than just “rule by councils.” It means that a council’s decision is binding only to the extent that the laity binds 
itself to that decision. Sergius Bulgakov, The Orthodox Church, trans., Lydia Kesich (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's, 
1988), 61-67.
with God – and “human affairs.” Yet between the two there had to be a 
“symphony” in the framework of a single Christian society in which both Church 
and state cooperated in preserving the faith and in building a society based on 
charity and humaneness.36
 The quotation from Meyendorff is helpful insofar as it expresses that symphonia was 
ultimately a kind of worldview. It was a non-compartmentalizing way of looking at life, relating 
both civic and ecclesial matters to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The above episodes also 
show how far symphonia fell from its ideal. Viewing “life in Christ as a whole” is a laudable 
objective that could not be realized in a fallen world with a fallen political system. Leo and his 
iconoclastic successors were caesaropapists in practice.37 Though the symphonic corrective won 
in the end, it did so at a high cost to the integrity of the visible church, closely allied as it was to 
political power. Though the “holy rioting” required of symphonia may be the only alternative to 
accepting oppression in the absence of modern, democratic institutions, it hardly suggests the 
realization of a single, christonormic reality. Nonetheless, the fact that the church could resist 
caesaropapist emperors demonstrates that its eschatology was not entirely realized. Otherwise,  
the emperor’s word would have been as good as the word of Christ. Caesaropapists counted on 
the eschatological failures of the church, and they were always disappointed to find that the 
church could still disobey its earthly king in the name of its Heavenly King. 
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36 John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1983), 214-15.
37 It is also important to remember that caesaropapists, contrary to Dvornik’s thesis, did not exactly fall under the 
spell of paganism, either. For individuals like Eusebius, the Christian syncretism to the Hellenic was accomplished 
with the help of biblical prophecy and eschatology. It is hard to argue against the idea that for Eusebius the 
ascension of Constantine was not the beginning of the reign of God on earth. He speaks of Constantine’s support of 
the church as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy about the end times, saying, “In accordance with a prophet’s 
prediction, which mystically signified beforehand what was to be, there came together bone to bone and joint to 
joint, and all that in riddling oracles the scripture infallibly foretold.” Eusebius of Caesarea, The History of the 
Church, trans., G. A.  Williamson (New York: Penguin, 1965). X.3
 Guroian rightly says that the eastern church retained its pre-Constantinian sense of 
vocation – to sanctify itself until the parousia – even as it became the official state religion. If it 
is true that the eastern church retained its pre-Constantinian sense of vocation then the church did 
recognize a difference between the empire and the kingdom of God. If the empire still needs to 
be perfected, then the kingdom of God has not yet come. Thus Meyendorff, as critical as he is of 
the practical effects of symphonia in the political realm, rightly describes it as the “aspiration” to 
make the empire like the kingdom.38 This sense of symphonia as an eschatological telos to be 
realized as much as possible in the realm of culture is the promise it contains for the 
contemporary church.
Triangulating Church, World, and Kingdom
 If, as Guroian says, the ideal of symphonia was the church adapting its eschatological 
ideal for a new situation, then there is potential to adapt symphonia to our situation as well. 
Symphonia, as we have seen, attempted to subordinate a human kingdom to the kingdom of God, 
a subordination manifest in the capacity of Christians to mobilize and act against their “divinely 
appointed” monarchs. The king was also authorized by the kingdom of God. Though this 
authority was conditional, it does help explain why, as a political theology, symphonia was 
almost a complete failure: it was up to the people to try to figure out when their apparently 
divinely authorized king was acting rightly, and when he was not. Being divinely authorized, his 
word was not equal to the word of Christ, but it could be confused with the word of Christ. That, 
together with the absence of modern political institutions, is why resistance to imperial 
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incursions against the God’s reign, which the church struggled to embody, most often took the 
form of a kind of holy rioting. Angry bands of monks causing mayhem in the streets of the 
capital is probably not the harmony Justinian had in mind. 
 The problems that plague political symphonia raise the question of its value for the 
contemporary situation. Given that our situation is not imperial, does it not make better sense 
simply to return to the early church’s hope for the coming kingdom rather than this Byzantine 
version of that hope? I grant that returning to the ethos of the “New Testament church” has a 
certain appeal, particularly in an American context, which has known all manner of Christian 
primitivism over the years, but this question also forgets that just as our situation is different 
from the Byzantines, it is also different than that of early Christians. We are no longer a minority 
sect in a pagan culture. We actually have more in common with Constantine’s society insofar as 
Christianity has indelibly marked our culture and remains the majority religion in the United 
States. Being formally secular, modern, and democratic also precludes some of the more 
unpleasant aspects of symphonia as a political ideal. Fortunately, symphonia does not have to be 
a political theology. It works best as – and perhaps always was – an ecclesiology. This suggests 
that this same ideal can be adapted to a new secular reality, for as the circumstances of the 
church change, the church’s commitment to he kingdom does not change, only its expression. 
 We will consider in a moment how to lift symphonia from the rubble of Byzantium and 
adapt it to our own context, but this first requires sorting out its essential building blocks, thus 
taking stock of the above history by focusing on aspects of symphonia applicable to our 
contemporary secular situation, particularly in response to the problem of Christian cognitive 
dissonance. In particular, symphonia combines some of the better aspects of postliberal 
125
ecclesiology (such as its emphasis on Christian identity) with an honest recognition of the 
church’s implications in culture. I propose we see symphonia as coordinating a provisional 
triumphalism and situational sectarianism, regulated by the reign of God’s righteousness. Again, 
the point here is the ideal, not its mostly failed expression. 
 Faith in the kingdom of God is the source of the church’s provisional triumphalism. As 
noted above, the Byzantine church, possessed of an eschatological imperative to sanctify the 
world in the sanctification of itself, saw the kingdom of God as the criterion of its dealings with 
the state. In other words, the church had a mission, and it could justifiably engage the institutions 
of the state to help it fulfill that mission. Because this triumphalism was not the triumph of the 
church over the world but the triumph of Christ, it bears little in common with Milbank’s desire 
for a new Christendom. It was confidence that Christ was working through extra-ecclesial 
institutions, not the triumph of the church over those institutions. Nor am I suggesting that the 
Byzantines were a particularly good at restraining the many excesses of their triumphalist 
impulses. When one sees conquest of the barbarians as conquest of the devil, there is clearly a 
problem! However, for the purposes of adapting symphonia to the contemporary church, the 
principle matters more than the failed reality, and the principle to pay attention to here is that of 
the possibility of constructive engagement with society, so long as it is conditioned by God’s 
reign. Provisional triumphalism, seeing Christ over and in the world, precludes erecting strict 
boundaries between the church and the world. 
 Because the actions of the church in society were judged by something other than the 
church itself, the Byzantines could also be situationally sectarian. The church did support the 
empire, often to terrible excess, but the history also shows instances wherein the church was able 
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to withdraw into its own particularity to bear critical witness to the state. Such resistance was too 
few and far between, admittedly. Nor should we ignore the fact that the Byzantines left much to 
be desired when it came to considering what the reign of God had to say about social welfare, the 
economy, war, education, the rights of women, and so on (but the Christian Greeks were far more 
equitable and just than their pagan forebears). Again, however, of concern is not historical 
failures but the principle itself. The eschatological ideal that symphonia represented could still 
realize the early church’s sectarian resistance of Rome (that which is the standard of the church’s 
faithfulness all the time, according to Hauerwas’ ecclesiology). When the empire had gone too 
far, the church had the capacity to withdraw into itself and to witness, so to speak, “against the 
nations.”
 In sum, symphonia works sometimes with society and sometimes against it. In it, we find 
the beginnings of an initial response to postliberal accounts of the narthex. I said before that a 
consistent account of the narthex in a secular context requires stressing ecclesial uniqueness 
without erecting an imaginary wall around the church. Byzantium bespeaks the possibility for 
such a dynamic relationship. 
 This perspective may not seem immediately portable to our own. In Byzantium, church 
and state were formally concentric, whereas in our society church and state are formally separate. 
A theological argument for their partial convergence under the kingdom will be made in the next 
chapter, but to make an initial case for the relevance of symphonia today, and to indicate how to 
engage the secular symphonically, we turn now to some more recent thinkers who saw the 
potential of this ideal to help the church relate to a new, more modern situation (not yet our own, 
but like it). Though not yet an ecclesiology, their versions of symphonia as a kind of theory of 
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culture suggest how we might dust off the elements of this Byzantine ideal and build a narthex 
out of it. 
Symphonia as a Theory of Culture: The Russian Sophiologists
 As stated above, the twofold purpose of this section is to look at models that anticipate 
adapting symphonia to a secular context, which simultaneously serve as an apologia for its 
applicability. The three Russians to be discussed in a moment – Vladimir Solovyov, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, and Fr. Sergei Bulgakov – were only marginally successful because of certain limits 
their history, culture, and life circumstances placed upon them, yet they share in common a 
remarkable ability to expand the domain of symphonia beyond the political (not to exclude the 
political but incorporate it into a larger vision of the world). Because the concern of this section 
is lessons we can learn from these figures for adapting symphonia to a more modern context, I 
will focus more on relevant points where their ideas overlap. Therefore, I will present the thought 
of each, singly, drawing joint implications in a concluding subsection. 
 
Vladimir Solovyov: Symphonia as “Theonomy”
 It may seem odd to suggest that Vladimir Solovyov, a 19th century Russian philosopher 
and mystic, indicates how symphonia might operate absent imperialism, but Solovyov, though a 
Slavophile (generally considered a conservative movement) was also something of a reformer. 
His context was imperialist, but he also expanded symphonia for a more modern, and in some 
sense pluralistic, situation somewhat like our own. He advocated for what he called “free 
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theocracy.”39 For the record, though it is hard to think of a more misleading term in the history of 
modern political philosophy,  Solovyov actually did not mean anything like the rule of the church 
– a “clericocracy” – we commonly associate with that word. He tried to indicate this by putting 
the inadequate adjective “free” in front of it, but his clarification was less than helpful. To 
understand his meaning, and how this was a re-envisioning of symphonia, we need to know a 
little something about the worldview behind it.
  Solovyov was a mystic. When he wrote, he sometimes believed he was channeling the 
World–Soul, he called Sophia (a concept to which we shall return later).40 In one of these 
writings, a dialogue, the character “Sophie” declares, “[I]n order to be that which it is, it [the 
infinite] must…be the union of itself and its opposite.”41 This quotation expresses the conviction 
at the heart of Solovyov’s philosophy, namely that divine transcendence does not compete with 
divine immanence. Therefore, all that is good in the world is, in a certain sense, God. The 
universe exists within God, who is also the basis of human personhood and its aspirations. Says 
Solovyov, “[T]here is God in man.”42 Believing the cosmos was a manifestation of God’s own 
inner–divine life, his philosophy is thus characterized by a refusal to separate the natural from 
the supernatural. Humans are potentially divine by virtue of their creation imago Dei, which 
bespeaks an inherent capacity for deification. Anticipating the work of John D. Zizioulas, 
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Human Nature, ed. John Witte Jr and Frank S. Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 515.
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Deutsch Kornblatt, Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov (Ithica: Cornell, 2009). 
41 Vladimir Solovyov, “The Sophia: A “Mystical-Theosophical-Philosophical-Theurgical-Political” Dialogue,” in 
Divine Sophia: The Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, ed. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt (Ithica: Cornell University, 
2009), 128.
42 Vladimir Solovyov, “‘At the Dawn of Misty Youth’: A Semiautobiographical Short Story,” in Divine Sophia: The 
Wisdom Writings of Vladimir Solovyov, ed. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt (Ithica: Cornell University, 2009), 243.
Solovyov believed that “person” is a word that can be applied with equal accuracy both to God 
and human beings, because there is no formal difference between them.43 Thus Michael Meerson 
writes that for Solovyov, “The main vestige of the Trinity is not the world, but the human 
person.”44 This conviction – about the potential divinity of the human person – is the basis for 
the way Solovyov and those who came after him conceived of the intersection between church 
and society. We are, he says, temporal, intellectually blind creatures with an innate desire for 
eternal life and absolute knowledge. As such, the human being is a breathing contradiction. Not 
unlike Augustine, this internal conflict is, for Solovyov, the cause of human behavior, both good 
and bad.45 It is both what traps us in our egoism and that which the divine engages to rescue us 
from it. We begin, Solovyov says, to transcend our egoism in communion with other individuals. 
This communion has two primary contexts: the church and the state. The former is the divine 
initiative and cause of this transcendence; the latter, consistent with Solovyov’s theological 
anthropology, is the human response to it.46 Therefore, he concluded, civic affairs need the 
spiritual guidance of the church because politics is an inherently spiritual discipline insofar as we 
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46 Vladimir Solovyev, God, Man and the Church: The Spiritual Foundations of Life, trans., Donald Attwater 
(Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 1974), 1-34, 137-89.
are inherently spiritual people. Likewise, politics has implications for the life of the spirit. By 
working with others for the good of the whole, we learn self-transcendence.
 This brings us to Solovyov’s adaptation of symphonia. He said church and state need to 
work together because the spiritual and material always intersect each other. In The Justification 
of the Good, he indicates his ideal for this relationship. The following passage is highly 
symphonic. 
The normal relation, then, between the state and the Church is this. The state 
recognises the supreme spiritual authority of the universal Church, which 
indicates the general direction of the goodwill of mankind and the final purpose of 
its historical activity.  The Church leaves to the state full power to bring lawful 
worldly interests into conformity with this supreme will and to harmonise political 
relations and actions with the requirements of this supreme purpose. The Church 
must have no power of compulsion, and the power of compulsion exercised by the 
state must have nothing to do with the domain of religion.47
Though Solovyov is redeveloping symphonia insofar as he proposes a cooperative relationship 
between church and state, he appears not to be proposing a policy but an ideal relationship, one 
that, according to Paul Valliere, has much more in common with Paul Tillich’s “theonomy” than 
“a vicariate of some kind.”48 Solovyov is advocating for a culture wherein its artifacts are rightly 
recognized as “vessels of a spiritual content.”49 In a way, this reproduces Justinian’s Seventh 
Novella (which stated that civic and ecclesiastical affairs are not so different) in an updated form 
by saying that church and state need each other because material and spiritual concerns are 
interrelated. His approach to this harmony also bears the marks of modernity insofar as it is 
democratic and pluralistic, which he indicates by stressing both the freedom of individual 
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(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 394. Emphasis original.
48 Valliere, 551.
49 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans., James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948), xvii.
conscience and the “universal Church,” which could refer to Orthodoxy, but most likely 
indicates a broad catholicity – a sobornost of all true believers, everywhere.50
 One other important way this updates symphonia for a more modern context needs to be 
mentioned. Though it may not be obvious at first glance, free theocracy is a response to Jesus’ 
preaching of the kingdom of God in the gospels. As Valliere helpfully observes, 
Besides his Constantinianism, Soloviev's theocratism was a response to the idea 
of the kingdom of God in the gospel. By recognizing the centrality of the 
kingdom in the Christian message, Soloviev was ahead of his time. The majority 
of Christian theologians and ethicists in the nineteenth century were tone-deaf to 
the theocratic theme in the gospel. For them, Jesus preached an inner, spiritual 
kingdom that was to be sharply distinguished from the supposedly crude, 
nationalist theocracy of the Jews. Soloviev rejected this one-sided spiritualizing of 
the gospel along with its anti-Semitic implications. In this he anticipated Albert 
Schweitzer and others who rediscovered the Jewish apocalyptic roots of 
Christianity at the turn of the century. He also anticipated twentieth-century 
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mysticism). Solovyov believed that not only the Orthodox Church was the church. The universal church was the 
church of sobornost – of a spiritual family of all true believers everywhere. This means that, even though talks about 
the importance of the church for society, contrary to Knox’s fears, he does not mean one church in particular, nor 
does he seem to be proposing an actual political program. He simply did not naively believe that “the church” would 
make society run more smoothly (after all, being Russian he was quite familiar with an official state church). For the 
history of the church also reveals a capacity to promote or ignore human suffering, not only in the life of the spirit 
but the body as well. Having inherited from the Enlightenment (interpreted through Genesis) a belief in the 
fundamental dignity and integrity of the human person, Solovyov knows that true religion cannot be forced. That 
said, Solovyov did not simply adopt wholesale the Enlightenment belief in human dignity. He acknowledged the 
good in it, but he added that it was insufficient to liberate human beings from the egoism that lay at the root of 
human injustice and oppression. True religion, he said, is able to recognize not only the divine rights of human 
beings but also their divine content (not only what he would call their Sophianic foundations but also their universal 
kinship in the body of Christ and the image of God in them). Vladimir Solovyov, Vladimir Solovyev's Lectures on 
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three in the God-human, Jesus Christ, the full-implications of the Incarnation had not yet been worked out, which is 
what Solovyov’s project was trying to do. His sophiology was an attempt to conceive of how God and the world 
were related, and what that meant for the organization of society. Vladimir Solovyov, Vladimir Solovyev's Lectures 
on Godmanhood, ed. Peter P. Zoubof (Poughkeepsie, NY: Harmon, 1944), 89-127.
theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King, and John Howard 
Yoder, who demonstrated the political seriousness of the gospel.51
Solovyov has thus placed society under God’s reign in a way similar to his Byzantine forebears 
without requiring it to be some kind of policy. The reign of God is something individuals can 
freely choose to live into.
Fyodor Dostoevsky: Ivan Karamazov’s Symphonic Society
 A similar emphasis on the relevance of the kingdom of God for modern society appears in 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, who replicates Solovyov’s “free theocracy” from another angle, adding a 
more deliberate emphasis on its eschatological aspects. In a passage of The Brothers Karamazov 
that receives far too little theological attention, Fyodor Dostoevsky proposes a similar ideal of 
church state relations that suggests a somewhat democratic revision of symphonia.52 It is a little 
known fact that Solovyov and Dostoevsky were friends; they even pilgrimaged together to the 
Optina monastery, upon which the monastery in the book was based. While it is impossible to 
know if the following episode was based upon a real conversation between Solovyov and 
Dostoevsky, the ideas presented in it bear the marks of Solovyov. 
 In this particular episode, the Karamazovs (excepting Dmitri) and a few other characters 
are gathered in the cell of Fr. Zossima. Ivan (uncharacteristically) argues for the church to take a 
more active role in jurisprudence. This is only the formal topic of conversation. As the debate 
progresses between Ivan’s camp (which includes himself and some priestly supporters) and a 
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secularist also present, Miusov, it becomes clear that the real issue is the role of the church in 
society.53 Miusov the secularist compartmentalizes. He says that church must have no say in how 
criminals are punished because its concerns are fundamentally spiritual. Like Solovyov, Ivan 
objects that so-called spiritual matters have material consequences. In the case of crime, 
punishing the criminal in a utilitarian manner – by depriving her of freedom – only reinforces her 
own utilitarian attitude toward society, which is what motivated her crime in the first place. Thus, 
the material consequence of ignoring the spiritual component of crime is more crime. Ivan and 
those in his camp counter that the only way to reduce crime is for the discipline of the church to 
confront the criminal with the consequences of her action. He is talking about excommunication, 
an idea which tends to grate against our modern sensibilities. However, it is important to note 
that Dostoevsky focuses on its redemptive purpose, which is in keeping with the biblical 
prescription about it (see 1 Corinthians 5:1-5, wherein the purpose of excommunication is to 
bring about repentance). In sum, like Solovyov, Dostoevsky has pointed to a matter-spirit 
continuum when he talks about crime and punishment. Society receives material harm when it 
fails to nurture the spiritual lives of its citizens, and it receives a material benefit when its 
policies see its citizens as bearers of the image of God.
 A final exchange in this passage between Miusov and Ivan presents the gist of the latter’s 
position. The argument boils down to how each perceives the church and culture should relate to 
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the kingdom. For Miusov, “the Church is a kingdom not of this world.’”54 State recognition of 
the church, he says, would surely lead to a new Christendom like that in the Catholic west (a 
powerful accusation in Russian Orthodox polemics)! But a new Christendom seems to be the 
furthest thing from Ivan’s mind. He is actually quite critical of Russia’s “Constantinian” heritage, 
saying,
[D]uring the first three centuries Christianity only existed on earth in the Church 
and was nothing but the Church. When the pagan Roman Empire desired to 
become Christian, it inevitably happened that, by becoming Christian, it included 
the Church but remained a pagan State in very many ways. This was bound to 
happen. But Rome as a State retained too much of the pagan civilization and 
culture, as, for example, in the very objects and fundamental principles of the 
State. The Christian Church entering into the State could, of course, surrender no 
part of its fundamental principles – the rock on which it stands. It could pursue no 
other aims than those which have been ordained and revealed by God Himself, 
among them that of drawing the whole world and therefore the ancient pagan 
State itself into the Church. In this way (that is, with a view to the future) it is not 
the Church that should seek a definite position in the State, like ‘every social 
organization,’ or as ‘an organization of men for religious purposes’ … On the 
contrary, every earthly State should be, in the end, completely transformed into 
the Church and should become nothing else but a Church, rejecting every purpose 
incongruous with the aims of the Church. All this will not degrade it in any way 
or diminish its honor and glory as a great State, nor lessen the glory of its rulers. 
All this will only turn it from a false, still pagan, and mistaken path to the true and 
rightful path which alone leads to the eternal goal.55
A return to Constantinianism was not Ivan’s goal. He calls Christendom “false, still pagan, and 
mistaken.”56 Clearly the symphonia he had in mind was nothing like the ecclesiological 
triumphalism rejected earlier. If ecclesial domination of the state were the purpose of the church, 
then the kingdom of God would have come with Constantine. Instead, he sees Constantinianism 
as part of an ongoing process – the sanctification of life by the conversion of the state – 
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provisionally adopted “with a view to the future.” In his apparent advocation of church discipline 
to complement state punishment of crime, Ivan calls not for doing away with the institution of 
the state or subordinating the state to the church but letting the “aims” of the “Kingdom of 
Heaven” guide both.57 This is comparable to the matter-spirit continuum undergirding 
Solovyov’s theonomic vision of culture, except it is a little more overtly eschatological. This is 
also a remarkably progressive vision of church-state relations, considering its context in “Holy 
Russia.” The presumption that most people in society are Christian somewhat limits the degree 
to which Ivan’s intended subordination of church and state to the kingdom can be applied 
directly to our context, but in a way his proposal boils down to the expectation that Christian 
individuals in a society behave as if their commitment to Christ’s kingdom mattered beyond the 
walls of the institutional church. Such an expectation does not seem out of the question, 
irrespective of the official position of the state toward religion.58 
Fr. Sergius Bulgakov: Symphonia in Western Exile
 We turn finally to Sergei Bulgakov because he partly applied Solovyov and (in the 
character of Ivan Karamazov) Dostoevsky’s expectation to a more or less formally secular 
context, indicating to us the contours of the mutual interpenetration of church and secular absent 
imperialism or Christendom.59 Bulgakov completes the transformation of symphonia from a 
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59 Bulgakov indicated dependence on the free theocracy of Solovyov and the work of Dostoevsky in Sergius 
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political theology to something that is closer to, though not completely, an ecclesiological 
account of the interpenetration of church and culture. We will turn to the way Bulgakov 
coordinated church, world, and kingdom theologically in the next chapter. It is first necessary to 
consider the formal elements of this arrangement. 
 The circumstances of Bulgakov’s life prevented him from spending too much time 
explicitly developing a political theology. In particular, it is worth remembering that Bulgakov 
was not always a theologian. His career was quite colored. For a time he was a Marxist 
economist, an idealist critic of Marx, then a member of the Russian Duma, winding down his life 
as an ecumenist theologian in Parisian exile.60 By the time he really devoted himself to the 
systematic study of theology, he was spending much of his time working to educate a nascent 
community of Russian diaspora. Nevertheless, like his intellectual forebears, when Bulgakov did 
wax political, he invoked the symphonic ideal. We can best see how to apply this ideal to our 
secular context by juxtaposing an early and later version Bulgakov developed, one while serving 
in formally Christian Russia, the other in Paris. 
 Early on, Bulgakov thought of symphonia as a democratic corrective to the effects of 
Russian imperialism. During the Pan-Russian Church Council of 1917-18, Bulgakov played a 
major role in authoring a statement that said the church should support the work of the state 
insofar as the state conforms to the laws of the church.61 The idea that the state should take 
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account of canon law may be a little off–putting, but we should remember the context. This 
synod met in a Christian state, and its job was to develop and interpret church law (Russia was 
the self-proclaimed heir to Byzantium – a Third Rome – and, in a manner of speaking, the last of 
Constantine’s line). The content of the document suggests that Bulgakov intended the church to 
stand on the side of the powerless, such as the Russian peasant. Expanding upon Dostoevsky’s 
thoughts about jurisprudence, he proposed that church and state officials meet periodically so 
that the church might help guide the policy decisions of the state in order to make them fairer to 
those at the bottom of society. He seemed to realize that the moral authority of the church could 
apply not only to the criminal but also – perhaps especially – to those in power. Russia was not a 
democracy, and those without power had little chance of being heard. In this document Bulgakov 
was calling for the church to be their voice.62 Thus, the potential of the church to hold all its 
members accountable to their professed commitment was the genius of symphonia. 
 In the 1920s and 30s Bulgakov was exiled by the Bolsheviks as an irreformable enemy of 
the state.63 For the first time in his life, he found his church to be just one of many religious 
institutions in a modern, western democracy. Absent formal recognition of the church, in which 
his own tradition was virtually non-existent, a wiser, more experienced Bulgakov rethought his 
earlier political theology. Never a fan of the institutional Russian Orthodox Church,64 in Paris he 
proposed that symphonia works better in a secular state (mentioning the United States, 
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specifically).65 Bulgakov realized that the separation of church and state was not a separation of 
church and life. Any formal cordoning off of the church from society at large “remains exterior 
and not interior” to the church.66 The practical genius of this statement was the insight that the 
distinction we draw between church and state – or let us say church and secular – institutions 
was only virtual. The fact that Christians were in the state meant the church was in the state, and 
vice versa. Therefore, some kind of “official” transformation of life by cooperation between 
church and state, traces of which we find in the writings of Solovyov and Dostoevksy,  did not 
matter. More important, Bulgakov said, was the “transformation of the state by the interior 
energies of the Church,” not, “outside, from above, but from within, from below, from the people 
and by the people.”67
Collective Analysis of Solovyov, Dostoevsky, and Bulgakov
 To sum up the above and draw a collective conclusion from the Russian thinkers we have 
discussed, it is fair to say that Solovyov, Dostoevsky, and Bulgakov desired to transform culture 
into a theonomy, by inviting members of the church to orient their lives in the institutions of 
society toward the “aims,” as Ivan would say, of the kingdom of heaven.68 For all three thinkers 
symphonia boils down to a non-compartmentalizing consistency. This expectation is identical to 
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68 One might object that Ivan does not invite so much as enforce conformity to these aims, but this would be to 
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confession. It is an invitation, albeit a forceful one, to live in a way that conforms to one’s stated values. This is what 
symphonia boils down to for all three thinkers: a non-compartmentalizing consistency. Such an objection is also a 
red herring because the point for all three thinkers is not policy but principle – to live in the light of the kingdom of 
God wherever one is
that of the Byzantines, who presumed the possibility of “legislated” Christianity. The more 
modern and democratic version of symphonia these Russians offer is closer to a theory of culture 
than political ideal because, even though they rejected secularism as a way of looking at the 
world, their statements about the importance of individual religious freedom in instituting a new 
symphonia suggest they pined for a more formally secular context like our own. This, as 
Bulgakov later realized, is of great advantage to a symphonic engagement with culture because if 
the point of symphonia is to make the world below an image of the world above, then what was 
required was not laws or their enforcement but true piety among individuals in society, which 
required freedom of conscience and presumed a modern sense of pluralism. Such is not yet the 
modern secular but necessary presuppositions for it, which suggests that some version of 
symphonia could work well in a context like ours. Symphonia, as the above thinkers conceive of 
it – coordinating church and world under the kingdom of God in the lives of individual 
Christians – is possible without formal recognition of the church because it boils down to the 
way the church thinks about itself and the world around it. 
 
Conclusion
 The way that Solovyov, Dostoevsky, and Bulgakov adapted the Byzantine ideal they 
inherited provides us with the architecture needed to develop an alternative to postliberal 
ecclesiology and its concomitant cognitive dissonance. As Augustine helped show us, a more 
consistent understanding of the influence of the secular on us and our support of the secular 
needs to account for the presence of the kingdom of God both in the church and society at large. 
This recognition was further confirmed by the example of the Byzantines. They did not show us 
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how to coordinate the three terms of church, world, and kingdom theologically, but, in the way 
they recognized the kingdom of God at work in extra-ecclesial institutions, they provided us with 
a template whereby we might later develop a doctrinal account of how constructively to engage 
the secular on the basis of its conformity to the kingdom of God. They show us the possibility of 
an engaged ecclesiology that stresses the identity of the church as the unique body tasked with 
proleptically conforming the world to the revelation of God’s kingdom through the tactical 
methods of provisional triumphalism and situational sectarianism. The Russians we discussed 
above suggest the possibility of such engagement beyond the limits of Byzantium, particularly in 
a formally secular society. Solovyov, Dostoevsky, and especially Bulgakov saw that individuals 
can freely exercise the church’s ministry of the kingdom non-institutionally and unofficially, the 
“interior energies” of the church, as Bulgakov said, affecting culture through the dissemination 
of the members of the body of Christ in it. 
 Yet the above examples have only given us a form for relating the presence of the secular 
in the church and the church in the secular, not the substance. One might rightly object that the 
constructive argument so far has compared apples to oranges. Byzantium and “Holy Russia” 
were still officially Christian. For the church to engage the state was for the church to engage 
part of itself. In other words, it is one thing to see the kingdom of God at work in a Christian 
society; it is quite another to suggest that the kingdom of God is at work in a formally secular 
society. I have yet to address the problem at hand. Thus, so far, the counterpositional narthex of 
Milbank and Hauerwas stands. 
 The next chapter begins to respond to that objection, getting us partway toward moving 
symphonia from a political to an ecclesiological register. It will justify ecclesial engagement with 
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the secular as internal to the church’s own commitment to the kingdom of God by offering a way 
of seeing aspects of the secular itself, along with the church, as the prolepsis of that reign. To 
accomplish this task, I engage the sophiology of Sergei Bulgakov. Given the nature of Bulgakov 
as a controversial theological figure (in some circles), coupled with his penchant for the esoteric, 
it might be good at this point to remind the reader that this essay’s method of argumentation is 
not so much to make a logical case for symphonia, but to offer an internally consistent alternative 
to a problem I see with one way of relating church to culture. In other words, there are possibly 
other ways to account for this interaction (such as liberalism, which also offers an internally 
consistent, non-cognitively dissonant way of relating church to culture), but the one I offer below 
“works.” The next chapter does not recommend Bulgakov but uses his theology as a starting 
point for a more coherent way of thinking about the church-world limen than that provided by 
our foil. Sophiology can help us to do that, initially, insofar as it attempted to expand the cultural 
aspects of symphonia discussed above into a theological system that attempted to reconcile the 
eternal God to human historic developments in order to justify the church’s engagement with 
modernity (at least, this was one of the objectives of his broad and ambitious project). I will 
make a case for seeing the kingdom realizing itself “unconsciously” in the secular, assisted by 
the “conscious” midwifery of the church. Though ultimately, the next chapter will move beyond 
the Sophia metaphor, it serves as a useful “springboard” to begin to go beyond the 
counterpositional ecclesiologies of Milbank and Hauerwas.
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CHAPTER V
HISTORY AS BASILEIA FOR AN ENGAGED CHRISTIANITY
…in earth, as it is in heaven.
Matthew 6:10, KJV
 The intent of the last chapter was not to call us back to Byzantium but to see if something 
of their political theology could be applied to our churches today. This requires moving 
symphonia into an ecclesiological register, which is not out of the question, given that symphonia 
was the imperial response to the early church’s eschatological imperative to proleptically 
embody the kingdom of God in their fellowship. The Russians we looked at gestured toward a 
possible solution for us: it is possible to engage the secular in a way that is transparent to the 
kingdom of God without any kind of formal recognition of the church, because the church 
already penetrates secular society through the extension of the body of Christ in its members. 
This chapter offers a provisional theological rationale for such engagement, which is necessary 
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to account for a context that is not formally Christian. The fundaments of this rationale will be 
provided by Sergei Bulgakov.1
 But first, since the purpose of this chapter will be to indicate how symphonia can operate 
as an ecclesiology, it is prudent at this point to offer an initial defintion of ecclesial symphonia 
that the remainder of this essay will fill out. Under the Byzantine model, the church supported 
the work of the state insofar as the state conformed to the church’s own eschatological ideal. 
Ecclesial symphonia is formally similar but substantially different. Under ecclesial symphonia, 
the church supports the secular insofar as the secular conforms to the church’s vision of the 
kingdom of God and resists the secular insofar as the secular resists God’s reign. The kingdom 
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1 Some may question my use of Bulgakov in this chapter for a couple of different reasons. Namely, there are people 
in my own tradition who consider him a heretic, whereas Milbank considers him an ally (so he might wonder at me 
invoking Bulgakov against him). Little can be said to the first group that has not already been demonstrated by 
others. Bulgakov is cleared of heresy, not just on a technicality (being convicted in absentia), but because only the 
most prejudiced reader can conclude that Sophia is a fourth person of the Trinity (the charge leveled against him). 
Furthermore, my own reading of Bulgakov is not uncritical. Even if he were a heretic, that would not preclude 
panning for gold in the stream of his thought. For a concise history of the heresy charges laid against Bulgakov and 
his exoneration, see Bryn Geffert, “The Charges of Heresy against Sergii Bulgakov: The Majority and Minority 
Reports of Evlogii's Commission and the Final Report of the Bishops' Conference,” St Vladimir's Theological 
Quarterly 49, no. 1-2 (2005). Also, a recent essay by Antoine Arjakovsky and Michael Plekon can be read as a 
defense of Bulgakov against contemporaries who consider him a heretic, insofar as their essay is an apology for its 
modern applicability. Antoine Arjakovsky and Michael Plekon, “The Sophiology of Father Sergius Bulgakov and 
Contemporary Western Theology,” St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 49, no. 1-2 (2005). For an account of the 
original charges, see Paul M. Count Grabbe, Isaac E. Lambertsen, and Joachim Wertz, “Concerning the False 
Teaching of Archpriest Sergius Bulgakov,” Living Orthodoxy 16, no. (1994). As for Milbank, this is not the place to 
discredit his reading of Bulgakov, who is probably far more “liberal” than Milbank realizes. For one, I do not wholly 
agree with Bulgakov, so such an argument would be superfluous. It would also be superfluous because Milbank’s 
reading of Bulgakov stresses the “theurgic” aspects of his thought, whereas here I am focusing more on the way 
sophiology legitimates the secular. Of course, Milbank would certainly object that Bulgakov does any such thing. He 
would be correct that Bulgakov opposed the “secularization of life,” but he had no problem with certain 
“Enlightenment” values, such as the separation of church and state. Bulgakov does not do the kind of genealogies 
one finds in Milbank. However, when he traces the roots of secularism, he attributes them not to Kant but to the 
church’s continued emphasis on individual morality in the face of a new modern social consciousness. In other 
words, secularism is a result of the church’s failure to keep up with modern social-scientific insights.  Sergius 
Bulgakov, “Social Teaching in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology,” in Sergii Bulgakov: Towards a Russian 
Political Theology, ed. Rowan Williams (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 275-78. Finally, not only do Milbank and I 
read Bulgakov differently, but in this chapter we are reading different parts of his corpus, so to speak. I invoke the 
most practical aspects of sophiology in order to construct an alternative to Milbank’s ecclesiology, whereas the latter 
seems more fascinated by Bulgakov’s esoterica, which I both critique and, to a certain extent, avoid. Milbank pays 
little direct attention to the ecclesiological aspects of Bulgakov’s thought, but seems to draw upon Sophia as a means 
of conceptualizing the creature’s unmediated participation in God. Milbank, “Sophiology and Theurgy.” See ibid. 
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, xix, xxvii (note 46). Milbank, Being Reconciled, 113, 128., Milbank, The 
Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural, 104. 
of God, we shall see, both justifies and regulates our engagement. This chapter is not yet directly 
dealing with the practical impact of the kingdom of God on contemporary church life, but makes 
a case for the secular partly corresponding to it. From this perspective, separation of the church 
and secular as different institutions is only virtual – a heuristic device. There is really only the 
kingdom of God and the way it extends itself into the church and the world around us. 
 Our ultimate challenge is to explain how our supportive interactions with that which 
intends not to conform itself to God’s reign can in any way be an expression of our fundamental 
commitment to it (that reign). This is where Bulgakov can help us. His unique theological vision 
enabled him, and so can enable us, to see possibilities in the secular to which many of his 
contemporaries were blind.2 As Bulgakov stood on the shoulders of Solovyov and Dostoevsky, in 
this chapter I want to see if we cannot scamper onto the shoulders of Bulgakov, to see both with 
and beyond him, uncovering the theological foundations of his vision of symphonia and making 
them our own. His sophiology can help us account for the interpenetration of church and secular 
in the narthex of Christian life in the way it sees God at work in culture. But in the end we will 
move beyond Bulgakov for reasons that will become clear later. Ultimately, I intend to 
demonstrate that seeing the foundation of the world not in Sophia but in Jesus Christ can ground 
a conditionally constructive engagement with the secular by reckoning to the secular the same 
desire the church has, whether it knows it or not, to realize God’s kingdom. Bulgakov gets us 
partway to this goal. My thesis in this chapter is that the Sophia metaphor rightly, though 
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2 This probably also owes something to Bulgakov’s personality, namely, the trace of the young Russian radical who 
remained deep within him, even after his conversion and ordination. Valliere notes that Bulgakov’s conversion was 
part of a wave of Russian intelligentsia returning to the church, yet still retaining, like Bulgakov, their radical ideals 
about individuality, democracy, and religious freedom. He writes, “The drama of the conversion of unbelievers to 
religious faith makes it easy to overlook the fact more was going on than a return to tradition. The intelligentsia did 
not arrive at the household of faith with empty bags, but with a load of liberal and reformist values which they had 
no intention of surrendering. The encounter between modernity and Orthodox tradition was dynamic: it operated in 
both directions.” Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, 243.
ultimately incompletely, helps mitigate the tension between the church and society by stressing 
the universal presence of God in the world, guiding the historic development of human culture 
toward its eschatological culmination.
 I will develop this thesis first by showing how his sophiology was the theological 
rationale for Bulgakov’s symphonic vision of society, discussed earlier. In a word, it was the 
attempt to find a theologically consistent and constructive way of relating the church to its 
environment. The second section explores the theology that justified this interactive relationship 
in greater detail, considering its potential to handle the problem that concerns us. To keep this 
presentation of Sophia, which can be a rather convoluted concept, as straightforward as possible, 
I focus on the way she is an extended metaphor for the integral interrelationship between God, 
creaturely becoming, and their eschatological consummation. Next, I trace the implications of 
this interrelationship for the church, both positively and negatively. Positively, this 
interrelationship proposes that the church open itself to developments of culture insofar as they 
may be “unconscious” prolepses of God’s kingdom. Negatively, it lacks a concrete enough 
standard for ecclesial engagement with the secular, leading either to paralysis or even complicity 
in the face of human sinfulness. This critique anticipate a more christocentric account of the 
church-world limen offered later. 
The Foundation of Symphonia in the Secular
 In this section I intend to show how Bulgakov deploys his theology of Holy Wisdom to 
justify ecclesial engagement with culture in general. This will give us insight into how we might 
account for the secular in the narthex today. In the first place, I will connect symphonia to 
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sophiology by arguing that the latter intended to be an expansion of the former for a new, modern 
era. Then, I will offer an initial perspective on just how Bulgakov justified culture and its 
artifacts in his early philosophy. Looking at this early work is essential to understanding the role 
the church plays in his later, more dogmatic, sophiology. 
Sophiology as Symphonia
 In a speech he delivered in 1934, Bulgakov indicated that he understood sophiology to 
develop upon the symphonia tradition.  Speaking to an American audience, he felt the need to 
explain Russian Orthodoxy’s teaching about the place of the church in the world and its 
responsibility to it, or its “social teaching.” In other words, he intended to explain, as clearly as 
possible, how Orthodoxy related the church to society. To meet this end, he spoke about three 
different ways of negotiating this relationship, each of which corresponds to the three main 
branches of Christianity. The following descriptions Bulgakov presents are imprecise caricatures, 
but significant for what they say about different ways of inhabiting the narthex.
 First, he talked about Roman Catholicism’s attempt to dominate the world institutionally. 
He described this approach as clericalization. According to Bulgakov, not only is this perspective 
overly-pessimistic about the world, but it also confuses the rule of the church with the rule of 
Christ. Next comes the Protestant approach. He seems to have in mind what we might think of as 
1930s mainline Protestantism, which involved the privatization of religion. This is a 
compartmentalizing perspective wherein one wears different “hats” depending on what the 
situation calls for. From this angle, what one believes may or may not have any bearing upon 
what we actually do. A good citizen is expected to fulfill certain responsibilities whether or not 
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they come into conflict with one’s religious commitment. This approach basically hands the 
world over to Gog and Magog. 
  These descriptions helpfully show how Bulgakov understands the social teaching of his 
own tradition to combine both a sectarian and triumphalist impulse in an alternative suggestive 
of symphonia. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant approach to society is wrong in itself, he 
says. Protestant privatization is a somewhat twisted form of primitive Christian indifference – 
what Bulgakov calls asceticism – towards society. It is to focus on one’s relationship with Christ 
at the expense of whatever the world might be doing. Likewise, Roman clericalization is a 
faithful attempt to live out the reign of God under the conditions of Christendom. The trouble 
arises when these approaches are isolated from each other. When the church tries to dominate 
culture, so Bulgakov knew from his history, it does not make culture better. Nor should the 
church think to remove itself completely from so-called secular concerns such as “the state, 
culture, and economics.”3 
 Bulgakov offers a symphonic alternative in his own Orthodox tradition, which he says 
strikes a balance between early Christian asceticism (i.e. a sectarian tendency to withdraw from 
society) and the aspirations of “Holy Empire” (i.e. the triumph of Christ in society).4 Admittedly, 
Bulgakov does not use the word symphonia, but he clearly seems to have this ideal in mind, 
especially insofar as he describes this Orthodox way of looking at the world as the foundation of 
a “Christian Sociology”5 or “social Christianity,” by which he means a theological account of 
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3 Bulgakov, “Social Teaching,” 278.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 275.
society. His alternative suggests a re-imagining of the Byzantine ideal presented in the last 
chapter.
 Bulgakov connects symphonia to his sophiological project when he adds that this 
Christian theory of society is an undeveloped doctrine, a theologoumena that has been the focus 
of “Russian religious thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and is now being 
seriously dealt with by our forward-looking theologians and philosophers.”6 This project which 
has occupied the cutting edge of Russian religious and philosophical scholarship, he adds later, is 
about the “self–revelation of God” in God’s “Wisdom.”7 In short, the symphonic ideal is an 
undeveloped Christian sociology that requires the explication sophiology can provide.
 He thus called this new sophiological symphonia an as yet undeveloped “dogmatic 
postulate”8 that 
opens a new way of life for Christian life and for Christian history. It gives to it 
not only a negative but a positive sense, it includes the creativity of man in the 
means of his salvation. It does not deny Christian freedom from the world and the 
value of a spiritually ascetic way, or the fight against sin in the life of every man, 
but it calls all to work also for this world. … The glorified body of the Risen 
Christ was transparent for the spirit, was a spiritual body, being at the same time 
no spirit but a body which could be touched, and this transparence was its 
glorification and beauty. 
 The same ideal of the transfiguration of the inert and dark matter of the 
world, its obedience and transparance for the spirit of man, is the final task of the 
creativity of man, who is called by God to have dominion over the world. The 
world must become in this sense the subject of the art of man, who is the true 
artist.9
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6 Ibid., 278.
7 Ibid., 279.
8 Ibid., 282-83.
9 Ibid., 283. Emphasis mine.
In this passage, Bulgakov states that the intent of sophiology is to find a way of incorporating 
human “creativity” into our understanding of salvation by transforming the world itself, making 
it transparent to the spirit. The comparison of this social Christian work to the resurrection also 
suggests that this human creative project is eschatological. Spiritualizing the world helps it 
realize the kingdom. More needs to be said about whether Bulgakov intends to propose that the 
church brings the kingdom, but the point for now is not to focus too closely on things that 
Bulgakov says “are not to be defined other than symbolically.”10 It is to see how the above 
passage envisions the attitude of the church toward the world. Here we stand, extroverted and 
engaged, brush in hand, with culture our canvas. 
A Culturally Engaged, Creative Christianity
 Looking at what Adrian Pabst called Bulgakov’s attempt to describe “a Christian theory 
of cultural activity” that inspired the above speech can provide insight for an ecclesiological 
account of the secular.11 This theory is provided by Philosophy of Economy, which intends to 
critique and offer a coherent alternative to Marxism and positivism. Both schools of thought, he 
says, possess an unfounded eschatological mythos about human progress – one the golden age of 
science and the other a communist Utopia.12 Bulgakov posits a counter-eschatology, of sorts, to 
these views. He sees humanity oriented toward a future without death, the full flourishing of life, 
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10 Ibid.
11 Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider, “Introduction: Transfiguring the World through the Word,” in Encounter 
between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World through the Word, ed. Adrian Pabst 
and Christoph Schneider (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 4.
12 See Catherine Evtuhov, “Introduction,” in Philosophy of Economy: World as Household (New Haven: Yale, 
2000), 9. Sergius Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household, ed. Gary Saul Morson, trans., 
Catherine Evtuhov, Russian Literature and Thought (New Haven: Yale, 2000), 278ff. The following presentation of 
Bulgakov’s economic thought focuses on Ibid., 123ff.
in the process of economy. Economy, as Bulgakov uses the term in this book, refers to the sum 
total of all human cultural, scientific, and other productive activities. In the struggle to expand 
the domain of life through acts of production, says Bulgakov, we glimpse a desire for something 
beyond ourselves, for we want not merely survival but a kind of flourishing that bespeaks the 
eternal. Bulgakov believed economy thus testified to a collective desire for resurrection. Like 
Gilgamesh, we produce because we desire to overcome our own mortality. Economy, says 
Bulgakov, is thus the collective work of making this world like the world to come. This desire for 
transcendence of the limits of material existence, in the material, points toward a transcendental 
subject of our collective work, a subject Bulgakov called Sophia. 
 In this early foray into what would later become his life’s work as a theologian, Bulgakov 
invoked Sophia as a metaphor for expressing the inherent unity and historic continuity in the 
“pleroma,” so to speak, of human economy oriented toward everlasting life. We can see how this 
continuity works by observing the way it combines aspects of Hegel and Marx. Hegel said that 
Absolute Spirit develops through a process of sublation in the advancement of human ideas.13 
Marx turned this idea on its head, so that the move from thesis through antithesis to synthesis 
does not drive material production, but material production yields new theses.14 Bulgakov 
considered himself an idealist, but he incorporated materialism by seeing human ideas and 
cultural productions as two gears turning each other.15 A scientific discovery or poem is just as 
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13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans., J. B. Baillie, (the Phenomenology of Mind) 
(Digireads.com, 2010), 306ff. Kindle Electronic Edition. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion: The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans., R. F. Brown et al., vol. III 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1985), esp. 249ff.
14 Thus, says Marx, “My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly 
opposite to it.” Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans., Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 
1976), 102.
15 Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, 231.
much a product of economy as a loaf of bread. Each stands in a continuum of products that 
happened before it and will come after it. Actually, a web would be a better metaphor than a 
continuum, for a hypothetical scientific insight – let us say an equation of some sort – is 
produced not only by the equations that came before it but a network of economic products 
concurrent with it, in anticipation of work to be done after it. It is a discovery made possible by 
conversations with colleagues, papers in journals, and even bad cups of coffee quickly 
swallowed in the wee hours of the night. These nodes on the nexus of economy compress to 
produce, in a moment in time, a new insight that, as soon as it is born, has already begun to move 
beyond itself.16 Sophia is this nexus. 
 Bulgakov says Sophia is also divine and human. She is human insofar as we create and 
we discover. She is divine insofar as she is ideal – the mind of God to which our truths and facts 
and beautiful creations aspire. Like a kind of primordial pleromic logos, she works herself into 
culture and its artifacts at every level of society. She is thus the inspiration of the holy prophets 
and the pagan poets, the muse of Homer and the genius of Heisenberg. Sophia is the “world 
soul” that funds our universal struggle for self-transcendence in economy.17 Stretching our minds 
toward the God, who is the source of our ideas and our products, economy is thus a union of the 
ideal and material in imitation of the eternal.18 
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16 One of the pithiest accounts of this nexus remains Leonard Read’s tract (first published in 1958), I, Pencil. In it, 
he effectively demonstrates that even the simplest of products cannot be produced independently of other 
tangentially related economic acts (though I do not share his enthusiasm acceptance of the fairness of the free 
market). Leonard E. Read, “I, Pencil: My Family Tree as Told to Leonard E. Read”, Foundation for Economic 
Education http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/rdPncl1.html (accessed 1 February 2011).
17 Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household, 131. See also Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the 
Lamb, trans., Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 79ff. Bulgakov, Comforter, 213ff.
18 Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household, 68ff.
 The significance of this early stage of Bulgakov’s thought is the way that what happens in 
culture is a divine work, whether culture knows this or not. The fundamental characteristic of 
Byzantine symphonia was its provisional legitimation of the empire – the church in society and 
society in the church. They could justify such engagement on the grounds that the empire was 
conceptually concentric with the church. In a post-imperial context, Bulgakov’s early sophiology  
justifies constructive engagement with culture on the basis of a shared eschatological impulse. 
Conscious awareness of this impulse is inconsequential. This vision of economy already gestures 
toward the potential for a new symphonia insofar as it locates God in culture. It suggests that, 
though the secular and the church do not have the same operations, they have the same end. This 
more reconciliatory account of the church-world limen is promising, but not yet complete.  
Overcoming Christian cognitive dissonance requires not simply placing God in the secular as a 
kind of invisible hypothetical, but really finding God there. Suggesting that what happens in 
culture reveals a desire for the divine only points toward a constructive coordination of church 
and secular, but it does not yet provide an integral account of their interpenetration in Christian 
life. For a more specific account of this shared objective between church and society which the 
foregoing account suggests, we must delve a little more deeply into the particulars of Bulgakov’s 
more mature theology. 
God, Encompassing the World for the Kingdom
 The previous section showed how Bulgakov expanded the Byzantine balance with the 
state to include culture itself. This section intends to fill out that account by exploring 
Bulgakov’s theology in order to consider how it incorporates the foregoing account of culture 
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into a comprehensive understanding of the church. Bulgakov’s later work, with which this 
section is concerned, is a theology of God and the world together that provided the rationale for 
his new symphonia, his social Christianity. We shall appropriate this rationale in a way that tries 
to avoid much of Bulgakov’s esoterica by focusing on the way he conceives of Sophia as three 
interrelated metaphors for God, the world, and the culmination of their union in the kingdom. 
This summary serves the objective of this essay by offering us a way to account for the church 
and the secular that unites them under the unfolding of God’s kingdom in history. Though, we 
shall see, this account is incomplete, this section presents Bulgakov’s theology without 
judgment, saving analysis and critique for the next section. 
Metaphor 1: Sophia as the Divine Nature
 Seeing how Bulgakov justifies culture in God requires first understanding how Bulgakov 
conceives of God. When it comes to a doctrine of God, Rowan Williams says, “Sophia is the 
divine nature.”19 For all intents and purposes, that is correct. We can identify her with God’s 
ousia. But Bulgakov tends to say, “Sophia is like ousia.”20 He refers to Sophia, which also he 
calls God’s “Wisdom,” God’s “Glory,” and the “Divine world,” to indicate that God’s nature is 
not a thing but an activity. The divine ousia is how the Trinity co-equally relates to itself.21 
Sophia, Bulgakov says, is ousia “in its self-revelation.”22 To understand the way in which Sophia 
is God’s nature revealing itself, we must first ask what is being revealed. In other words, what is 
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19 Williams, “Eastern Orthodoxy,” 576.
20 Sergius Bulgakov, “Hypostasis and Hypostaticity: Scholia to the Unfading Light,” St Vladimir's Theological 
Quarterly 49, no. 1-2 (2005): 43. Emphasis mine. 
21 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, trans., Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 117.
22 Bulgakov, “Hypostasis and Hypostaticity,” 43.
God? With all due respect to St. Anselm, Bulgakov would say, “God is love” (1 John 4.8).23 Of 
course, this answer is only a beginning because it does not tell us anything if we do not ask 
ourselves what is love, and thus what God is doing when God is loving. 
 Adapting an analogy from Aidan Nichols can help answer this question. He tried to 
describe Sophia by comparing human self-knowledge to divine self-knowledge. In the case of 
human beings, he says, there is always a gap between who we are and what we know about 
ourselves, a gap that does not exist in God because God is a Trinity. Therefore, God’s self-
knowledge is always immediate to Godself.24 Since Bulgakov himself describes Sophia as an 
explication of divine self-loving (and only self-knowing as a function of self-loving), it is more 
appropriate to go beyond Nichols’ interest in divine knowledge to focus on divine love.25 
Augustine recognized that human beings can only love themselves in God.26 Because God is our 
highest good, loving a lower good is a violation of the ground of our existence. That is what 
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23 Bulgakov would agree with St. Anselm that God is “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” In fact, 
he presumes this to be the case throughout his theology, in particularly his doctrine of creation. Anselm, 
“Proslogium,” in Proslogiusm; Monologium; an Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo 
(La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1954), II.
24 Aidan Nichols, Wisdom from Above: A Primer in the Theology of Father Sergei Bulgakov (Herefordshire, UK: 
Gracewing, 2005), 12-32.
25 See Bulgakov, “Hypostasis and Hypostaticity,” 25-27.
26 Augustine, The Trinity, VIII.V.12.
makes human self-love the root cause of original sin.27 Not so for God! God is triune. Therefore, 
divine self-love does not close God off to the love of others because divine self-love is always 
selfless love, fulfilled in the Holy Trinity. This makes the Trinity an inherently “open system” 
that is always also complete in Godself. Says Bulgakov, 
Begetting the Son, the Father goes forth to him by love in the life-giving Spirit, 
and the Spirit, as a living Hypostatic love of the Two between themselves, locks 
in triunity the reciprocity of love, whereby the disclosing of the nature of the 
Absolute Subject, the manifestation of the nature and power of I through thou and 
into we, appears as realised: I as triune We, in whom each hypostasis is revealed 
through another, I through thou and into we.28 
An axiom of Trinitarian theology is that the three hypostases act together as one. Because this is 
not a virtual acting – three persons acting as if they were one (by agreeing with each other) – 
Bulgakov says we can rightly speak of three hypostases as one subject. When we say “God,” we 
do not mean just the divine essence or one hypostasis but all three hypostases together; we refer 
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27See Augustine, “On Free Will,” in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. J. H. S.  Burleigh, Library of Christian Classics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), III.xxiv.71. I know as an Orthodox theologian I am expected to say “ancestral 
sin,” but I do not think it is very elucidating, or helpful to a spirit of ecumenism, to  pretend that the western and 
eastern ways of talking about human fallenness are mutually exclusive. The distinction is a very modern polemic, 
resulting from post-colonial and diasporic Orthodoxy. Unfortunately, the modern Orthodox mission to the “new 
world” of the west has sought to protect its numbers and draw new converts by a kind of self-Orientalism, over-
stressing what are actually more subtle distinctions between the eastern and western traditions. Thus John S. 
Romanides locates everything that goes wrong with the western theological tradition in the pessimistic anthropology 
of St. Augustine’s, in particular the inherited guilt of Adam. See John S. Romanides, The Ancestral Sin: A 
Comparative Study of the Sin of Our Ancestors Adam and Eve, trans., George S. Gabriel (Ridgewood, NJ: Zephyr, 
2002). I do not necessarily dispute the facts of Romanides analysis, just his conclusions. Augustine did say children 
inherit the guilt of Adam. Augustine, “A Treatise on the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on the Baptism of 
Infants,” in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff (Albany, Or: Ages Software), I.9-10. However, 
some Orthodox Christians have also held this view. St. Innocent said that every infant is “born in sin” and contains a 
“seed of sin” even before she knows good from evil. St Innocent, Indication of the Way into the Kingdom of Heaven 
(Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1999), 6. Sergius Bulgakov, The Burning Bush: On the Orthodox 
Veneration of the Mother of God, trans., Thomas Allen Smith (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009 [1927]), 23-29.Even 
if Orthodox Christians insist that infants are born innocent, insofar as sin is self-love, just give the infant a few 
seconds and she will be just as guilty as her parents. The differences is that we do not believe God holds children 
accountable for their sinfulness until they are able to understand their sin and its consequences. We Orthodox are not 
Pelagians. We agree with Augustine that salvation is impossible without the intervention of divine grace (even if we 
do not let that logic lead us to Augustine’s doctrine of limited election). Therefore, the fundamental difference 
between so-called ancestral versus original sin comes down do whether or not we think infants are guilty of sin from 
birth or a few minutes after it. On the significance of Romanides work, see Christos Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the 
West: Hellenic Self-Identity in the Modern Age, trans., Peter Chamberas and Norman Russell (Brookline, MA: Holy 
Cross, 2006), 275-77. 
28
to the three in the singular. From a Christian perspective, the Bible indicates the singularity of the 
triune God by referring to the one image of God in the plural (Genesis 1:26). God’s us is one I. 
Divine unity, therefore, is self-emptying love that is always fulfilled – never lacking anything – 
in its hypostatic return.
 Sophia is the divine essence insofar as she is this loving. She is not the three hypostases 
themselves but the act of pouring themselves out into each other and being returned by each 
other. Thus, Bulgakov calls her the “love of Love, the preeternal object and content of the love of 
God.”29 He once compared her to a fourth hypostasis in what may be the most misguided simile 
ever deployed by a Christian theologian, but his intent was to express the idea that Sophia is an 
eternal “moment” of self-embrace within the triune God – God’s threeness apprehending God’s 
oneness – embracing and loving all that they are in each other.30 Sophia is thus the human 
abstraction of God’s essence, made “virtual,” which is necessary for us consistently to realize 
that God is not two parts: one ousia and three hypostases, but that the one ousia of God is the co-
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29 Ibid.: 25.
30 See Sergius Bulgakov, “The Unfading Light,” in Towards a Russian Political Theology, ed. Rowan Williams 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 135.
incidence of the three hypostases, engaged in an eternal, kenotic dance, God not only loving, but 
loving the fact that God loves all that God is.31 
Metaphor 2: Sophia as Creation
 Sophia is the abstraction of God’s essence from a human perspective, but for God, Sophia 
is always concrete: she is the creation itself (in this aspect she is called creaturely Sophia).32 
Insofar as God is pure self-abnegation without loss, the Trinity “others” its essence in humanity. 
The Godhead apprehends the totality of itself in the cosmos. Creaturely Sophia is God’s essence 
distended into time. From the perspective of the above, this means that God loves Godself by 
loving us. 
 In a sense, we might say God needs the world, a statement that only offends orthodox 
sensibilities if we forget that some needs arise not out of lack but fullness. God “needs” the 
world in the same way that a loving couple “needs” a child, because the two of them, in a certain 
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31 Thus Anthony Baker and Rocco Gangle say that, “the Godhead together desires unity as if it were an extradivine 
being.” This description is half-right. It is right that Sophia is an abstraction, but wrong in that it is not an abstraction 
for God but for us. Baker and Gangle seem to stress the mediatorial aspects of Sophia like one finds in The Unfading 
Light, with the world on one end, God on the other, and Sophia in between. But Sophia mediates only insofar as she 
is knowledge (i.e. to know the world is to begin to grasp something of the mind of God) and love (i.e. to love the 
world with the love whereby God loves the world). At this point, we are beginning to get into some of the 
weaknesses of sophiology (that it is a metaphor that, in the end, Bulgakov makes work far too hard). The point is 
that Baker and Gangle seem to be reading Sophia through the Christological poetics of Milbank, which is not 
exactly how Bulgakov intended it. Anthony D. Baker and Rocco Gangle, “Ecclesia: The Art of the Virtual,” in 
Theology and the Political: The New Debate (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 272. See Milbank, The Word 
Made Strange, 123ff. Thus, I read Joshua Davis’ critique of sophiology in Baker and Gangle as a critique of one way 
of interpreting this metaphor (not to say that he does not raise other valid points about the ambiguity of Sophia). 
Joshua Davis, “A Critique of the Metaphysics of Ontological Poesis: Responding to Theology and the Political,” 
Political Theology 10, no. 1 (2009): 157-61. In footnote 29, Davis suggests that Sophia can be read in a more 
'Romantic' way, expressing the evolutionary drive of creatures, or the “whence of our Gefühl of absolute 
dependence” in Schleiermacher. I agree with Davis about the limits and potential of Sophiology in this Romantic 
direction, and add that this is actually how, I believe, Sophia is supposed to be read. This difference of reading may 
explain why Paul Valliere finds what radical orthodoxy would only see as perplexing correlations between the work 
of the “liberal” Paul Tillich and Bulgakov. Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, 236. For Bulgakov, as for Tillich, 
God is the answer to the creature’s existential desire for self-possession and self-awareness. Paul Tillich, The 
Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University, 1980), esp. 155ff.
32 For a complete presentation of Bulgakov’s doctrine of creation, see Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 119-56. Bulgakov, 
Comforter, 189-218. Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 33-146.
sense, cannot contain the fullness of their love. The same is true of God. True love expands itself. 
Like Gregory of Nyssa’s epectasis, it is an ever-fulfilling, never quenched desire for the other.33 
Bulgakov thus posits creation as the object of God’s eternally expanding self-desire. The merits 
of this proposition aside, this idea is important because it makes the universal integral to God’s 
own life. It thus synthesizes often competing trends in a doctrine of creation in a panentheistic 
vision of the God-world relationship. Modern theology tends to go back-and-forth between a 
Hegelian or Barthian point of view. Either the world is a manifestation of God’s own self-
development, making it necessary to God’s being, or God is completely free vis-à-vis creation, 
meaning that this world need not have been.34 From Bulgakov’s perspective, both sides are 
incomplete because they forget that love is beyond either the necessity of Hegel or the freedom 
of Barth. Love is a “free necessity,” a compulsion that does not limit because it arises from 
within oneself.35 If God created out of love, then Barth is right – God was not obligated to create 
the world – and Hegel is right – the word must be. God thus acts according to the dictates of 
God’s own nature, in neither an arbitrary nor limited way. 
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33 Nyssen, Life of Moses, 219-55. 
34 Of course, the above is a popular caricature of these two positions, but getting too far into the similarities and 
differences between Barth and Hegel would distract from the matters at hand. Still, it is worth noting that 
Bulgakov’s doctrine of creation is fairly Barthian. Barth is much more inclined to stress that creation is an act of 
divine freedom, proceeding from the divine will. However, he also says that the covenant is the “aim of creation.” 
This implies that God creates not simply by an act of divine fiat but as an expression of his own nature as love – a 
free expression, to be sure – but one that Barth seems to think was not exactly arbitrary. He stresses divine freedom 
more than Bulgakov (possibly in reaction to Hegel), nonetheless he describes the “free love” that motivated creation 
as an act of “divine necessity.” Interestingly, like Bulgakov, he describes the creative act as the revelation of God’s 
glory. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, trans., J.W.  Edwards, O. Bussey, and Harold 
Knight, vol. III.1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 26, 60, 230. For Hegel, see note 13 in this chapter.
35 As an example, a mother who jumps in front of an oncoming car to save her child is not forced to, nor does she 
simply choose to. She loves her child. So the proper course of action seems obvious. Love is beyond freedom and 
necessity. To switch metaphors, love does not limit our horizons, restricting freedom If anything, it expands our 
vision, freeing us from an aimless wandering. By giving us a direction – a range – in which to travel, love opens up 
paths of understanding our aimless curiosity would never have allowed us to discover. Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 
128.
 As the expression of divine love, the world, says Bulgakov, exists within God. He argues 
that panentheism contradicts the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo only if we take “nothing” literally, 
which would be a mistake. The doctrine of creation out of nothing must not be the description of 
a process but an affirmation of divine sovereignty. Otherwise, God would not be God because 
God would be limited by the “nothing” that surrounds the divine being. In fact, the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo was a response to Platonic understandings of creation out of pre-existent matter, 
meaning that it intended to affirm only that God needs nothing but Godself to create. Therefore, 
says Bulgakov, for God to create out of nothing is to create out of Godself. “Nothing” is but 
theological poetry intended to refer to the room God makes for creation within the inner-divine 
life, the creation God gives us freely to reciprocate the love that is the foundation of our 
existence. 
 This panentheism grounds the optimistic view of culture Bulgakov offered in Philosophy 
of Economy, for it means that creation is filled with Godself. When it comes to the content of 
creation, this must, in a certain sense, “pre-exist” within God as a kind of Platonic archetype.36 
Because creaturely Sophia is the distention of divine self-love into creaturely becoming, then 
those archetypes are realized in creation over time, both in nature and human events.37 This point 
of view smudges a strict boundary between special and general revelation by reckoning human 
products the result of a deep desire to reciprocate the love that is the ground of our existence. 
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36 I place quotes around that word to indicate its imprecision. It is heresy only insofar as it subjects God to time by 
placing God at the beginning of a sequential process, like a First Mover. We can think of pre-existence in a loose 
sense as referring to the eternal omniscience of God who knows, from a humanly perspective, what will be before it 
is. Ibid., 22.
37 I distinguish between natural and human events reluctantly for the sake of convention. Bulgakov understood, and I 
agree with him, that human beings are part of the eco-system. Human events produce natural ones and natural events 
impact human societies. The history of humanity is therefore inseparable from the history of the natural world. Ibid.,  
237ff.
Our products insofar as they are unsullied by human sinfulness, reflect the divine mind and strive 
to return divine love. In this way, Bulgakov tries to combine Plato and Aristotle by making the 
distention of divine love into creaturely becoming constitute nature’s entelecheia.38 Thus, the 
self-fulfillment of creatures is found in a Godward journey that is both beyond and more fully 
into themselves. As O’Donnell says, “The world grows toward the divine archetypes.” 39
Metaphor 3: Sophia as the Kingdom of God
 Insofar as Bulgakov will help us respond to Milbank and Hauerwas, a word must be said 
about the way he identifies Sophia with the kingdom of God. This point will be very brief 
because the kingdom of God is not fully developed in Bulgakov’s theology. He says a lot about 
eschatology in general (the universal resurrection, the parousia, and the fates of the just and the 
damned), but very little about what we today would recognize as the reign of God’s 
righteousness, particularly in the way that scripture deploys the term.40 He does explicitly say 
that Sophia is the kingdom of God in his essay “Hypostasis and Hypostaticity,” in which he 
identifies her with the final triumph of sin and death to take place in the universal resurrection. 
This identification of Sophia with the kingdom is consistent with what Bulgakov said earlier 
about the motive force behind economy. Again, though incomplete, it suggests that a maturer 
Bulgakov recognized that culture and its products are inspired by the kingdom of God that is 
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38 Ibid., 182.
39 John J. O'Donnell, “The Trinitarian Panentheism of Sergej Bulgakov,” Gregorianum 76, no. 1 (1995): 33.
40 Though the political component of the kingdom of God is underdeveloped in Bulgakov’s thought, he did 
anticipate many later developments in eco-theology. See Myroslaw Tataryn, “Sergius Bulgakov (1871-1944) : Time 
for a New Look,” St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 42, no. 3-4 (1998): 321.
breaking into the world through them. This means that that which inspires culture is the focal 
point of the church’s own life. 
 The significance of this metaphor lies in the way it is coordinated with his doctrine of 
creation. Bulgakov says Sophia is the “the ground and goal of the creation of the world.”41 
Insofar as Sophia is identified with the kingdom of God as well as the cosmos, this statement 
means to show that the destiny of the world is somehow written into it, in embryonic form, from 
the beginning. The kingdom, as Bulgakov understands it, is not just an irruptive moment within 
history but in some sense internal to its own processes. In his own words, “The transfiguration of 
the world is…simultaneously immanent to and transcendent to the world.”42 We might thus say, 
for Bulgakov, that creation is marked by what Sarah Coakely has called, in another context, an 
“eschatological longing.”43 This longing has implications for the church which must be 
addressed. 
What Sophiology Means for the Church
 The above suggests that creation contains within itself seeds of the kingdom of God, so to 
speak. Bulgakov would not exactly put it in those terms, but this expression is consistent with his 
thought. The seeds of Sophia develop in time toward their full flowering in the eschaton. Their 
partial flowering gives us partial glimpses into God’s reign. It is thus that he says Sophia is the 
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41 Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 470. Emphasis mine. I am indebted to Robert F. Thompson and Brandon Gallaher 
for helping me make this connection.
42 Ibid., 426. Sergius Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An Outline of Sophiology, trans., Patrick Thompson, 
Library of Russian Philosophy (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne, 1993), 95.
43 Sarah Coakley, “The Eschatological Body: Gender, Transformation, and God,” Modern Theology 16, no. 1 
(2000): 61.
creation and the kingdom of God. The following discussion draws out both the positive and 
negative implications of the way Bulgakov coordinates these two terms for the church. 
The Positive Implications of Sophiology for the Church: Our Eschatological Mission
 The positive implications of Sophia for the church, insofar as she is the embryonic 
presence of the world’s future in the present, is best expressed by first reflecting for a moment on 
a couple more images of Sophia. I am aware that so far I have spent a great deal of time looking 
at metaphors for Sophia, but that is because Bulgakov thinks about Sophia metaphorically. Still, 
the following images are less about what Sophia is in herself than what she means for the God-
world relationship as it relates to the being and purpose of the church. They come not so much 
from Bulgakov’s theology as from his own life (though he does offer theological reflection on 
their meaning). Bulgakov had two epiphanic encounters of Sophia. These were not literal visions 
like the kind Solovyov had but emotionally charged moments that illustrated to Bulgakov a 
shared desire between God and the world. At various points in his life, he saw Sophia in the 
Caucuses Mountains and in a painting of the Madonna.44 
 Mountains testify to the aspirational character of creation (creaturely Sophia). They are 
an inexplicable summons to transcend our own limits, to rise with the earth beyond ourselves. 
The mountaineer can give no more reason for climbing than the command within her, the small 
voice that echos like a thunderclap in her soul, calling her to ascend. Likewise, the poet, scientist, 
or laborer is similarly inspired to pursue her craft not as an end in itself but as a call from 
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44 See Evtuhov, Cross and Sickle, 38-39, 44. Bulgakov observes that he was still a committed atheist at the time, yet 
on both occasions God “ambushed” him, so to speak, in spite of himself, forcing out of his hardened heart prayer 
and admiration for beauty divine. Sergius Bulgakov, “My Conversion,” in A Bulgakov Anthology, ed. James Pain 
and Nicolas Zernov (London: SPCK, 1976), 10-11.
somewhere beyond herself. Such inspiration, Bulgakov would say, is the summons of God in 
Sophia. Mary, on the other hand, testifies to the full extent of kenosis in the divine Sophia. Not 
one on a list of eligible virgins tucked somewhere beneath Gabriel’s angelic robes, the 
incarnation depended on one teenage girl’s answer to a request to bear a burden probably any 
adult would immediately reject.45 
 These two images together testify to the dance of God and creation in time. God 
descends! We rise! History unfolds itself like a transcendent tango – a synergism of God and 
creature oriented toward an eschatological consummation. This synergism does not mean we 
bring the kingdom, only that by God’s grace we must work for it. We work with God toward the 
kingdom not because God needs our help but because God loves us. The salvation of the world, 
Bulgakov is fond of saying, is not a deus ex machina. God waits upon creation to be ready for 
the kingdom, which, by God’s grace, already stretches out beyond itself to receive God’s reign.46 
 The church inhabits this dance in a unique way. Bulgakov says, “Christ left the world in 
His ascension to heaven…because the creaturely world was incapable of receiving and 
encompassing His presence in glory. But His departure was temporary, and the world had yet to 
ripen to receive Him anew.”47 The church, he goes on to say, is the body of Christ and the temple 
of the Holy Spirit. As such, we occupy the space between the ascension and parousia to help this 
world realize realize the fulfillment of its perhaps unperceived eschatological desire. Just as the 
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45 Were that the case, says Bulgakov, the Incarnation would be “a miraculous coercion over man’s nature…a deus ex 
machina.” Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 206. Of course, the fact that Mary was selected because of the excellence of 
God’s grace upon her, to which she freely responded, together with her own personal sinlessness (though she was 
subject to original sin) means that her refusal of the angelic request was not a “live option,” so to speak. See also   
Bulgakov, The Burning Bush, 35-44.
46 Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 426. Bulgakov, Sophia, 95. See also Sergius Bulgakov, The Friend of the 
Bridegrom: On the Orthodox Veneration of the Forerunner, trans., Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).
47 Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 403. Emphasis mine. 
first coming of Christ happened in “the fullness of time” (Galatians 4:4) the second coming will 
take place when the world is ready to receive him. Like John the Baptist, we exist to prepare the 
way. The church has an eschatological mission: we are creation’s gardner.
 That does not mean the kingdom of God depends on the church. The world can ripen 
without the direct involvement of the church, by the power of the Spirit who continues to hover 
over the waters of creation (Genesis 1:2).48 She will work in the world with or without the 
knowledge of the people of God. “The wind blows where it wishes” (John 3:8). The world also 
ripens within the church itself, this in two senses. There is a mystical sense to Bulgakov’s 
sacramental theology; he believes the power of God that transforms bread and wine into body 
and blood, and the blessings of other material objects in the church (water, oil, grapes, etc.) does 
have a real effect on the world. Through its natural cycles the redeeming energy of God wends its 
way into the ecosystem, quickening it.49 In another sense, we can also speak of this 
transformation happening in the church in the lives of its members. As they begin to be 
transformed by embedding themselves more deeply into the life of the church, living with a 
particular people toward the coming reign of God, the world is transformed in them. After all, the 
lines we draw between the church and the world are only virtual. Both church and world are us. 
This is probably something of what Bulgakov had in mind when he spoke (in the previous 
chapter) of transforming society by the “interior energies” of the church, which does not mean 
that the world would be transformed only in the church. The light from a candle illumines more 
than the person holding it. What happens within the church diffuses beyond its walls as the 
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48 Ibid., 397-408.
49 Sergius Bulgakov, “The Holy Grail: (an Attempt at a Dogmatic Exegesis of John 19:34),” in The Holy Grail and 
the Eucharist, ed. Boris Jakim (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne, 1997).
members of the body of Christ extend themselves into their societies. Given that sophiology 
intends to offer a theological rationale for the Christian sociology described earlier, it is fair to 
say that the church helps the world ripen by its constructive engagement with culture. The church 
transforms society by bringing the world’s wisdom into itself and finding on it the fingerprints of 
Sophia. 
 This latter sense of the church’s eschatological mission is helpful for us insofar as it 
makes the kingdom of God the motive force behind an open attitude of the church toward 
society. The unconscious longings of creation for the kingdom, and their partial fulfillments in 
cultural products, warrants a constructive relationship between the church and the world. 
Bulgakov spoke of the need for a creative church in order to indicate this openness. As noted in 
the foregoing presentation of Philosophy of Economy, what happens in society is potentially 
insight into God’s own mind and therefore, in light of the mission of the church, a partial and 
proleptic instantiation of God’s kingdom.50 This openness owes to Bulgakov’s conviction about 
the unfolding of divine revelation in history. Since creation is the content of the divine life itself, 
its desire for the kingdom gradually being realized in the course of history, any new social or 
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50 On this constructive relationship between church and culture, it is worth noting the comeback Bulgakov has had 
among some Orthodox theologians, who find in him the potential for to bring their sometimes culturally isolated and 
reactionary theological traditions into closer contact with the modern world. It is thus that Miroslaw Tataryn sees 
Bulgakov as an Orthodox version of Henri de Lubac or Karl Rahner, doing for Orthodoxy what they did for 
Catholicism. He funds a shift from a “classicist” to an “historicist” perspective because of the way he opens the 
church to the creative insights of its culture. Tataryn also sees some parallels between Bulgakov and Lonergan. 
Myroslaw I. Tataryn, “History Matters: Bulgakov's Sophianic Key,” St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 49, no. 1-2 
(2005): 203. According to the author, Bulgakov shares Lonergan’s insistence that in creation is “an immanent source 
of transcendence.” Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A.  Morelli, eds., The Lonergan Reader (Buffalo: University of 
Toronto, 1997), 292. Both attribute this “imperative” to a desire for absolute knowledge which is closely connected 
with “a dynamic state [of loving] that prompts and molds all our thoughts and feelings, all our judgments and 
decisions” as the “first principle in our living.” Bernard Lonergan, “The Future of Christianity,” in A Second 
Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J. , ed. William F. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1974), 82. 
scientific insight may be the unfolding of revelation about Godself, as a glimmer of fullness of 
that life in the kingdom to come.51 
 The open attitude toward culture present in Bulgakov’s understanding of the mission of 
the church already bears implications for this project, for it suggests that erecting an 
ecclesiological wall between the church and the secular (even if that wall does not really exist) 
may violate some aspects of that mission. The Byzantines presented the possibility of resolving 
or at least mitigating the effects of Christian cognitive dissonance by coordinating church and 
society under the shared reality of God’s reign. Bulgakov’s sophiology suggestively addresses 
how to do that by locating the nascent and unconscious presence of the reign of God’s 
righteousness in culture. However, development of our alternative account of the church-world 
limen cannot stop here because there is a conceptual weakness in sophiology that keeps it from 
fully accounting for the contemporary church’s engagements with the secular. That weakness 
relates to the need to preserve ecclesial uniqueness in the face of some of the disintegrating 
effects of the secular. This emphasis, it has been shown, is necessary for a viable alternative to 
postliberal ecclesiology, and the related need to preserve the possibility of critiquing culture, 
which the symphonic ideal implies. Put simply, this conceptual shortcoming is the opposite of 
that which the third chapter criticized in Milbank and Hauerwas. They collapse the kingdom into 
the church. Sophiology has the potential to collapse the kingdom into the world. 
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51 As Tataryn says, “The reason for this positive assessment of human science and other areas of human creativity, is 
that this process, although undertaken in freedom, has the force of the Holy Spirit behind it.” Tataryn, “History 
Matters,” 211.
The Negative Implications of Sophiology for the Church: Sophic Ambiguity
 Few theological metaphors work as hard as Sophia.52 Bulgakov says she is the essence of 
the Godhead abstracted. She is also the goodness abiding in this presently fallen world. She will 
have been the ideal world in the eschaton. She is glory, beauty, truth, and wisdom. The trouble 
with these descriptors is that when Sophia becomes practically everything, she risks becoming 
practically nothing, dissolving into incomplete and contradictory abstractions. Sticking with the 
concern above and the metaphors of Sophia mentioned in the previous section, we turn now to 
one major point of critique that arises from two conceptual ambiguities surrounding all the 
implications of the Sophia metaphor. 
 The first point of critique relates to the nebulous status of Sophia within the Godhead. 
Bulgakov introduces this term to try to emphasize divine unity. On the whole, his trinitarian 
theology rightly stresses that God is not two interrelated parts – hypostases and ousia – but that 
God’s ousia is the ever-kenotic, ever-fulfilling love of the hypostases. Still, one cannot help but 
ask if introducing yet another theological term into our vocabulary (Sophia) does not underscore 
but undermine divine unity? Despite what Bulgakov tries to say about Sophia within the 
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52 In general, I salute the intent behind sophiology. I even agree with some of its conclusions, and even more of its 
insights. It is not unlike Barth’s Christological revolution applied to the Trinity, itself. No, Barth certainly would not 
have agreed with Bulgakov’s feelings about the relationship between special and general revelation, and certainly 
not his panentheism! God touched human history, said Barth, at a tangent, leaving only a crater behind. However, 
behind Bulgakov’s sophiology is a Barthian insight. Barth realized that the absoluteness of God did not preclude the 
Incarnation but made it possible, for a truly absolute God would not be limited by the creation, but could enter into 
it. See Barth, Epistle to the Romans. Like Barth, Bulgakov also realized that divine transcendence does not compete 
with divine immanence. Thus, a number of commentators have suggested that Bulgakov’s theology is a grand 
application of the Definition of Chalcedon to every other doctrine; the Incarnation testifies to an original 
correspondence between God and creation. Unfortunately, the content of sophiology violates the intent that funded 
this insight in the ways noted below. For Sophia as a development of Chalcedon see Tataryn, “History Matters,” 
205-6. See also, Myroslaw Tataryn, “Sergei Bulgakov: Eastern Orthodoxy Engaging the Modern World,” Studies in 
Religion/Sciences religieuses 31, no. 3-4 (2002): 316. Arjakovsky and Plekon: 222. Valliere, Modern Russian 
Theology, 292-93. Rowan Williams, “Introduction to the Lamb of God: On the Divine Humanity (1933),” in Sergii 
Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology, ed. Rowan Williams (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 168-69.
Godhead, this term makes it more difficult not to think of God as three interrelated parts: ousia, 
hypostases, and Sophia. Rightly resisting this urge, the mind ends up not quite sure what to make 
of her, rendering her a kind of quasi-hypostatic, non-person existing forever within the Godhead. 
In other words, apart from vague and lofty nouns, it is never clear what Sophia is, positively, in 
herself (so to speak). 
 The nebulous status of Sophia within the Godhead carries over into creation. For the 
record, some aspects of Bulgakov’s understanding of creation are compelling, particularly his 
interpretation of the creatio ex nihilo and the way it reconciles divine freedom to divine necessity 
in divine love. That said, his panentheism is problematic in its literalism and materialism. To be 
fair, there is some ground in scripture and tradition for poetically speaking of the world in God. 
Paul described Christ as he in whom “we live and move and have our being” in order to convey 
the way that God is for us (Acts 17:28). Likewise, St. Augustine asked in De Trinitate, “What, 
after all, is not in God, of whom it is divinely written, for him and through him and in him are all 
things (Rom 11:36)? So of course if all things are in him, what can things that live live in and 
things that move move in but in him in whom they are?”53 But Augustine would also find 
Bulgakov’s panentheism conceptually clumsy and problematic in its implications for a consistent 
doctrine of God, particular when it comes to what to make of evil. To explain his panentheism, 
Bulgakov likens God to an infinite, shoreless ocean, encompassing the cosmos.54 This image 
almost perfectly mirrors an idea for which Augustine condemned himself. 
I conceived your creation as a single vast mass differentiated by various types of 
bodies…I visualized you, Lord, surrounding it on all sides and permeating it, but 
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53 Augustine, The Trinity, XIV.iv.16. I am not suggesting that Augustine was a panentheist, only that creative 
reappropriation of the tradition could potentially justify panentheism. 
54 Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 44.
infinite in all directions, as if there were a sea everywhere and stretching through 
immense distances, a single sea which had within it a large but finite sponge; and 
the sponge was in every part filled from the immense sea. This is the kind of way 
in which I supposed your finite creation to be full of you, infinite as you are…55 
Augustine goes on to reject this vestige of his early Manichean habits of thought on the grounds 
that it both doled parts of God out unevenly to different creatures and, more problematically, 
implicated God in the evil done in creation by subjecting God materially to creation. 
 Independently, the above are problems for sophiology, but together they risk implicating 
the church in the evil of this world either actively or by complicity. From our perspective, Sophia 
is the essence of God abstracted. Admittedly, the Wisdom tradition in the Bible reveals some 
aspects of Sophia, but for the most part she is only concretely present to us in creation’s truth, 
goodness, and beauty (generally speaking). Whether or not such Platonic ideals as truth, 
goodness, and beauty exist forever in the heavenlies, this world is fallen. The criteria by which 
we recognize truth, goodness, and beauty are invariably skewed both by our limited, finite 
perspective and, more importantly, by our own sinfulness. She may be the goodness within fallen 
creation, but this is a goodness we sinful creatures must discover, and so, with little else but a 
few scattered verses and a vague feeling about the presence of Sophia in the world, we risk 
finding her in falsehood. We risk invoking her to justify our own sinfulness. In other words, 
despite all the lofty names Bulgakov heaps upon her, the absence of clear criteria by which we 
might recognize her, other than our subjective opinions about what truth, goodness, and beauty 
are, means that there is little to prevent Sophia from becoming a kind of inverted Feuerbachian 
projection, whereby she becomes not a repository of our ideals against which to judge and act 
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55 Augustine, Confessions, VII.v.7.
against creation’s evil, but a means to self-justification by projecting our collective evil into 
eternity. 
 The need to excise the good in created Sophia coming mostly from creation itself, this 
aspect of sophiology asks us to think in a circle. To be clear, this is more a conceptual problem, 
but it has practical implications, particularly for the eschatological mission of the church to help 
ready the world to receive the kingdom. This sophic ambiguity may not lead to horrific acts like 
genocide or infanticide or other such atrocities, but if we are constructively to engage culture 
where we find glimpses of divine wisdom in it, without being surer about what makes worldly 
wisdom divine, the church risks complicity with, or complacency toward, aspects of culture that 
seem wise, but should be rejected insofar as they do not conform to what will be the reality of 
God’s reign. In an extreme example, a church without a clearer picture of when to reject what 
happens in society risks repeating in some form the actions of Russian Christians who joyfully 
turned in Jewish neighbors to the Einsatzgruppen. Or it might lead us to conclusions of those like 
Tielhard de Chardin (who bears a great deal in common with Bulgakov), to see world events like 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as all part of the plan.56 This risk of self-justification makes Sophia a 
sufficient ground for engagement with the secular, but not critique. For the latter, Bulgakov 
proves insufficient. 
 At this point, one might ask, If Sophia unfolds prolepses of the kingdom of God in 
society – even secular society – then do not the criteria for ecclesial action in it come from the 
church’s understanding of God’s reign? Indeed, they do! The trouble is that, insofar as ongoing 
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56 I do not wish to suggest that Chardin is flippant about atom bombs. He is keenly aware of both the perils and the 
promises of nuclear energy, but he comes down, in my opinion, a bit too far on the capacity of human beings to 
shape their destinies as an expression of their common spiritual vocation. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future 
of Man, trans., Norman Denny (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 140ff.
human history is part of Sophia, and thus included in the self-understanding of the church, the 
content of the kingdom of God still remains somewhat open this side of the eschaton. This is the 
right question to ask, but there is not enough in Bulgakov’s theology to answer it. 
 In sum, the problem of sophic ambiguity calls into question the applicability of the 
Sophia metaphor fully to provide an account of the kingdom of God in the church and the world 
that also meets the need of preserving ecclesial uniqueness. My concern to preserve the potential 
of ecclesial critique of the secular is not motivated by a desire somehow to maintain the visible 
purity of the church. That is impossible. My concern involves the self-understanding of the 
church in the secular. Bulgakov shows the church how to be open to its society. From the above 
perspective, even that which formally precludes consideration of God need not immediately be 
prohibited from influencing the church, for there is good in it that comes from God. There are 
insights of the secular that can and have influenced the church in a positive way (such as the 
liberation of women and a greater concern for human rights). For that reason the church also 
should not worry about supporting those aspects of the secular that correspond to the coming 
reality of God’s reign. That said, to prevent or mitigate Christian cognitive dissonance in a way 
that still allows us to stress the identity of the church in a way comparable to Milbank and 
Hauerwas, we need not just openness to the secular but the possibility to withdraw from it, to 
assert our own narratives in the face of it, and to stress the judgment of the kingdom of God 
against it. While there is much in the secular from which the church has done well to learn, there 
is much in it that should be rejected (such as capitalist deprivation of the two-thirds world and a 
utilitarian attitude toward individuals and the earth, to mention what should be a few 
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uncontroversial examples). In a word, sophic ambiguity makes such judgment, at minimum, 
rather difficult. 
Conclusion
 At this point it would be good to pause and take stock both of where we have come and 
where we shall go. Challenged by postliberal ecclesiology to develop a comparable account of 
narthexical space that explains the presence of the secular in the church (influencing it) and the 
church in the secular (supporting it), we have seen that the way to address this challenge focuses 
both on preserving a distinction between the kingdom of God in the church (though not denying 
that the church is a proleptic experience of the kingdom) while also locating the kingdom in 
society. The Byzantines offered us a model for doing that in their ideal of symphonia, which 
responded to the partial presence of the kingdom in society by conditionally supporting it or 
critiquing it, as circumstances dictated. 
 In this chapter, we took a closer look at Bulgakov as providing the initial dogmatic 
content for the Byzantine architecture presented in the previous chapter. Such is justified on the 
grounds that he understood his philosophical and theological project to undergird a newer 
version of the symphonic ideal, which he called social Christianity. Philosophically, he focused 
on the creative potential of the church to engage culture on the basis of the presence of Sophia 
guiding and directing its historic development. The theology he later developed to explain this 
work of Holy Wisdom focused on a panentheistic relationship between God and the world that 
was oriented toward its culmination in the eschaton. Though when it comes to the kingdom of 
God, Bulgakov’s eschatology is somewhat undeveloped, we can rightly say that he sees the 
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kingdom nascently unfolding in world-historic process, which includes not only what we think of 
as nature but also human history as well. This justifies the secular to the church by making the 
kingdom of God the driving force of the life of the world, with or without the direct involvement 
of the church. His ecclesiology tied the church to this understanding of the world by conceiving 
of it as the kingdom’s gardner, so to speak, working in the world to ready it to receive Christ in 
the parousia. Constructive engagement with the secular, nurturing the seeds of the kingdom it 
contains, is why we exist. 
 This conception of the church thus partly responds to the Christian cognitive dissonance 
of postliberal ecclesiology by conceiving of our inevitable support of the secular not by denying 
or ignoring it but by incorporating it into our raison d'être. Our commitment to the kingdom thus 
requires commitment to the world. At minimum, this point of view makes the boundary between 
the church and the secular permeable by seeing the kingdom of God at least partially present in 
both. However, we have also seen that a full response to Milbank and Hauerwas’ account of the 
narthex requires stressing ecclesial uniqueness. Despite his best intentions, it was argued that 
Bulgakov’s sophiology makes such an emphasis problematic because the content of Sophia, and 
thus the kingdom of God (with which he identifies her), is too nebulous. She funds our 
engagement with the world, but her concrete content comes from the world we engage. This 
conceptual weakness in Bulgakov means we cannot end at sophiology. As helpful as this 
metaphor has been for conceiving of how to reconcile the church to the development of human 
culture and society within the kingdom of God, Sophia provides insufficient ground upon which 
to construct a fully symphonic account of the church in the secular. 
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 Thus, the next chapter will respond to this shortcoming by, in a sense, filling out the 
content of the kingdom of God in order to provide the church with more concrete criteria for its 
engagement with the secular, both constructively and critically. To do this, we will continue the 
above discussion in order to emend Bulgakov’s theology in a way that uncovers more stable 
ground upon which ecclesial symphonia must be based: the presence of the kingdom of God in 
Jesus Christ. 
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CHAPTER VI
ECCLESIAL SYMPHONIA:
FINDING IDENTITY IN THE NARTHEX
“To what shall I liken the kingdom of God? It is like leaven, which a 
woman took and hid in three measures of meal till it was all leavened.”
Luke 13:20-21
 The last chapter offered a provisional definition of ecclesial symphonia as constructive 
engagement with the secular on the basis of the kingdom of God’s proleptic manifestation in it. 
The sophiology of Bulgakov helped us see how culture may unconsciously contain these 
prolepses insofar as it is the kingdom that drives its development. We further saw that, inhabiting 
the space between the ascension and the second coming, the church exists to prepare this world 
to receive the reign of God’s righteousness both in itself and in its engagement with culture. For 
us, this means that the secular cannot be ipso facto precluded from the self-understanding of the 
church but is actually incorporated into it. We exist to engage. This openness gets us halfway to a 
symphonic alternative to the counterpositional views of Milbank and Hauerwas, but a viable 
alternative to their ecclesiologies must also stress ecclesial identity, which is something we saw 
sophiology is unable to sustain. The absence of concrete content for the kingdom of God within 
the Sophia metaphor complicates ecclesial judgment of the secular (the provisional sectarianism 
conforming to the Byzantine model), thereby impeding the eschatological work of the church. 
Sophiology thus makes our support of the secular, and to a limited extent even our withdrawal, 
“thinkable” in a hypothetical way, but not actually. For that reason, we must move beyond 
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sophiology to a more traditional and orthodox way of conceptualizing God’s relationship to the 
world: Jesus. 
 I do not mean to suggest that Bulgakov does not care about Jesus. Though sometimes one 
walks away from his books wondering if this is how Augustine must have felt about the 
Platonists,1 Bulgakov does have a christology.2 Sophiology was, among other things, an attempt 
to unpack the logical implications of the Definition of Chalcedon.3 Nevertheless, sophiology 
remains abstractly metaphysical, unable to provide us with a clearer vision of not whether but 
how to engage the secular, because Bulgakov resists directly connecting Sophia to the man Jesus 
Christ. Sophia, he says, is hypostasized in Jesus.4 She is the Word of God in the act of creation.5 
But he breaks with what is, to my knowledge, universal patristic consensus that equates Wisdom 
with the second person of the Trinity.6 This chapter argues that the revelation of the kingdom of 
God (not in Sophia but) in the incarnate Word – the man Jesus Christ – is how the church today 
both recognizes and responds to prolepses of that reign in the secular. 
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1 Augustine, Confessions, VII.xxi.27.
2 Bulgakov has written a remarkable christology from which contemporary theology would do well to learn. It is 
important for the way that his presumption of a noncompetitive relationship between God and the world allows him 
to develop an account of the divinity and humanity in Jesus that persuasively combines Alexandrian and Antiochene 
christological emphases, as well as for a fairly Moltmannian reflection on the triune experience of the cross. Still, he 
often favors abstract dogmatic issues over the concrete figure of Jesus Christ presented in the gospels. His argument 
is most persuasive when it is most biblical. See Bulgakov, Lamb of God.
3 Ibid., 51ff.
4 See ibid., 107-17. Bulgakov, Comforter, 184, 200-1.
5 Ibid., 191-92. Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 129.
6 Typically, one must be cautious about making totalizing claims such as this. Surely, there must be some ancient 
church mother or father who did not identify Sophia with the Son. However, try as I might, I cannot come up with a 
single example of someone who did not see Old Testament Wisdom referring to the Son. Were there such a person, 
Bulgakov would likely have referred to him or her. He does not, which suggests at minimum that Bulgakov could 
not come up with any examples either. All he can do is observe this connection in patristic theology and critique it in 
some way or another. Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 15-19.
 I first develop this thesis by substituting with the Word the function Sophia serves in 
Bulgakov’s theology. For an account of the Word providing the content of creation, my 
archetypal instance of the tradition is Athanasius because of the way his understanding of the 
incarnation overlaps with Bulgakov. However, my intent is not simply to return to an older way 
of thinking about the God-world relationship but to allow Bulgakov’s understanding of Sophia 
revealing herself over time to help bring the tradition into the present. His modern sense of 
history augments the tradition by allowing us to think of an historicized Logos, whereby we 
occupy the outer edge of the ongoing distention between the foundation of the world in the Word 
and the work of God in Jesus Christ. The second section turns to that work. Jesus Christ, to apply  
Bulgakov’s language, is not only the “ground” of creation but also its “goal.”7 Looking at three 
different but related accounts of the presence of God’s reign in Jesus Christ – in politics, 
economy, and community – will provide us with some reasonably concrete criteria for 
recognizing and responding to prolepses of the kingdom in the world around us. Thus, this 
section will be the answer to the problem of sophic ambiguity critiqued in the last chapter, 
showing how we draw criteria for engagement with the secular not from the world itself but the 
presentation of Christ in the gospels, which poke their way through the soil of secular society. 
Obviously, neither these criteria nor their application will be exhaustive. Indeed, talk of 
application will be fairly general, but symphonia is not about knowing what to do in every 
circumstance. We can never know that! It is about living life in the light of God’s reign. This side 
of eternity, that light is never bright enough to illuminate all the twists and turns of life, but it can 
point us in the right direction. Finally, we complete the process of moving symphonia into an 
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ecclesiological register by noting how the first two sections place the church in a dynamic 
relationship to its culture, and drawing implications therefrom. Jesus Christ is the foundation of 
the world, incarnate in time, partly revealing a future that has yet to arrive. Thus, the full impact 
of his work is yet to be determined but is partly read to us by the ongoing story of the world 
around us. This does not divest the church of its identity as the body of Christ or the anticipation 
of God’s reign but incorporates the “situation” into that identity. It means that for the church to 
exist for God’s kingdom is also to exist for the world. Who we are is found in the conscious 
incorporation of our context into our identity through a constant return to the presence of Christ 
in word and worship, thereby guiding the eschatological longing of the secular toward a future it 
does not yet know it desires. 
Jesus Christ: The Wisdom of God
 This section offers not simply a christological corrective to Bulgakov but aims to use his 
sense of the revelation of God in Sophia partly to update the patristic tradition. On the one hand, 
I will dispute his refusal to identify Sophia with the Word of God by addressing his major 
argument against it. Having dispatched his objection to this identification, I will further argue 
that nothing essential from Bulgakov’s theology is lost by attributing to the Word the major 
functions Bulgakov assigns to Sophia. The result is something of an historicized understanding 
of the Logos, revealing himself in the ongoing story of creation, climaxing in Christ, and 
proceeding from him toward the culmination of creation in the kingdom. Not only does this 
synthesis not take away from Bulgakov’s understanding of the integral relationship between God 
and the world in history, but it also overcomes the problem of sophic ambiguity (addressed at the 
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end of the previous chapter) by establishing some narrative boundaries (to be addressed in the 
second section) for recognizing the proleptic presence of the kingdom of God in the world.
Why Wisdom was not the Word
 Fairness to Bulgakov requires that, rather than simply asserting that we should see 
Wisdom as the Word, we give attention to why he objected to this identification. He was not 
ignorant of the fact that he was breaking with tradition by separating Old Testament accounts of 
Sophia from the Son.8 Bulgakov did say that precursors to his own unique take on Sophia could 
be found in the speculations of Origen and the energies of Gregory Palamas.9 He also felt that his 
sophiology was anticipated in certain church buildings and feasts unique to Russian Orthodoxy.10 
That said, his insistence that his sophiology was not dogma but doctrine – an unfinished 
theologoumena – suggests that he knew he was mostly innovating. Or, since innovation is 
sometimes code for “heresy” among some of Bulgakov’s more conservative church kin, let us 
say he knew that he was “creatively re-appropriating” the tradition. Bulgakov justified his 
exegetical raid and revision of the tradition by insisting that it is necessary to free Sophia from 
captivity to the Logos if we are to hold a consistent doctrine of the Trinity. Otherwise, he said, 
we divide God into parts by implying that, since the Son is Wisdom, the Father and Spirit are not 
wise.11
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8 Bulgakov quotes Proverbs 8:22-31. Bulgakov, “Social Teaching,” 279-80.
9 Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 108, note 14. Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, 15-19. Bulgakov, Sophia, 1-12.
10 Ibid., 2-4.
11 See Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 110-11, note 16.
 Bulgakov’s concern about dividing the persons of the Trinity according to function is 
valid. This is something we risk whenever we apply human terms and concepts to attempt to 
express divine reality. Nonetheless, his objection is, frankly, perplexing both in its literalism and 
in its inconsistency with his own theology. Beginning to consider how Bulgakov’s objection does 
not square with other aspects of his doctrine of the trinity will also shed light on its odd 
literalism. 
 When it comes to pneumatology, Bulgakov follows the lead of Augustine (which is to his 
credit, given the way the Orthodox often polemicize against him). He says that the Holy Spirit is 
the love that holds together the Father and the Son in the Trinity.12 Yet this assertion contradicts 
the logic whereby he refuses to identify Wisdom with the Word. Were we to extend that logic to 
his pneumatology, we could argue that calling the Spirit “love” means that the Father and the Son 
do not have love. This contradiction either means that Bulgakov cannot rightly call the Spirit 
“love,” or that he can call the Word “Wisdom.” 
 This example illuminates the befuddling literalism in Bulgakov’s argument. It seems 
fairly clear that to say that we cannot call the Spirit “love” for the reason I mentioned violates an 
apophatic consensus in trinitarian theology that our language about God is extremely limited. 
Our words will always only gesture toward the divine reality, never capture it. Relatedly, a 
corollary of this recognition is that the persons of the Trinity are what they are only in each other. 
Each hypostasis completes the others but is not incomplete without the others. Therefore, to say 
that the Spirit is love is not to say that the Father and Son do not have love, but it is to recognize 
that they have love in the Spirit. Similarly, it seems reasonable to insist, against Bulgakov, that 
181
12 Bulgakov, Comforter, 66-67.
there is no reason why we cannot say the same of the Son. The Father and Spirit possess wisdom 
in the Word. Otherwise, we risk reducing God to a collection of attributes that must not only be 
equally but identically possessed by all. 
Seeing the Word as Wisdom
 Having dispatched Bulgakov’s main objection to identifying Sophia with the Son, we 
turn now to consider how attributing to the Word what Bulgakov applies to Sophia helpfully 
reconfigures his sophiology in a way that resolves the ambiguity that comes from making the 
world itself our standard for engaging the world, while still preserving the church’s openness to 
the historic development of human society as proleptically and partially revealing God’s reign. 
What follows is not only a patristic “correction” of Bulgakov (through Athanasius) but a 
Bulgakovian expansion of the tradition. 
 St Athanasius makes a good interlocutor for Bulgakov because of a remarkable degree of 
overlap in the way each relates divine immanence to divine transcendence.13 Well before 
Bulgakov, Athanasius attempted to express the non-arbitrariness of the world for God in a 
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13 Bulgakov was by no means unfamiliar with Athanasius’ identification of Wisdom with the Logos, to which he 
objected on the grounds that such an identification would subordinate the Logos to the Father (by identifying the 
Logos with the world). Ibid., 25 (note 21). In a lengthy excursus in The Burning Bush, Bulgakov discusses 
Athanasius’ understanding of the Logos in more detail. There he cites Athanasius as an intellectual forebear. Both 
Arius and Athanasius believed that Sophia in Proverbs referred to the Son, which the former used as proof that the 
Son was a creature (see Proverbs 8:22ff). Athanasius countered that the creatureliness of Sophia in that passage 
referred to the economy of the Son. Thus, says Bulgakov, Athanasius anticipated sophiology by distinguishing 
between a divine and creaturely wisdom. Unfortunately, Athanasius sees the creation as an event that takes place 
“outside” God, which suggests that God is somehow supplemented by the cosmos. See Bulgakov, The Burning 
Bush, 146-49. On the latter objection, Bulgakov’s seeming need to apply prepositions to the relationship between 
God and creation creates the problem he intends to overcome. Athanasius’ assertion of divine freedom vis-à-vis the 
creation does not require supplementation. Indeed, a passage which I will quote at length below suggests quite the 
opposite – that Athanasius does think God provides all the content for creation. As for the charge of 
subordinationism, this seems to derive from a materialistic way of thinking about the God-world relationship that 
Bulgakov apparently finds impossible to avoid. To locate the content of creation in the Logos need only subordinate 
the Logos if we identify him with the creation, that is, if we resort not to panentheism but pantheism. Then he would 
be less than the Father inasmuch as creation is less than the Father, but I see no reason why insisting that the Son 
sustains creation requires any kind of hierarchy within the Trinity.  
consistently trinitarian way (such as it was at the time). Like Bulgakov, he accomplished this 
objective by positing an original correspondence between God and the world. To see how he did 
this, we should examine what he says about the Word in an important passage from On the 
Incarnation. Responding to those who believe that the Word is too transcendent to become 
incarnate, Athanasius writes, 
All things derive from the Word their light and movement and life, as the Gentile 
authors themselves say, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” Very well 
then. That being so, it is by no means unbecoming that the Word should dwell in 
man. So if, as we say, the Word has used that in which He is as the means of His 
self-manifestation, what is there ridiculous in that? He could not have used it had 
He not been present in it; but we have already admitted that He is present both in 
the whole and in the parts. What, then, is there incredible in His manifesting 
Himself through that in which He is? By His own power He enters completely 
into each and all, and orders them throughout ungrudgingly … Does not the mind 
of man pervade his entire being, and yet find expression through one part only, 
namely the tongue? Does anybody say on that account that Mind has degraded 
itself? Of course not. Very well, then, no more is it degrading for the Word, Who 
pervades all things, to have appeared in a human body. For, as I said before, if it 
were unfitting for Him thus to indwell the part, it would be equally so for Him to 
exist within the whole.14
The Arians were among those who believed that divine transcendence precluded divine 
immanence. The majesty of God meant God could not touch creation. As the above passage 
suggests, Athanasius seemed to realize that transcendence that precluded immanence was not 
really transcendence (because it was limited by something). Rather, true transcendence includes 
and makes possible immanence. He thus hit upon the same insight as Bulgakov, but without 
recourse to Bulgakov’s understanding of Sophia. 
 Like Bulgakov, Athanasius posits an original correspondence between God and creation, 
but he locates this correspondence in the Word, who can enter creation and become a part of it, 
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14 St Athanasius, On the Incarnation, trans., A Religious of C.S.M.V., Popular Patristics (Crestwood, NY: St 
Vladimir's, 2000), §42. Emphasis mine.
on the basis of none other than himself. As the foundation, internal logic, and sustainer of 
creation, the Logos can enter the world as that “in which He [always] is.” Still, Athanasius’ 
perspective is somewhat limited and can be helpfully amended by Bulgakov. The former was not 
able to see all the implications of the incarnation for history. That is not to say that Athanasius 
thought the birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ were inconsequential, but that his 
consciousness of history itself was limited by his context. For Athanasius, it is incredibly 
important that Jesus Christ overcame death in the flesh and founded the church, enabling those 
after him to be equally fearless in the face of death, but the effects of this work on history were 
more indirect and limited to the general change Christ makes possible in human nature and the 
ongoing expansion and influence of the church.15 Bulgakov’s greater historical consciousness 
enabled him to develop the implications of this connection between God and the world for 
human society more broadly. In terms of Athanasius’ theology, we can thus say that Bulgakov 
allows us to see how the foundation of creation in the Word moves history toward the incarnation 
in anticipation of the kingdom of God. The incarnation – which includes the entire arc of Jesus’ 
life, death and resurrection – thus ripples beyond its time, place, or even the church itself to 
affect the entire course of human history. Jesus Christ “happens” in the perfect tense because the 
world is a process – a story whose meaning is not clear until the final period on the final page.
 Seeing creation founded in the Logos, incarnate for our salvation, and moving 
kingdomwards preserves the interrelationship of the three metaphors for Sophia outlined in the 
previous chapter (that she is the love of God abstracted into the creation on the way toward the 
kingdom). Nothing essential is lost by replacing Sophia with the Word. In the first place, though 
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it would not be correct to say that Jesus Christ is the abstracted essence of God, as the object of 
the Father’s love, we can continue to say that God loves creation in loving the Son. More 
importantly for our purposes, seeing creation founded in the Son does not change the fact that the 
destiny of creation is written into the world from its foundation. It does not negate the 
eschatological longing that drives historic process. Rather, assigning to the Word what Bulgakov 
assigned to Sophia yields a synthesis that overcomes sophic ambiguity by focusing our 
understanding of what it means for history to drive toward its culmination in the kingdom on 
Christ, for the reign of God’s righteousness has already appeared in the flesh among us. “[W]e 
beheld His glory” (John 1:14). Thus, the eschatological longing of creation is given a new focus. 
From the church’s perspective, that for which creation pines has become incarnate for our 
salvation. The kingdom of God has arrived ahead of time in Jesus. 
 As we fulfill our eschatological mission of working with the secular, teasing out of it the 
embryonic prolepses of the kingdom present in it by virtue of its foundation in the Word, we are 
guided in that work by the presence of the kingdom in Jesus. He is the inner logic of creation, not 
only the Alpha and Omega but all the letters in between. The world, we now know, is not a static 
deposit but a story of evolution, growth, and development. Seeing history shot through with 
Christ, insofar as it grows toward the incarnation and the parousia, preserves the openness of the 
church toward the world made possible by Bulgakov’s view of the presence of God in the 
development of culture. This view of the world distended between Christ – as its foundation and 
culmination – not only allows but requires a certain amount of engaged openness toward the 
secular insofar as it is part of a history, the crest of which we ride, that will at least partly have 
been the reign of God’s righteousness.  
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 Because Jesus Christ, to whom our Scriptures bear witness, is the presence of God’s 
kingdom, we also have some boundaries that norm our engagement with the secular, both 
positively and negatively. Conceptually, this perspective fulfills the first requirement of 
developing a viable alternative to the postliberal account of the narthex. Since the kingdom of 
God is not only proleptically present in the church but also society, we can now engage the 
secular insofar as aspects of it will have been the kingdom of God revealed in Jesus. However, 
this world (which does not exclude the church) is corrupted by sin. We also look to him to 
recognize and react to this fallenness. 
 Insofar as the intent of this essay has been to develop such an account of the church in the 
world, we can almost stop here. Seeing history moving toward the kingdom, we are positioned to 
look for glimpses of God’s reign in the world around us. Locating the kingdom of God in Jesus 
Christ, to whom the Scripture bears manifold witness, we have some sense of what to look for. 
This is a “sense” because the kingdom of God is a person, which means it cannot be reduced to a 
clear set of prescriptions that apply in every circumstance. When we find seeds of the kingdom in 
the secular, we can work as God’s gardner, tending to the green shoots of God’s reign until Christ 
returns, and we can see the ways this world resists God’s reign, which gives the church some 
understanding of how and when to struggle against the secular. Thus, the foregoing has outlined 
the basic dynamic of symphonia in a secular context by indicating how we can reconcile 
ourselves to the secular in the narthex of Christian discipleship. But, so far, this is only an 
outline. There is a difference between offering the church an ecclesiology (limited such as this 
one is) and offering the church a tactic. So far, the description of this symphonic dynamic with 
the secular has only amounted to some kind of stratagem or maybe a coping mechanism. Thus, 
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the preceding is not yet robust enough to stand as a viable alternative to postliberal ecclesiology, 
in part, because it does not fully conform to the reason for the church’s existence. Symphonia as 
we saw, is more than a tactic but the expression of the church’s eschatological ideal in 
Byzantium. Insofar as we are our commitment to the coming reign of God’s righteousness, called 
to embody it in and through the world, a complete picture of symphonia in a secular context 
requires expressing what it is we think we are embodying. For this, once again, we turn to Jesus 
– the kingdom of God in person. 
Jesus Christ: The Presence of the Kingdom
 To say that Jesus Christ is the foundation of the world and the cause of its historic 
development in human culture means that God’s revelation in the life of Christ recorded in the 
scriptures norms our symphonia. This section thus intends to fill out the framework of the 
symphonic dynamic between the church and the secular by considering concretely the way the 
kingdom of God is present in both. In other words, we can think of how the kingdom is present 
in the secular, but that still does not tell us how to recognize and thus respond to it. Therefore, in 
this section, we point toward the presence of the kingdom in the secular, as well as its absence 
(so to speak), offering some initial criteria for ecclesial engagement (either constructively or 
critically) by looking briefly at the life of him in whom the reign of God’s righteousness was 
made manifest. 
 The following presentation will be limited for two reasons. In the first place, it cannot be 
an exhaustive account of the kingdom of God revealed in Christ because such an account would 
require a thorough christology, which, given the fact that I have already pulled together a number 
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of different strands from the Christian theological tradition in many times and places, would 
make the remainder of this argument both long and unwieldy. In the second place, I do not 
believe an exhaustive account of the kingdom of God in Christ is possible. Exhaustive accounts 
(in the plural) are possible, just not one story. This, because the Bible itself, in a manner of 
speaking, is conscious of its own internal diversity. It offers us at least somewhere between four 
and seven different versions of Jesus (if we count Revelation, parts of Isaiah, and the Psalms). 
Therefore, a single presentation of God’s righteousness in him, no matter how many scriptures it 
quotes, will be unbiblical and must, therefore, be rejected as the new Diatessaron it is. The most 
biblical way to draw criteria for recognizing the presence of the kingdom of God in the secular is 
to offer a few different perspectives on how it was made manifest in him. 
 Therefore, we will look below at three variform but overlapping pictures of the kingdom 
of God in Jesus, keeping things manageable and relevant by focusing on its presence in three 
aspects of life – the political, economic, and communal – in the work of Jürgen Moltmann, M. 
Douglas Meeks, and John Howard Yoder, respectively. Obviously, each theologian is concerned 
with all of those things, and more. They are offered below not as objects of thorough study and 
analysis but heuristic illustrations to serve as jumping-off points for reflecting on the presence of 
the kingdom in the secular today. That is why I have chosen to focus on the kingdom’s presence 
in the economic, political, and communal, for at the opening of this essay I noted that two 
children of the secular to keep in mind are the state and the market. Looking at them will help us 
get a clearer picture of how the church can concretely respond to the presence of the kingdom in 
the secular. Thus, the following summaries will be capped off with a set of observations that 
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draw the presence of Jesus from scripture into our context, and, through Yoder, gesture toward a 
way for the church faithfully to respond to that presence. 
Jürgen Moltmann: The Kingdom of God in the Political
 Among other things, Jürgen Moltmann presents the cross of Christ as a clash between 
two different regimes: the reign of God and the reign of Pilate (which represents hierarchical and 
repressive political systems that provide luxury and security to the few at the suffering of most). 
Moltmann stresses that God is not unaffected by what is happening in the world but, in the cross, 
shows the Trinity to be for those at the margins of society – the fodder of the Roman Empire. 
The triune God is an inherently relational and thus inherently loving being, and so capable of 
suffering both in Godself and with those who suffer.16 Thus, in the cross, God not only suffers 
the sundering of Godself as the Father forsakes the Son, who is justly condemned by the state 
and the law, but God suffers with all who suffer. This is because the resurrection is the 
affirmation of all that God became in the cross. Therefore, in Christ, God not only accepts but 
embraces and affirms the outsider, the poor, the abandoned, and the Godforsaken.17 
 The crucifixion, says Moltmann, happened because, “The gospel of Jesus and his public 
behaviour were political in the extreme.”18 It was a threat to the false peace of the pax Romana, a 
hierarchy of the divine emperor, citizens, slaves, and foreigners, funded and authorized by an 
equally hierarchical pantheon of deities who favored and secured the established order of society 
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(if they were properly reverenced).19 As Messiah, Jesus preached a kingdom that inverted the 
Roman social order. It was a reign in which the poor would be blessed, the hungry filled, and the 
sorrowful masses would rejoice. Those who made their living at the expense of the poor, the 
gluttons, and those who extravagantly celebrated their status would find their fortunes reversed 
when his kingdom arrived (Luke 6:20-26). Mockingly underscoring Pilate’s “defeat” of this 
rebel, and thus the presumed preservation of the old social order, he hung a sign over the head of 
this naked and dying revolutionary (Luke 23:38), proclaiming him the king of the Jews. The 
resurrection begins the overthrow of Rome. In solidarity with the abandoned and Godforsaken 
fodder of society, it announces that, “There is no ‘outside the gate’ with God…if God himself is 
the one who died outside the gate on Golgotha for those who are outside.”20 The margins are 
made central to God’s own life in the resurrection, giving them hope for a new future of God’s 
“liberating love.”21 
 Though I do not agree with every aspect of Moltmann’s christology, he rightly says that 
the cross and resurrection challenge the politics of hierarchy and subjugation, be they Roman 
aristocracy or American plutocracy. As an illustration of this point we might consider Jesus’ 
statement, “Let the little children come to Me, and do not forbid them; for of such is the kingdom 
of God” (Luke 18:16). We often associate children with innocence, but in Jesus’ day a child was 
one who was without status. Nobody was more vulnerable than a child. The vulnerability of the 
Son on the cross shows the triune God to be on the side of those without status. Criminals were 
not the only ones carried out of the city. Trash was also dumped outside the gates. In Moltmann’s 
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delightfully Alexandrian way, we can rightly say that God becomes and vindicates the garbage of 
oppressive regimes of all kinds. In the cross and resurrection of the Son, the triune God lifts up 
that which we dispose, proclaiming that the “darkness” of the old order of things – an existence 
without hope, where one’s life depends on the whim of others – is “passing away” (1 John 2:8).
M. Douglas Meeks: The Kingdom of God in the Economy
 In God the Economist, M. Douglas Meeks applies Moltmann’s juxtaposition of the 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of Pilate to political economy (as distinct from the science of 
economics). In particular, Moltmann’s view that our concepts of God have political implications 
is essential to Meeks’ argument, which extends the former’s point to say that our God-talk also 
has economic implications.22 In particular, Enlightenment Deism, which  has so thoroughly 
impressed itself on the modern American imagination, has given us God-talk that makes our 
economy of scarcity possible, whereas a biblical view of God as Trinity – who identifies with 
“the weak, the foolish, the low and despised” – enables an economy of gift and abundance.23 Our 
modern economy thus tends to conceive of God’s freedom in terms of the market, whereas 
Meeks calls us to re-think the market in terms of God’s freedom. The market depends upon belief 
in an aloof deity, who cannot suffer, and who is unconcerned with human affairs; the Bible 
shows the triune God to be engaged with God’s people, capable of suffering, with concern for the 
weak and powerless.24 
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 Meeks thus offers the history of God in Scripture as a challenge to the god of the market. 
Moltmann above juxtaposed Christ to Pilate, focusing on the cross as the clash of two political 
systems. Meeks is not unconcerned with the cross (insofar as he assumes much of Moltmann’s 
soteriology), but also places great emphasis on what the life of Christ reveals in the context of 
the history of Israel (a shift in Moltmann’s theology visible in The Way of Jesus Christ). Thus, 
Meeks juxtaposes “God’s basileia economy” to Pharaoh’s slave economy, which not only serves 
as a foil for Meeks to develop the content of God’s economy but is also proxy for all economies 
that perpetuate the luxury of a few through the deprivation of the masses (i.e. scarcity 
economies). The Exodus indicates God’s compassion for slaves and desire for their liberation. 
The gift of God’s manna in the desert not only confirms this compassion but is also something of 
a prophetic pronouncement of God’s intention for human economy: that nobody takes more than 
she needs so that everyone is able to survive the day. 
 This subordination of the market to the needs of people challenges “market society,” 
which Karl Polanyi defined as “a whole society embedded in the mechanism of its own 
economy.”25 A market society is impossible without the logic of commodification, which today 
allows not only for the exchange of goods and services but people (i.e. the labor market) and 
nature (i.e. land and housing), fueled by the invention of money (which requires faith). The 
modern market is intended to be a perpetual motion machine, like Paley’s watch.26 It is premised 
on the belief that fairness requires our limited resources to be distributed not according to need, 
but according to those who best understand how this machine works. Such a system is 
192
25 Karl Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, Studies in Social Discontinuity, ed. Harry W. Pearson (New York: Academic 
Press, 1977), 9. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon, 2001 [1944]), passim.
26 See William Paley, “Natural Theology,” in The Works of William Paley (Edinburgh: University Press, 1828).
unthinkable from the perspective of God’s economy. The God of the Bible is one who intervenes. 
On Sinai, God establishes the Torah, which contains rules for the care of the poor and the 
foreigner, as well as a system of regular debt relief and redistribution of resources, called the 
Jubilee, to ensure that those who have much do not have too much and those who have little do 
not have too little.27 
 Jesus thus inherited from his people a long tradition of concern for the poor and the 
suffering of captives. Like his heavenly Father, he shows us the possibility not of an economy of 
scarcity that encourages hoarding, but an economy of gift and abundance. He does this in the 
miracle of feeding the 5,000, which in a way repeats the manna in the wilderness, anticipating a 
future economy where the needs of all are met.28 He does this in the life he lived with his 
disciples, having a common purse and eating common meals. He does this in himself, on the 
night of Jesus’ betrayal, exemplifying that the currency of the kingdom is in giving. There, 
masters serve, giving not just their resources, so the eucharist confirms, but themselves for the 
lives of others.29
 The feasibility of such an economy is beside the point. Meeks does not seem to intend to 
institute a new economic system but to offer a critical alternative to the current one. Certainly, 
some aspects of his history of God have implications for modern economic and social policies. 
Though I do not want to say prematurely what will be addressed in more detail below, the 
kingdom’s economy of sharing has implications for taxation, welfare, and bankruptcy laws, to 
name but a few, but more importantly than an economic system, Meeks offers a vision for a way 
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of life. We work to help realize aspects of God’s economy in this world, but we also live lives of 
economic abundance, giving, and service in the midst of our economy of scarcity. Choosing to 
live an economy of abundance and gift in the midst of such an economy – denying the false 
belief that there is not enough for all to flourish – is already partly to realize God’s kingdom 
ahead of time. 
John Howard Yoder: The Kingdom of God in Community
 This brings us to the work of John Howard Yoder, who attended to the political as well as 
economic implications of the gospel, but focused especially closely on their embodiment in the 
Christian community. I say “community” and not “church” out of deference to Yoder’s 
anabaptism. Naturally, he talked about the church, but he did not have in mind the grand 
institutions that we so commonly associate with that word. He meant a society of the faithful, 
“the believing community.”30 Thinking about the church as a community stresses that following 
Jesus is not to join an institution but to commit to a way of life. This refusal of the church as an 
“house of authority” (to use Edward Farley’s classic term) is, ironically, a conviction present in 
the symphonic ideal as well.31 The power of the church, for Yoder, is principally in the way the 
kingdom of God is miraculously present in it, not institutionally, but through a re-definition and 
re-configuration of things that are quite ordinary toward the kingdom.32 The following summary 
194
30 Yoder, Body Politics, 21.
31 Edward Farley, Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method (philadelphia: fortress, 1982), 165. I 
recognize the irony in comparing a critic of Constantinianism to the Byzantines. See John Howard Yoder, The 
Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984), 135ff.
32 See ibid., 80-101.
of how Jesus establishes a community to continue the work of the kingdom will necessarily 
repeat some points he shares in common with Meeks and Moltmann.33 
 Yoder says the cross is “the confrontation of two social systems” and a “clash between 
two regimes.”34 These terms illustrate a communal emphasis in Yoder’s christology. It is true that 
the cross is what happens when the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Pilate meet, but the 
threat of Jesus, he adds, was not the man himself but his community. Yoder points out, “New 
teachings are no threat, as long as the teacher stands alone; a movement, extending his 
personality in both time and space, presenting an alternative to the structures that were there 
before, challenges the system as no mere words ever could.” Thus, says Yoder, in the crucifixion 
of Christ, Rome declared war not just on a single individual but an entire way of life: the “new 
social reality” of the Christian community that began to gather around him.35 The kingdom of 
God may be present in Jesus Christ, but that does not mean it is confined to him. It naturally 
extends itself beyond this single individual to attract a group of people – the first disciples and 
now us – who begin to live the life he embodied. 
 Yoder’s ecclesiology thus takes shape as a kind of eschatology via negativa. The church 
comes into conflict with its society insofar as its society resists God’s righteousness. The church 
is the community of the faithful who set up the tables of their agape feast at the foot of the cross. 
Its uniqueness is not in its doctrines or worship but its adherence to Christ. Stressing this 
identification of the church with the crucified Christ explains the counter-cultural nature of 
Yoder’s ecclesiology. He does not oppose culture for its own sake but, like Meeks and Moltmann 
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above, stresses the way the kingdom of God, present in Jesus, brought him into conflict with the 
authorities of his day. The church that gathers around the cross will be equally threatening to 
powers that hierarchically establish themselves through domination and violence. 
 The church is unique not because of anything it does but because of its adherence to 
Jesus. This point is especially prominent in Body Politics, where he more or less rejects the 
notion that the church is something mystical. That is not to deny the need for grace or the Holy 
Spirit, but to underscore the point that our identity is dependent upon Christ, who challenged the 
powers of his day precisely by his lowliness. In the desert, Satan tempted Jesus to be more than a 
peasant-teacher, to gather crowds by putting on a show, and to demonstrate his power. In 
resisting these temptations Christ shows his power is in weakness (2 Corinthians 12:9) and his 
wisdom is foolishness to the world (1 Corinthians 1:18). To say that the identity of the church 
comes from him means that the church is equally weak and foolish. Its power is in repeating his 
way of life. In new contexts, we refuse the ethic of violence and domination that led to the 
crucifixion, and so we receive the same treatment Rome gave Jesus. Likewise, as Rome imposed 
its will from the top down, the Christian community rejects such assaults on the divine image 
hierarchy perpetuates.36 In Rome we are called to account for our debts and our offenses. The 
Christian community forgives debtors and goes even further by extending to its members God’s 
own forgiveness in its fellowship.37 Rome forces its will upon others. Christ did not force but 
enticed. He called, and people either freely followed him or they did not. Accordingly, (for 
Yoder) baptism repeats this free invitation to commit oneself to the kingdom, becoming a 
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member of a society in which all are welcome, regardless of sex, class, or race.38 Gathering 
together in his name in love and communion makes him present in the eucharist once more.39 
Yoder’s description of a sacrament underscores the power of the church to embody Christ in 
seemingly ordinary things like non-hierarchical and non-violent relationships. Yoder says a 
sacrament is a human actions in which God acts.40 The church is unique in this sacramental 
sense: we commit ourselves to a way of life that Christ makes possible. 
 Yoder’s view that the power of the church is in the habits Christ creates in it is correct. 
Though I do not share his juxtaposition between the ordinary and the miraculous when it comes 
to the sacraments, he is right to see the church as the continuation of the “ethic” (so to speak) of 
the kingdom into the present. Actually, there is a great deal in common between Yoder and the 
symphonic perspective. His basic understanding of the Christian community and the Byzantine 
ideal see conflict with society as a function of eschatology – culture’s conformity to the 
kingdom. Yoder happens to possess what we might call different ecclesiological “prejudices” (a 
term I do not mean pejoratively but in the sense that one’s background shapes how one views 
history), which lead him to see a greater degree of conflict between church and society than this 
essay assumes. Yoder will come up again in a moment, as we see how symphonia takes place 
between the church and the secular, but in light of the above I first want to outline some basic 
criteria for seeing God’s reign in secular society today. 
Seven Observations about the Kingdom of God in Jesus in the Secular 
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 I have summarized the above three thinkers because the point of symphonia is to see the 
presence of the kingdom of God in culture. This requires a sense of what the kingdom of God 
looks like, which Jesus reveals in himself. Moltmann, Meeks, and Yoder see implications of that 
reign for the present, rippling out beyond their particular historical instantiation in Jesus himself, 
a sense that culminates in what we might call the communal christology of Yoder. In Moltmann, 
we see that God’s reign challenges the politics of oppression, and Meeks makes a case for what 
can be called a basileic economy not only of sufficiency but abundant sharing, both of which, 
Yoder shows us, are to be embodied in the faithful. From this perspective we can see that the 
purpose of the work of Christ was to make the kingdom of God happen not only in but beyond 
himself. 
 The last section having concluded a conceptual construct for seeing the kingdom of God 
at work in the secular through its own grounding in Jesus, I want to offer some observations for 
recognizing its presence in the following pages. I focused on the above three themes with this 
intent in mind, for the shape of our society is largely determined by the configuration, 
negotiation, and coordination of market, political, and social interests, which offers a fairly 
comprehensive and comprehendible perspective on how the kingdom of God might be made 
manifest in our modern, secular society and, thusly, how we might respond to it.41 Obviously, the 
following cannot locate all the manifestation of God’s unfolding reign in our secular culture, but 
the above can give us partial glimpses of it and suggest means of response to it. 
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 In Jesus, the kingdom of God is for the disposables.42 America is not that different from 
Rome. We may produce more trash than any other country in the world, but consumable goods 
are not the only thing we dispose of with barely a second thought. We throw away people, too. 
We support our extravagant lifestyles (by the rest of the world’s standards) through wage slavery 
and sweatshop labor, the modern serfdom of peasant farming in our global economy, and 
pillaging the earth of its natural resources. Keeping our goods cheap requires keeping our labor 
poor and trying not to think too much about where our food and clothing came from. The reign 
of God in Jesus Christ cries out against such practices. Not giving much thought to the people 
used up in the machine of our global economy makes us like the crowds who passed by the three 
crosses on the way to Jerusalem. Maybe we actively spit upon the Godforsaken, but more often 
than not we try not to look at them so that we can go about our business. 
 We glimpse the kingdom of God at work in individuals and institutions that point to the 
suffering masses and remind us in some way or another that they too bear God’s image (even if 
they would not put it quite that way). The kingdom of God is at work when people begin to trace 
the origins of their goods, to humanize the global economy and the policies that perpetuate it by 
including the stories of their producers in the products we buy. We glimpse the kingdom when 
people begin to trace the origins of their foods or participate in CSAs, in living wage movements, 
and even something as minor as the proliferation of compost bins. The presence of Jesus Christ 
in the Godforsaken puts a face to those whom it is so easy for us to throw away. We see the 
kingdom when a person looks in the face a man who wears and eats what others have worn and 
eaten, shakes his hand, and asks his name – who sees Christ in the disposables. 
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 In Jesus, the kingdom of God is for the political prisoner and the tortured.43 Let us not 
forget that Christ was branded an enemy of the state and a dangerous radical. He was mocked, 
and he was tortured.44 The gospels say he was falsely accused and convicted with only shaky 
evidence (Matthew 26:60). Of course, crime must be punished. Jesus did not liberate the 
criminals to his right or left (in a certain sense of the word), but there is a difference between 
punitive correction and baseless detention. There is a difference between forgiving a crime and 
excusing one. To the Romans, Jesus was a foreigner and an uncivilized barbarian. For them and 
us, he is just part of a faceless mass, standing behind barbed wire in an orange jumpsuit with a 
bag over his head. 
 We glimpse the kingdom of God in the lawyer who works pro bono to bring some hope 
and the promise of a future to a political prisoner others brand a dangerous radical. We see it in 
representatives and activists who risk their own careers and reputations daring to speak on behalf 
of the extremist. We see it in the reporter who gets leaked photos of the tortured and in the staffer 
who leaks them. The kingdom of God is at work among those who bear witness to the fact that 
even those we fear, perhaps even rightly, still bear the image of God and are therefore worthy of 
our compassion and love. 
 In Jesus, the kingdom of God is life-giving abundance.45 The history of God with Israel, 
both in the desert and in Jesus, is antithetical to the gravitation of wealth toward those at the 
upper-echelons of society. Possessing more money than one can ever spend in her lifetime is the 
epitome of hoarding. When some of the Israelites tried to do this with the manna in the 
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wilderness, they found that it had spoiled overnight (Exodus 16:20), showing that the 
extravagance and waste of unused abundance leads to corruption and decay. Though there is 
death in poverty there is also a kind of slow, hidden death in unjust wealth. “But woe to you who 
are rich,” Jesus said, “For you have received your consolation” (Luke 6:24). Those who find 
present consolation in wealth are to be pitied because hoarding rots the soul. That is why some 
children born into privilege can lack the capacity to empathize with the disposables in society, 
even going so far as to lay most of the blame for their problems on their own bad behavior or 
alleged incompetence, blind to the sadly ironic fact that many of the rich have similar problems 
(such as addictions or other destructive behaviors) as those at the bottom of society, only their 
money is able to protect them from the consequences of their long, slow suicide. This can make 
repentance difficult to impossible. The rich are not exempt from suffering in an economy of 
scarcity (even though their suffering does not compare with that of the poor).
 True economies of giving defy the fear that makes us hoard and the eroding effects it can 
have on the soul. An economy where each attends to the needs of the other is rich in the widest 
possible sense of the term. Jesus is often depicted as preaching poverty. In truth, he preached 
poverty for some who clung to wealth, like the rich young ruler (Matthew 19:16ff). But Jesus did 
not Romanticize the poor. He was also a laborer. He knew poverty (the sacrifice his parents 
offered after his birth was a sacrifice made by the poor, Luke 2:24). Yet, in spite of this fact, 
Jesus is never depicted as struggling to get by with his disciples. He and his disciples had 
abundant resources, celebrating so much that he even developed a bit of a reputation (Luke 
7:34). He celebrated because being with others and enjoying God’s bounty is also a foretaste of 
the life to come. By giving one learns that the currency of the kingdom is not silver or gold, but 
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the rarer commodities of love, joy, peace, and fellowship, goods lacking among those who find 
security in their wealth. This is the currency of the kingdom of God (Matthew 6:19-20), some of 
which is on deposit in the community of the faithful. 
 Therefore, we glimpse the kingdom of God in acts of philanthropia, even though, in the 
grand scheme of things, the woman who buys a sandwich for a beggar is probably not greatly 
contributing to his quality of life. It is a poor financial “investment,” but that assumes that 
investing is the point of giving. Giving brings God’s reign close to us. It offers hope and the 
vision of a different kind of future. Every time we resist the urge to hoard by forcing our hands to 
give of our resources, we begin trading in the treasure of the kingdom. Even small acts of 
philanthropia, bestowed not on ourselves but with others so that they may experience something 
of the joy of heaven on earth, remind us not to worry. God cares for the lilies, so God will care 
for us (Luke 12:27). The things we need shall be added to us as well (Matthew 6:33). 
 In a similar way, we even glimpse the kingdom of God in celebratory extravagance. 
Celebration is essential to living in the light of God’s reign, for Jesus said the kingdom of God 
would be a celebration (Matthew 26:29) and a feast (Matthew 22:1ff)! Angels rejoice when a lost 
sinner comes to repentance (Luke 15:10). When we celebrate with each other, we celebrate life, 
which his a foretaste of the abundant life to come in God’s reign.  
 For this reason, in Jesus, the kingdom of God is living without fear.46 We hoard because 
we are afraid. Falling into the zero-sum mentality that is the stock and trade of economies of 
scarcity, we see others as a threat to our prosperity, and thus maybe even our very lives. But 
God’s reign is life lived to its fullest.47 In the economy of God, everyone will have enough, but 
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nobody will have too much. Nobody will go to bed wondering how they will get their next meal. 
No mother will skip dinner so that her child may eat; she will never have to decide between food 
and medicine. In the modern vernacular, God’s righteousness means that everybody has an 
inalienable right to live. 
 We thus glimpse the kingdom in those who help people not to be afraid. The kingdom is 
in churches that have become inns for the homeless. It is in doctors who provide free medical 
services on the weekends. We see the kingdom in a representative who resists pressure to cut 
funding for food stamps to fund wars of choice, and we see it when we forgive suffocating debt 
because debt makes people slaves (Proverbs 22:7). The slave has no security because nothing he 
has is his. We thus glimpse God’s reign when nations decide that losing a drop in the bucket of 
their annual budget is worth improving the quality of life for millions in the two-thirds world.
 In Jesus, the Kingdom of God is in the ordinary. Yoder helped us to see that the power of 
God’s reign is not in those things wherewith the devil tempted Jesus. The kingdom is not 
mystical or magical but begins to be embodied in some of the ways just mentioned. The kenosis 
of Christ means that we have to recognize him. This was true not only for his own people but for 
us as well. Not everyone followed him. The kingdom, they knew, cannot look like a Galilean 
(John 1:46) whose closest disciples smell like sweat mixed with fish. Even his hometown, when 
Jesus announced the beginning of God’s reign, were so incensed by what they heard that (after 
their initial awe wore off) they tried to throw him over a cliff (Luke 4:29). We are at no less of a 
disadvantage than those Nazarenes. For us, the kingdom of God is something that has to be 
recognized as well. Their challenge is our challenge: When we meet the kingdom of God, not to 
throw it over a cliff. 
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 Because of this challenge, in the final place, in Jesus, the kingdom of God is in the 
church. Though Yoder did not want the church to shut out society, he did focus on the way the 
kingdom in the church challenges society. It is important to remember that just because the reign 
of God grows to fruition in the world does not mean it is absent from us. To say that would be to 
place the church on the same footing as the secular and thus re-inscribe the problem of sophic 
ambiguity in a different form. We love the world not for its own sake but because of Christ who 
brings his reign to fruition in it. Experiencing God’s reign in the midsts of our sisters and 
brothers teaches us to recognize and respond to that reign in the world. In this movement from 
our experience of the kingdom of God in the church to its presence in the world we see a modern 
instantiation of the Byzantine pattern. Our symphonia takes place in this interactive movement 
from the church to the secular, seeking to discern the presence of the kingdom of God through 
the resources and wisdom of the Christian community. 
Conclusion: Symphonia in the Narthex
 The observations of the previous section show us that some measure of symphonia 
already happens. The church engages and supports formally secular organizations and 
movements because we somehow feel they are “good” and “right.” The foregoing has attempted 
to account for such engagements ecclesiologically. In particular, it has tried to conceive of a 
more coherent alternative to a postliberal foil by explaining how such engagement does not 
violate but is a part of the unique identity of the church. Therefore, we shall bring this argument 
to a close first by showing how the preceding presentation responds to the challenge of Milbank 
and Hauerwas’ counterpositional ecclesiologies, which will help us, in the second place, see how 
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symphonia can offer a more coherent account for the inevitable interactions of the church and the 
secular. 
An Ecclesiological Alternative
 Calling to mind our critical foil once more can help us get a clearer picture of the 
symphonic alternative by way of contrast. There is no need to rehearse in detail the arguments of 
previous chapters, save to remind ourselves that postliberalism focuses on a return to the 
narratives of the church, which appears especially strongly in Milbank and Hauerwas (insofar as 
they repeat aspects of Lindbeck’s thought) as a focus on the church itself over and against its 
surrounding culture, in our case secular culture. Thus, the church “absorbs” the secular, meaning 
that it interprets secular culture through the lens either of its texts and traditions (Hauerwas) or its 
ongoing, self-correcting history (Milbank). For the church to see the world only out from within 
its narratives – which is to see the world out from within itself – makes the church not really 
secular. This interpretive meniscus – bolstered by an eschatology that collapses the church into 
its future perfection – thus acts as a kind of shield against the disintegrating effects secular 
society can have on traditional Christian practice, except that this seeming protection comes at 
the cost of consistency. Christian cognitive dissonance refers not just to an inconsistency of 
practice and belief but the promotion of such a “disconnect” by effectively blinding us to the 
ways we do engage and tacitly support that which we profess to oppose.
 The foregoing description of the kingdom’s presence in Jesus Christ makes such an 
understanding of the church’s relationship to its narratives and its culture extremely difficult to 
maintain. As the foundation of the world, Jesus Christ is its internal logic. As the future of the 
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world, he is the coming kingdom. This perspective renders history as the the unfolding of the 
logic of creation on the way toward its eschatological culmination. Nature, human societal 
development, and everything involved in their interaction are taken up in his coming reign. 
 A disagreement Jürgen Moltmann had with the political theology of Karl Barth can help 
unpack the significance of this christonormative view of history for the church. Moltmann takes 
a critical stance toward Barth’s notion that the we must look for “parables” and 
“correspondences” of the kingdom of God when dealing with the political realities of this world. 
He agrees with the sentiment but not the description, saying, “It would probably be more 
appropriate to history to regard these correspondences not as parables of what is perfect, but as 
anticipations and promises in the process of realization, in which the ultimate announces itself in 
the penultimate and the unconditional in the conditioned.”48 The disagreement with Barth is thus 
over whether, when we glimpse the kingdom in society, we see the kingdom itself. The language 
of correspondence implies a separation between the kingdom and the world, which Moltmann 
rejects. The kingdom is present in the world around us, but in a kind of preliminary form. From 
the broad view of creation grounded in Christ I have put forward, we can say that history itself 
contains “anticipations and promises in the process of realization” (emphasis mine). 
 To further illustrate this point by adapting the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares 
(Matthew 13:24-30), we can say that the seeds of the kingdom of God grow up in the field of 
human history. Though Augustine used this parable to argue for the doctrine of the “invisible” 
church, seeing creation itself as God’s field expands the meaning of this parable beyond the 
church.49 The seeds of the kingdom grow up in the universal history of human cultural 
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development. During this process, we can sometimes begin to see the differences between the 
wheat and the weeds, but to attempt to separate them ahead of time damages the church. 
 Returning to the matter at hand, grounding creation in the Word and orienting its 
development toward the kingdom means there can be no absolute limits placed on what may be 
the growth of the seeds of the kingdom in the world – particularly in the historical progress of 
human society and culture – ahead of time. This inclusiveness renders any attempt to conceive of 
the church in a way that shuts out society’s influence potentially to shut ourselves off from the 
work of the Word that is happening there. It is to attempt to pluck the weeds before the harvest is 
ready, thus failing to see how aspects of God’s reign may be partly present among us.
 Yet, the revelation of our future in Jesus Christ means that, even though we can no longer 
simply assert ourselves against the secular, we are not at the mercy of culture. We can begin to 
see differences between the kingdom of God and creaturely fallenness because our hope for the 
future has already arrived ahead of time. The church can judge the world in humble anticipation 
of the final judgment by turning to the biblical witness to Jesus, and it can be more certain of its 
judgments the more pronounced the difference is between the present situation of society and 
God’s coming righteousness (but we should also be mindful of the fact that to judge the world in 
this way is also for the church – which is a mixed body – to judge itself, as well as to be subject 
to the judgment of the world around it, for “with the measure you use, it will be measured back 
to you,” Matthew 7:2). Therefore, we can no more uncritically accept the secular than we can 
uncritically reject it. He to whom the Scripture bears witness testifies in himself to the future the 
world shares with us. In a world that is fallen, the arc of Christ’s life thus guides our engagement 
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by calling our attention to aspects of our present culture that conform to the reign of God’s 
righteousness, and, alternatively, those that do not. 
 Even so, the witness of Christ in scripture to the unfolding of the kingdom in the present 
is not always clear. It is still something we must discern. In this act of discernment a more 
consistent vision of the narthex takes shape. We find ourselves between the presence of Christ in 
the world and the presence of Christ in the witness of our narratives. Fr. Alexander Schmemann 
once said, “[T]he kingdom of God is the content of the Christian faith – the goal, the meaning 
and the content of the Christian life.”50 If this statement is true, and the kingdom happens in the 
secular, then the secular is rightly constitutive for the identity of the church today, at least to a 
point. The disciple engages the secular not for its own sake, but because she is looking for the 
presence of the kingdom of God in it. The need to discern throws her back upon the narratives of 
her community, seeking for analogues in scripture whereby she might locate and water the seeds 
of the kingdom in her society. In this way, the secular is included in the narratives of the church 
insofar as it raises the questions which we turn to the witness of scripture, within the context of 
our interpreting community, to answer. Our narratives, in turn, send us back to the world to tend 
to the presence of the kingdom in it. To go even a step further than that: if the kingdom of God is 
the content of the church, then insofar as the kingdom is present in the secular, the secular is the 
content of the church, too. 
 This partial constitution by the secular, conditioned by the kingdom of God in it, does not 
present a challenge to ecclesial identity but relocates it. Our identity as the church does not come 
to us simply from our narratives but the creative interactions of these narratives with our culture, 
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for as the secular sends us to our narratives to discover our identity in Jesus Christ, we discover 
that he is not confined to our text but is also present in our world. Thus, we are sent back into the 
secular to find and to nurture the seeds of the kingdom of God in it. Accordingly, we can only 
even speak about identity in a “tongue-in-cheek” kind of way. Our identity in the present is 
always changing as a result of this interaction because who we are as the church comes to us as 
our past narratives meet our present context and both are illuminated by a future that has not yet 
fully arrived. 
 Christian cognitive dissonance is what happens when discernment is exchanged for a 
constant critique, wherein we do not admit the ways we support the secular and are influenced by  
it. The preceding account addresses this problem by locating the identity of the church not 
simply in its narratives. Rather, the need to discern the presence of the kingdom of God in the 
world requires a constant return to the revelation of God’s future in Jesus. We thus inhabit an 
oscillating dynamic between our narratives and our culture. Acknowledging the inevitability of 
this interaction with the secular, without being uncritically open to it, allows for the conscious 
incorporation of aspects of culture into the church, still subordinating this process to our 
reception of God’s coming reign seen in the scriptures. This keeps the narratives of the church 
primary without presuming a false unidirectionality between those narratives and the culture that 
positions our reading of them. 
 I said earlier that this process of engagement and incorporation was inevitable. 
Recognizing this interaction between our narratives – interpreted in the context of the worshiping 
community – and the secular keeps us honest about the fact that we are formed by both without 
losing what it is that makes us unique, namely our commitment to the kingdom of God. So we 
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are able to recognize that we are shaped by the secular and support it without this necessarily 
being a problem for us. Or, to put it differently, we can resist Christian cognitive dissonance if 
we are upfront about the fact that who we are is no more the product of our narratives than our 
society but their interaction in the ongoing story of the church. In a certain sense, our identity is 
found in our narthex.
A New Symphonia
 This creative interaction is our symphonia. Symphonia is about constructively 
triangulating the church’s interactions with society under the kingdom of God. The foregoing 
understanding of history, as being driven by its foundation in Jesus Christ toward the kingdom, 
thus partly manifesting it in the present, enables us to see the seeds of God’s reign sprouting in 
the secular. This perspective incorporates our inevitable engagement with the secular into our 
own self-understanding in the way I just described, so that what it means to be the church is to 
support the secular and even to be influenced by it, insofar as these actions are conditioned by 
the proleptic realization of the kingdom of God within it.
  We saw for the Byzantines that the idealized harmony they sought between church and 
state was the adaptation of the early church’s eschatological imperative to embody God’s reign 
for an imperial context. As such, so the sophiologists showed us, it does not require a formally 
Christian state, only the recognition that the kingdom of God is present in society and that the 
church is more than its institutions. In the above schema, the secular plays for us the part played 
by the emperor of Byzantium. The question is not whether to engage the secular but how. 
Tactically, the Byzantines offer us the helpful model of provisional triumphalism and situational 
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sectarianism for thinking about how it is we relate to the secular. We can promote the secular 
whenever we see it promoting the reign of God’s righteousness, the triumph of life over death, 
and the incorporation of the margins into the center of society. Likewise, we can oppose the 
secular when it is domineering, hierarchical, and perpetuating itself through the consumption of 
human fodder. Furthermore, insofar as we are the body of Christ, we can have some measure of 
confidence in our capacity to discern the difference between a world that is laboring to give birth 
to its own renewal, and a world that fights against its own future. The presence of Christ in our 
midsts reminds us that this world will one day be a place where the last are first, where the naked 
are clothed, where the poor are fed, and where tax collectors and prostitutes have their dignity. 
Anything else requires our resistance.
 Like our Byzantine forebears, we stand between withdrawal on the one hand, and 
embrace on the other. Yet, unlike them, these scales cannot be balanced in any kind of “official” 
way. The balance of symphonia must happen within ourselves, in particular within the local 
church as we discern “on a case by case basis” (so to speak) how to respond to a kingdom we 
believe is coming to fruition in this still fallen world. I have said, symphonia today can only be 
an ecclesiology. Of course, I have not presented an entire ecclesiology, but a part of it. 
Symphonia is an ecclesiology for the narthex. It is about being the church in a liminal space. 
Only, in this case, the space is us. Like the narthex, we are both church and world at once. 
 We constructively support the secular by attending to the presence of the kingdom of God 
in it. This de-centers the church, so to speak, locating our mission not in the perpetuation of some 
kind of stable construct of our imagined identity, but in our tending to the anticipatory growth of 
God’s reign in the world. Discerning the kingdom in the dynamic that takes place in the narthex 
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is what allows us to be sent – like migrant workers (Matthew 9:37) – to nurture the green shoots 
of the kingdom of God within secular society. Yet it is precisely our prioritization of the kingdom 
that enables us to withdraw again into our own particularity. Just as the Byzantine faithful bore 
witness against the emperor, remembering that we embrace the world not in itself but for the 
sake of the kingdom in it enables us to withdraw again into our own particularity, resisting a 
world that is in many ways still captive to the powers of sin and death. We are able to bear such 
witness because a people that looks for the beginning of God’s reign in the world need not forget 
that the church is still the body of Christ and a foretaste of the life to come.
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